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against the Great Russian hegemony.) The Ukrainian enthusiasts of 423
'cultural acheivements' so recently lauded by Kaganovich himself 474
were now accused of 'maintaining relations with nationalist political organizations in Galicia'. And it was not difficult to prove their connections with open or secret organizations 'suffering under the yoke of Poland'. The existence of such connections had been tolerated and even favoured by the Soviet administration to the extent which they furthered Communist propagandist activities in Poland, but there could be no difficulty, if necessary, in treating them as treason.

In 1930 the first Ukrainian political trial took place in Kharkov. 668
A group of individuals were accused of having relations with 'the 674
Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine'—the same organization 661
which had been created before the war under the protection of the Austro-Hungarian Government and which was now supposed to be functioning in Galicia. In the following year, as a result of the growing resistance of the peasants to collectivization, action against Ukrainian 'suspects' became more violent. The peasants were bitterly opposed to the *kolkhozy*, but certainly not on 'national' grounds. Faced with the imminent danger of a peasant revolt, the Soviet administration decided to eliminate all persons who through their origins could be considered to be connected with the peasantry and who might organize this revolt and become its leaders. Regardless of their loyalty to the Soviet régime during the preceding years, there now began a systematic destruction of Ukrainians belonging to the 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'.

In 1931 the Bolsheviks professed to have 'discovered' a Ukrainian 661
organization called 'the National Centre'. Holubovich (former 687
head of the *Rada* Government and participator in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations), Shershel, Mazurenko and other 'ex-politicians' were accused of being the leaders of this secret organization. They were shot. Thousands of arrests followed, the victims of which suffered execution or exile to labour camps which were themselves living cemeteries. Two years later, in 1933, the political police (G.P.U.) declared that they had discovered a real military conspiracy on the part of 'a secret military organization'. After a theatrical trial, Kotsubinsky (Vice-President of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars), Kovnar (Commissar for Agriculture), and scores of other persons who had all occupied important posts in the army or the administration were shot. One of the most prominent figures in Ukrainian political life, who from the beginning had associated himself with the Communist Revolution and who had for a long time been an influential member of the Council of People's Com-

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●66' 687 missars, Skrypnik, committed suicide in July 1933 in order to avoid arrest.

In that same year Postyshev replaced Kaganovich as 'dictator' in the Ukraine (he only occupied the position of 2nd Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party). He arrived with orders 'to make an end of the counter-revolution that had woven itself a nest in the Ukraine'. The speech which Postyshev delivered at the 12th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party, soon after entering on his office, indicated the new line of Soviet policy.

'In Ukraine our leading Party members and Comrade Stalin himself are specially hated. The class enemy has been to a good school in this country and has learned how to struggle against Soviet rule. In Ukraine have settled the remnants of many counter-revolutionary parties and organizations. Kharkov has gradually become the centre of attraction for all sorts of nationalistic and other counter-revolutionary organizations. They have all been drawn to this centre and they have spread their webs all over the Ukraine, making use of our Party system for their own ends. You remember, Comrades, when twenty Secretaries of Party Regional Committees dared to declare that it was impossible to fulfil the Harvest Plan' (nos. 15–21 of the *Proletarian*, Kharkov, 1934). At the same Congress the chief of the Ukrainian G.P.U., Beletsky, read a report in which he declared that 'Imperialists, through agents and through the remnants of the inimical classes which we have not destroyed and to which belong all the *kulak* and 'Petlyurian' elements of the Ukrainian villages, will yet prepare in the country criminal activities and diversions against the principal objects of our Ukrainian Economic Plan' (*ibid.*). Beletsky then proceeded to read aloud a proclamation which was supposed to have been seized by the G.P.U. and according to which Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries were 'dreaming about the denationalization of the whole of Ukrainian industry and the re-establishment of large landownership'.

Accusations of this type were of course inventions of the G.P.U., but the speeches of the head of this grim organization and of his political chief Postyshev indicate that the new policy of the Soviets was directed to the destruction both of the institution of private property among the Ukrainian peasants and of their national characteristics of stubborn individualism and love of freedom.

Postyshev had been given two problems to tackle: the first was to root out 'the counter-revolution' alleged to be lurking in the Soviet administration and in the Communist Party in the Ukraine;

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the second was to crush the will of the peasantry. In the first he 661 ●
succeeded as best he could and added to the sensational trials of 487
1931–3 the discovery of 'a secret Ukrainian organization' which was accused of being in direct touch with the Ukrainian separatists who were working abroad under the leadership of Colonel Konovalets. It was, however, beyond the strength of Postyshev to cope with the chaos which reigned in rural Ukraine during the years 1932–4 as a result of the policy of forced collectivization. Despite the fact that Postyshev 'eliminated' from the Ukrainian Communist Party over a quarter of its total strength, and in spite of thousands of arrests and hundreds of executions, the Party Secretary was accused of 'weakness and lack of energy' and was replaced by a certain Kossior. The late 'dictator' was, after a lapse of time, himself arrested and probably shot together with many of his closest collaborators.

But all the cruel personal dramas which took place under the 4791
Secretaryships of Postyshev and Kossior were as nothing compared
to the terrible miseries which overtook the Ukrainian countryside 661
during the five years 1930–35 as a result of the introduction of the 433
kolkhozy. In their very essence *kolkhozy* were organically opposed to all the traditions and ways of life of the Ukrainian peasantry. Collective farming on a large scale was carried through at the cost of ruining small and 'average' peasant farms through the instrument of the ruthless pressure of the administration. The very rapid development of 'the *kolkhoz* movement' so much admired by Communists all the world over was the result, not of the peasants voluntarily joining the collective farms, but of their being driven on to them often by the use of military force—a fact which Stalin himself acknowledged in his article 'Head-turning from Success' (*Pravda*, 2 March 1930). The immediate consequence of the *kolkhoz* policy was seen in the lowering of agricultural production throughout the whole country which quickly led to the increasing misery of the peasantry, famine and terrible mortality. One of the principal reasons of all this was the *mania grandiosa* which always characterizes the policy of extreme ideologues; having become convinced of the low productive capacity of the smaller *kolkhozy* already set up, the enthusiasts of the Communist Party, in 1930, demanded their enlargement on a 'gigantic' scale. According to the reliable testimony of a member of the Communist Party (the Ukrainian agronomist Mirkevich, the initiator of tractor stations) 'this measure, in a series of regions, was realized in an exceptionally bureaucratic and senseless manner. *Kolkhozy* of 55–100 hectares were suddenly transformed, without any adequate technical preparation, into

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474 *kolkhozy* covering some tens of thousands of hectares; as, for
●661 instance, the *Kolkhoz* of "Chervony Perekop" in the Government
423 of Kherson which was set up to comprise 50,000 hectares. In some cases, "to simplify matters", a whole region containing hundreds of villages was declared to constitute one *kolkhoz*. All the boundaries between village lands were abolished; then the whole expanse of land arbitrarily included in the *kolkhoz* was divided into farms of several thousand hectares each—without any regard as to where the villages actually lay. Cattle and agricultural machinery were scattered about over scores of kilometres' (*Pravda*, 3 April 1930).

Nevertheless Stalin declared that: 'The time has come to finish with every kind of camouflage: we must destroy the *kulaks* and deprive them of the possibility to work on the land.' At that moment anyone who owned three cows or the equivalent in sheep, pigs, or even chickens, was considered to be a *kulak*. As a result of this policy it was not long before all the larger and more prosperous peasant farms were destroyed. These farms, since the disappearance of the large private estates, had been the principal producers of the agricultural surplus, since it was only the better-off farmers who had a surplus in excess of their needs for disposal in the towns.

474 As early as 1930 the policy of forced collectivization provoked
661 open resistance in the Ukraine, and attempts were made at armed
423 revolt; but geographical conditions did not favour the type of
668 guerilla warfare which was undertaken with considerable determination and success by the peasants in Georgia, and particularly in the Armenian district of Karabagh and by the Tartars of the Daghestan foothills. These agrarian risings in the Ukraine were suppressed with the greatest cruelty and were followed by mass executions and by the transportation of tens of thousands of peasants. The Soviets applied methods which were then almost new in their struggle with the Ukrainian peasantry; they put them into concentration camps where they had to do forced labour. In the region of Odessa, near Tiraspol, a large and prosperous colony of 'Old Believers' completely disappeared. All the men, with the exception of a few youngsters who managed to cross the Dniestr into Bessarabia, were transported, and the women and children simply scattered over the steppe. The construction of the White Sea Canal, so much advertised by the admirers of Soviet methods in Western Europe, cost the lives of many tens of thousands of peasants, as the vast cemeteries along the banks of the northern lakes and rivers bear witness.

Very often the prospect of transportation to the far north or to Siberia caused the peasants, as in old time, to abandon everything

and to wander off into the steppe 'where the eyes look'. Until the 474
Bolsheviks erected barbed wire all along the frontier, the Volhynian 661
peasants used to cross the Polish border in large bodies with their 423
women and children and cattle—sometimes a thousand strong and
more—with the merciless detachments of the G.P.U. hot in pursuit, 668
held off by an armed rear-guard. According to reports appearing in the Polish Press in 1932 great numbers of these fugitive peasants were held in quarantine camps in Poland. At the same time gangs of fugitives from Central Russia and the Ukraine made their way into Transcaucasia under the leadership of ex-soldiers; conditions here, where a struggle against forced collectivization was also in progress, were little better than in the Ukraine, and large numbers, Russians and Tartars and Tats from the Talish region, forced their way across the Araks frontier into the northern provinces of Iran.

The abolition of small and 'average' farming, the disorganization 731
in the newly formed *kolkhozy*, the passive resistance of the peasants, 166
and the bestial brutality of the methods which accompanied the 661
enforcement of the new system, brought about the famine of 1932–3. The first news of famine in the Ukraine came from the Polish frontier in the autumn of 1932. It became known that domestic animals were perishing wholesale and that the mortality among the population was enormous. Already, even in the summer, there was no more bread in the Ukraine. Millions of human beings were set in motion. Part of these great crowds infested the towns in the hope of being able to survive until the next harvest. But the main flow of movement was directed towards the northern Caucasus, the regions beyond the Volga, Siberia and Turkestan. In many districts only the old people remained where they were in the hope of somehow surviving on potatoes. There were wide districts which were almost completely abandoned by the population. Whole villages went to ruin, and the once prosperous gardens and fields were abandoned to weeds.

Early in 1933, before the time of spring sowing, orders were issued to drive back the migrant hordes by force to their villages. Great numbers of peasants who were arrested and coralled in camps died because they were not fed. Those who returned to their lands, sick and hungry, found that they had to set to work with spades and staves because only about a fifth part of the horses remained and most of these were too weak to work. A particular foreign correspondent 131
who obtained permission to travel in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Kharkov and Poltava in the autumn of 1933, affirms that, according to statements which were made to him in the offices of the local administrations, about 10 per cent of the population of

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731 South-Eastern Russia died of hunger in the first months of 1933. As in 1921–2 numerous cases of cannibalism were recorded.

665 In spite of this vast tragedy, self-satisfied and triumphant speeches were a feature of the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets which met at ●661 Kharkov in 1935. 'For glorious Ukraine the last years have been, as in the rest of our country, a period of brilliant unheard of achievements. The rapacious rural *kulak* class has been completely destroyed, annihilated. Never will the heroism of those days be forgotten! Never will the loathing against the oppressors disappear! Those were not idle words which Lenin wrote when he affirmed that the principal enemy of our Bolshevism is the peasant! Thousands of the best sons of our country have lost their lives in the great and ruthless struggle.' 'Against this enemy', in the words of *Pravda*, 'the economic structure which carries along with it joyous culture and a happy life to millions of Ukrainians suffering for centuries from privations has at last triumphed in the country.' Stalin's revolutionary Communist régime proved, as ever, logical. If 'thousands of the best sons of our country' had really lost their lives in 'the great and ruthless struggle' against the peasantry, the peasants had to count their losses in millions.

000 But notwithstanding the brilliant victory proclaimed on the internal front in 1935 the Soviet Government had new reasons for anxiety in the radical change which had taken place in the European situation as a result of the attainment of power by the Nazi Party in Germany. The official doctrine of the Nazi Government was based on 'the right of the German people to an adequate living space', and the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler, in search of a better and happier future, was taking a dangerous interest in the east and south-east of Europe. It was now nearly twenty years since *Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*; and the glib attribution of the military catastrophe of Germany in the last war to the evils of Marxism had had the result of reviving in a new generation of Germans all those vague aspirations after world dominion which recur from time to time to compensate that unfortunate people for the frustration which has been their historical lot.

In glowing passages in *Mein Kampf* Adolf Hitler had waxed lyrical on the subject of the Ukraine and the Urals, and the Führer seemed prepared to abandon the oceanic and colonial dreams of William II in favour of a continental imperialism which might carry the Germans into Asia in the first great movement in history of a people from west to east. In 1934 the ten years' Non-Aggression Pact concluded between Germany and Poland appeared to Soviet statesmen to be the first step towards a collaboration in the east at

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the expense of the Soviet Union in which the dream of a revived 000 *Rzecz Pospolita* (never absent from the mind of the ageing Piłsudski) might be combined with a German *Drang nach Osten* which could give to the Third Reich effective predominance over a great economic land empire stretching beyond the Don and the Caucasus to Turkestan and the Altai. At the same time the German understanding with Japan threatened the Far Eastern dominions of the Soviet Union.

'The Ukrainian Question' began to be discussed in the German 662 Press, and from 1934 'the foreign danger' ceased to be only a conventional formula at Soviet political trials. The uneasy masters of the Kremlin began to believe in its reality. The memoirs of the ex-Chekist Krivitski have made it clear that from an early date after Hitler's accession to power Stalin was planning to create a situation in which he might be able to arrive at a compromise with his adversary in Berlin—an event which was eventually consummated between the two parties in August 1939.

A direct collaboration with the Russians, as an alternative to joint aggression with Poland, had always attracted influential circles in Germany—circles which included the majority of those soldiers, technicians and business men who, during the Rapallo period, when many Germans were employed as specialists in Russia, had had excellent opportunities for forming a clear appreciation of realities in the Soviet Union. Many connections, direct and indirect, existed between these men and high officials in the Soviet armed forces, administration and industry.

The unsurpassed genius of Stalin for political manœuvre was 661 never better illustrated than when he succeeded in annihilating all those elements most likely to be in—or in the future to enter into—relations with the Germans. Thus, at the same time, he was able to deprive the Germans of their potential collaborators, and was himself able to assume the position which his victims had intended to occupy vis-à-vis the Germans. From Stalin's point of view the execution of the 'Red' generals in 1935 was a preventive rather than a punitive measure, as were the subsequent widespread 'purges' in the armed forces and among the Communist officials in the national republics in the Ukraine, Caucasia and Central Asia. It was not by accident that the first to be eliminated were those who owed their revolutionary careers to their capacity for enterprise and daring action: the Marshals Tukhachevski, Uborevich and Yakir.

A Jew by origin, Yakir had distinguished himself in Budenny's 'Red Mounted Army' during the Bolshevik invasion of Poland in the summer of 1920, and later during the liquidation of the *atamans*'

661 bands in the Ukraine. At the time of the 'purge' he occupied the highest military post in the Ukraine: that of Officer Commanding the Kiev Military District. The drama in the Ukraine did not end with the execution of Yakir; during the years 1935–7 several thousands of persons occupying important posts in the Red Army and in the Soviet administration were arrested and shot or exiled to concentration camps in Siberia and the North of Russia. This whirlwind of arrests and executions even carried away with it Postyshev and Kossior, the former instruments of 'the Revolution against the peasants'.

701 186 In the meantime the last remnants of the national Ukrainian Army, which had flourished in the years 1923–9, disappeared. Units of the Ukrainian Army, based on the system of 'territorial Divisions' in the Red Army, had been quartered in the Ukraine alongside the troops 'of the Union'. The struggle with the peasantry had made it desirable to abolish the territorial system in the Ukraine as well as in other parts of the Union. The Ukrainian units were broken up and distributed to other parts of the country and their place was taken by regiments recruited in Great Russia. After the execution of the staff of the Kiev Command and the senior personnel of many of the Ukrainian regiments, nothing remained of the Ukrainian Army except the names of certain 'Red' regiments which were retained for the sake of form; but the Ukrainian language continued to be used in units where the rank and file were predominantly of Ukrainian origin.

Stalin's Constitution of 1936—which evoked such enthusiasm 642 among European Communists and which was even hailed in the capitalist Press of Western countries as a laudable 'return to democratic institutions' in contrast to the dictatorships of Central Europe—was a cynical accompaniment to the slaughter of so many thousands of Party members which was going on at that time within 'the Soviet Paradise'. Stalin's Constitution marked the final abandonment of the theory that the minority nationalities ranked as equal partners with Great Russia within the Soviet Union. The 'union of different states' was now transformed into one integral state (Paragraph 13: 'The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a unified state'). According to Paragraph 14 all authority on questions relating to international affairs, the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace, the organization of defence and the command of the armed forces, foreign trade, the safety of the state, the management of all banks, all forms of transport, the principles of land distribution, the basis of public instruction, hygiene, and criminal and civil laws, was reposed in the Central Government.

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§2. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The late Alexander Guchkov used to say that 'the social revo- 000
lution begun by Lenin in 1917 was carried through during the following twelve years in the towns and industrial centres only. It did not profoundly affect the countryside until 1929.' Just for this reason Stalin in that ominous year undertook what was to amount to a second and more fundamental revolution in the life of the peoples of Russia.

The condition of the peasantry had so far improved during the 565
years 1922–29 that the Communist régime was able to realize that 665
the peasant was fast becoming the principal and most formidable 661 ●
adversary of the Marxist Revolution. An implacable struggle was 185
therefore initiated against that enemy who had succeeded in recuperating in the social and economic sense, but who was not yet ready to enter the field as an organized political force contending for mastery with a Communist Party which derived its power from the support of the industrial proletariat.

The economic Five Year Plans elaborated by the Soviet régime were dictated by the necessity of reconstructing the social and economic structure of the country in a way which should correspond with the bases of state which the continuance of the political dictatorship of the Communist Party required.

'The main idea of the Soviet Five Year Plans was the accelerated industrialization of U.S.S.R. and, parallel with it in accordance with the political needs of the régime, a rapid collectivization of agriculture. It was always for political rather than for economic reasons that the New Economic Policy, which the Communists had
been obliged to put into practice since 1922, was abolished in 1929. 423
The Communist Party, under the leadership of Stalin, proceeded to 661
a new experiment in collectivism in the countryside, using in this 565
case unusually brutal and inhuman methods which completely 474
ruined all more or less prosperous farmers. The peasantry were
unable to offer any effective resistance to the authorities, since their [668]
risings were only scattered and isolated in character. The peasants chose instinctively the easier way of passive resistance which found expression in the contraction of production and in the careless and unsatisfactory operation of the first collective farms (*Kolkhozy*). As a result of the policy of the Communist Party and of the natural reaction of the peasantry, the country had again to endure a frightful famine which bore its worst aspect in those regions where the percentage of collectivized farms was greatest' (Markov).

The Party had finally triumphed over the peasantry by the end of

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423 1934, and in January of the following year it proclaimed its political
● 661 and social victory. Reference has been made in the preceding
565 chapter to the social upheaval, the great losses in human life and the
474 redistribution of population incurred during the 'Revolution
[433] against the Peasants'. Losses in natural wealth were also formidable:
during the five years, 1929–34, horses declined by 50 per cent; cattle by 40 per cent; only about half the total number of pigs survived and one-quarter of the sheep.

The first efforts of the Soviet administration had been directed to
475 the organization of *Sovkhozy*—the large Government farms which
in effect replaced the 'capitalist' private estates of the pre-Revolutionary period. Grain, beet sugar and stock-raising *Sovkhozy* were set up. In 1934 there were already 10,500 of them, of which 1665 were situated in the Ukraine and New Russia. In 1935 the sown area of the *Sovkhozy* attained 15 million hectares as against 2 million in 1929 (i.e. 10 per cent as against 2 per cent of the whole sown area of the Union). Livestock confiscated from the peasantry stocked these 'model' farms, which soon began to evoke the admiration of urban tourists from the West. The *Sovkhozy* were well supplied with the most modern agricultural machinery: in spite or because of this fact they failed to absorb any large proportion of the rural labour which had been deprived of normal occupation by the new measures. In 1931 only 1½ million people throughout the whole stretch of the Union were employed on *Sovkhozy*: in 1934 nearly 3 million were employed (of which 1½ million were in Ukraine and New Russia).

474 The *Kolkhozy* proved to be a far more important factor in the
661 new agricultural economy. Between 1929 and 1934 all means—
including the most ruthless—were employed to force the peasants on to the collective farms. The number of *Kolkhozy* grew rapidly: in July 1930 only 23 per cent of all farms had been converted into *Kolkhozy*; by the beginning of 1932 the figure was already 60 per cent; by the beginning of 1934 it had reached 72 per cent; and in 1936, 90 per cent. During the last three years individual farmers in U.S.S.R. have almost completely disappeared: the sown area occupied by private farmers amounted to 34 per cent in 1934 and to only 4 per cent in 1936.

474 As a result of the widespread famine conditions and the really
423 serious insurrections which had troubled the authorities in the
656 Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia during the period 1930–32,
and as a result also of the deterioration in the international situation which followed the Nazi rise to power in Germany in 1934, the Soviet Government, in spite of its proclaimed 'victory', found itself forced to modify the principles on which rural collectivization

subordinate, that the Ukapist appeal for inclusion was definitely 665 rejected and that the group was offered the choice of suppression or of self-liquidation. They accordingly accepted the voluntary decision and signed thus their own death warrants as had the Borotbisty by their early submission.

All three parties had the same general attitude toward all non-Communists and bourgeois groups. They were in general agreement that these had to be destroyed and driven from political and social importance. Thus, all adopted a hostile attitude toward the nationalists who had supported Petlyura and the Ukrainian National Republic. They attacked the remains of the Social Revolutionists, the Social Democrats, and all the non-Marxian or Marxian groups that did not accept a strict Communism. They dissolved the organizations and seized their property, while they imprisoned many of the older leaders and tried to humiliate them in the eyes of the Ukrainian public.

Thus in 1921, they staged in Kharkiv a public trial of the [687] members of the Executive Committee of the Social Revolutionists. The list included V. Holubovych, the Prime Minister at the time of Brest-Litovsk, N. Petrenko, P. Hubenko (Ostap Vyshnya), Lyzanivsky and many others. They were charged with hostility to the "government of workers and peasants" but apparently the regime was not too sure of its ground and merely sentenced them to relatively short terms in prison.

It was not only the politicians who suffered, for the new regime[1/1] 661 ● 575 attacked every institution which it did not control. In 1920 it abolished all Ukrainian professional organizations and trades unions, including such as the Poltava Society of Workers in Cooperatives and similar groups in Kiev, Kharkiv, and other cities. Then, by arrests of the leaders of the cooperative societies, it forced new elections and put into power only those persons who had the direct approval of the Russian Bolsheviks.

It was next the turn of the purely cultural organizations. All the societies of the Prosvita (Enlightenment) which operated a chain of reading rooms, schools, libraries, theatres, etc. were disbanded on the ground that they were connected with the Rada

[1/1] [Ukrainian Soviet Republic -- Analyst]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

661 575 of the old Ukrainian National Republic. The regime arrested and shot as chauvinist counter-revolutionists many of the active workers. Those who were spared at the moment were treated as members of the proscribed classes and were punished by the exclusion of their children from schools, the denial of food cards, etc., all the traditional devices to eliminate the counter-revolutionary and suspected classes.

At the same time the government confiscated all the funds of educational institutions and the private organizations which had, during the Ukrainian National Republic and earlier, been interested in educational and scientific work. It closed the Ukrainian scientific societies in Kharkiv and Kiev and it put an end to all of the pre-Soviet journals, newspapers, and magazines. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences which had been planned during the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky but had not commenced its work, was treated somewhat more leniently and it was allowed to open largely to support the pretext that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was an independent state, although it was made clear that Communist influence would be exerted on its statutes and organization.

517 Such a period of intellectual disintegration, could not fail to leave its mark on all aspects of Ukrainian culture and art. The older writers who had achieved some prominence before 1914 either retired again into the emigration or they became silent. The younger generation, which was just rising into prominence, was either driven into temporary seclusion or, for the most part, swept into the surging current of events. They felt the leftward urge of many of the intellectuals and tried in one way or another to catch the spirit of the times in their works.

Yet it must be realized that, as in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, there still did not exist a predominant party line in the field of literature and the arts. Writers, painters and dramatists of widely differing tendencies accepted the revolution and loudly protested that they and they alone were the true mouthpieces of the times and greedily sought for support from the commissars.

They were the more fortunate in this because the bulk of the

½[Eradication of pre-communist cultural organizations in 1920 -- Analyst

leaders, like Rakovsky, had little appreciation of Ukrainian life. 517
Few of them understood the language and they preferred to work [645]
through the Russians in the cities and the Donets basin. They were, however, still unable to deal advantageously with the villages where the Ukrainian population was chiefly congregated and they allowed the former Borotbisty to secure key positions in the People's Commissariat for Education. Thus it came about that the one commissariat which could exert the most direct influence on the cultural life of the country was the one in which the Ukrainian influence was strongest.

The time was not propitious for the publication of works of large size and of high artistic value. The years 1919, 1920 and 1921 were years of turmoil when nothing seemed to be real and permanent except death and violence of every kind. The mere struggle for existence was so intense that it absorbed the energy of almost the entire population and the economic decay spread like a creeping paralysis over the land. To the destruction of the civil wars [669]
and of the fighting with Denikin were now added the ravages of the Communist detachments, which swarmed over the country seeking for food to take to the north to save the Russians.

In the early months it would be hardly fair to talk of a Com- 642
munist system of government, for while the theorists were debating [66] ●
as to how they should build socialism and Communism, armed Communist bands organized under the Red Army or under the Cheka (the Extraordinary Committee for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution) indulged in mass terror, murder and robbery.

The measures adopted in Petrograd and Moscow for the dis- 423
tribution of the land were ill adapted for the Ukrainian situation4/1 369
It was only natural that these were applied with a certain amount of peasant approval at the expense of the larger Russian and Polish landlords, many of whom had cooperated with the Germans. This was the more natural because in pre-war days the bulk of the grain that had been exported from Ukraine had come from these estates and, as everywhere in peasant Europe, the confiscation and division of the land among the peasants reduced the amount of food stuffs available for the urban population.

4/1 [of Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 1919 -- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

423 The natural result was the growing depopulation of the cities.
369 Peasants who had gone into industry now flowed back to their native villages and demanded their share of the land in the hope that they might be able to raise food for themselves and their families. This increased the already overcrowded rural population and intensified the bitterness that was felt among all classes.

The hatred thus aroused was increased by the formation of committees of poor and landless peasants to take over the estates. Yet in Ukraine there was an important sector of the population who had been the owners and proprietors of from two to nearly one hundred acres of land. In some districts these included nearly a quarter of the peasant families and in an attempt to propitiate them the Soviets were frequently inclined to favor them and allow them to retain their holdings instead of dividing them among the more idle and shiftless of the population.

651 Yet this did not serve to maintain agricultural production,[1] for
661 the crying demand of Moscow was for food. The Communists had abolished all markets and taxes but they substituted for them a rule that the peasants were to turn over their entire crop to the government and should retain for themselves only 31 pounds of grain per month for each member of the family. This naturally dissatisfied the peasants who had been won to the support of the new regime by the promises of the government that they could secure for their own use the land of the state and of the landlords. Each year, as the Soviets tried to enforce the collection, they planted less and less acreage and resorted to more skilful methods of hiding what they did produce in the hope that they might somehow exchange it for those manufactured products of which they were in urgent need.

To counterbalance this, the Russian detachments made more and more extensive raids and they were not satisfied to take merely the legal surplus. They seized everything in the way of food and supplies on which they could lay their hands and, in case of opposition, they ruthlessly shot the peasants without any trial or investigation as counter-revolutionists. In a sense they succeeded in their mission, for the food collectors in 1920 secured in Ukraine 2,560,000

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[1] [Expropriation of landowners, distribution of land to peasants, 1919-21- Analyst]

tons of grain or about 75% of the total amount that they secured 651
in the whole of the former Russian Empire. 661

This led to new clashes and with the suppression of the larger armed partisan bands, there grew up a new feeling of ugliness that boded ill for the security of the whole regime. The success of the Communists in the industrial centres was thus balanced by their failure to win over any substantial part of the rural population.

In the cities the new regime[1] met with problems of another 433
kind. The workers in the great coal and iron industry where Com- 369
munism was strongest had at a very early date expelled the managers [327]
and foremen and had taken over themselves the operation of the plants, many of which had been ruined in the civil war. Now they found that they were not able to restore production. Industry practically came to a halt and by the end of 1921 there was only one blast furnace operating in Ukraine. The production of pig-iron dropped to 11,300 tons, or barely 3% of the pre-war production. The railroads suffered the same fate. There was no way of repairing them and without a trained administrative staff, they almost stopped functioning. This, in turn, increased unemployment and a lack of food in the cities and once more the city dwellers began to stream out into the country districts.

As a final blow there came in 1920 one of those periods of 731
drought which have recurred sporadically in Ukraine throughout the centuries. In view of the general decay in transportation and the ravages of the war, this became serious and the situation grew even worse when the same phenomenon was repeated in 1921. Between the drought and the raiding detachments, the peasants had no reserves of grain and a famine broke out which cost the lives of several million Ukrainians.

This famine was very definitely the result of Communist mismanagement, plus the drought, but the Soviet regime was unable to take any effective counter-measures. When its extent was realized, the regime allowed through the League of Nations the organization of the American Relief Administration under Herbert Hoover. This collected and sent to the stricken areas large quantities of grain but it carried on its work with such impartiality that

[1] [Ukrainian Soviet Republic established 1919 -- Analyst]

the independence of the Ukrainian Communist regime in the hope 665
that sooner or later they would be admitted to the Communist International as an independent national Communist Party. They therefore willingly accepted the doctrines of the International, which was little more than the third facet of the ruling block. By 1925 the situation had so far developed that their aspirations for this were definitely checked and even this theoretical opposition was eliminated by compelling the Ukapisty to enter into the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party, or else.

This situation makes clear the relations that existed between 661
Ukraine and Russia during the early years of the New Economic Policy. As agriculture and industry revived in Ukraine, it was suggested that the Ukrainian government send aid to its Communist brothers. That suggestion was a command, and just as the Muscovite bands under Militant Communism scoured Ukraine for food, so under the New Economic Policy, the so-called Ukrainian government began to drain off the wealth of the country for the charitable purpose of helping its Russian brothers.

The vagueness and the ambiguity of this system was partially 631
cleared up by the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The treaty establishing this was signed on December 30, 1922, just as Lenin was becoming paralyzed and unable to function efficiently. It bound together the various Soviet Republics, while at the same time it paid lip service to the right of any of these Republics to secede. Of course, this was from the beginning an empty phrase, for the only people who had the power to declare the secession was the Council of Soviets of the Federal Republic and they were Communists assigned to their posts by Moscow and bound to obey the orders of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In addition to this, a surprising number of the ruling group of the Russian Soviet Republic now took over the corresponding posts in the Union and thus added still a fourth facet to their varied activity.

The Constitution, which was formally adopted at a Union 631
Congress of Soviets on July 6, 1923, went still further in providing 642
for the government of the Union. The Commissariats were divided 645

payment of a specific amount of tax in kind and left to the peasant 432
the rest of his crop. In an endeavor to get this grain into Russia, 241
the government offered to buy it but it did not have the funds or 185
the inclination to pay for it at the market price. The financial reforms connected with the introduction of the chervonets could, to a certain degree, make it expedient for the peasant to sell to the government for cash, and as time went on the peasant gained the power of selling his crop for cash but the Moscow control of transportation and the prohibition of large scale trading left him helpless and he saw himself forced to dispose of it locally or to the government. Then the government made a fixed price which was far [435]
below that of the free market, and was often scarcely a third of the amount that the peasant could have secured. This sale of large quantities of agricultural products at a fixed price gradually became the rule and was one of the signs that the period of toleration for private income was coming to an end.

In 1925, the government began to clamp down on the small 656
traders, the Nepmen, who had profited by the opportunities which 661
they had had. Again it had a large choice of measures. Thus, depending on the situation, it could invoke laws against the hiring of labor; it could order the state agencies to refuse to buy from or sell to an obnoxious individual and thus isolate him; it could suspend his ration cards and perquisites, take away his right of voting and thus make him a pariah in the community; it could levy prohibitive taxes which would put him out of business and confiscate his property; or it could find some violation of some other law or regulation and imprison or exile him.

The degree of pressure which was put upon the peasants and 439
the workers varied from year to year. Each year Ukraine was 241
compelled to export more to Russia without regard to the needs of the local population. Thus, the amount of grain rose from 1,050,000 tons in 1924-5 to 3,165,000 tons in 1926-7, when there was a bumper crop, but in 1927-8, when the harvest partially failed and there were signs of need in the country, the amount collected and exported rose to 4,353,000 tons. At the same time, the continually increasing demands aroused again a spirit of oppo-

CHAPTER NINE

The Five Year Plan

Lenin and the Communists had never made any concealment of the fact that the New Economic Policy was only a passing concession to put an end to the stagnation and demoralization which had resulted from the civil war and the period of Militant Communism. It was not the adoption of a definite plan for the future nor was it a sign of a growing rapprochement with capitalism or a gesture toward the rest of the world, as the partisans of the Soviets abroad tried to make it appear. [185] 656 471 661

With each step of the recovery of the economy of Ukraine and of the Soviet Union as a whole, unobstrusive steps were taken to remove the various concessions which had been made. Year by year, from about 1925, new regulations were introduced by the Commissariat of Finance, one of the All-Union Commissariats which had the definite object of suppressing not only the concessions but of tightening up the restrictions on individual life and preparing the way for socialism and communism. By one device or another, the Nepmen were broken. Now the government forbade the state trusts to sell to them as individual traders either raw materials or finished or semi-finished products. Agreements which had been freely made by the government were either suddenly cancelled or were perverted. Obviously false charges were brought against the various individuals and they were fined exorbitantly or they were arrested and deported. By the fall of 1927 the sector of private trade had been almost completely liquidated and the way was open for the central government to do what it would with the situation.

With the Nepmen disposed of, the way was open for a similar attack upon the wealthier classes of the peasants and those who

656 had profited by the operation of the Ukrainian land code which,
471 as we have seen, was less rigid than were the similar arrangements
● 661 in the RSFSR, where the land society was organized far more on
[427] the lines of a collective than it was in Ukraine. It was always possible to apply individually any of the laws against the leasing of land or the employment of hired help, for in both cases the provisions had been left vague and indefinite, so that the authorities could act whenever they so desired. As a matter of fact, as one of the first measures the administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic reduced the period on which a lease could be made from thirteen to six years and thus it was easily possible to upset many of the calculations that had been made by the richer and more progressive landowners.

[435] At the same time[1] the closing of the official markets rendered it possible for the government to force the peasants to dispose of their grain at the officially pegged prices which in the grain-growing districts were considerably lower than they were in the less fertile areas of the north. If this did not produce the desired results, it was equally possible to demand the grain tax in kind and to compel the peasants to turn over, free of charge and under the guise of payments, additional supplies. All these measures, which were introduced in many cases personally and not by districts, caused the peasants to feel themselves becoming steadily more impoverished and less able to resist the demands of the government.

631 On the other hand, the All-Union Commissariats which took
642 precedence over those in the individual Soviet republics and which were, in reality, staffed only by Russian Communists, effectively broke the power of the localities or of the republics to have any special voice in the management of their own affairs.[1] This was, in its turn, skilfully explained by stressing the superior requirements of the Union which, on any closer analysis, turned out to be the interests of the Russian area. Thus, at the XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a Russian who was at the time the chief of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission remarked in an unambiguous manner: "It seems to me that we must assign perfectly clear tasks, to emphasize that the national

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[1] [1925, during relinquishment of NEP -- Analyst]

Once this was decided, the way was open for the establishment of the First Five Year Plan which was frankly drawn up so entirely in the central offices that the local Commissariats of the different republics ceased to have their former significance in the state and became, for the most part, mere subsidiaries to be watched and checked at every turn or at every manifestation of a tendency toward independence. 642 631

There was no longer any talk of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its powers to maintain diplomatic representatives abroad or with the pretense that it was handling its own affairs under the guidance of the All-Union Communist Party. The role of the Russian element in the state kept on increasing and once more it was possible to revive the old arguments as to the need for definite russification.

It was relatively a simple matter for the government to administer industry as it wished. It had retained control throughout the period of the New Economic Policy of the leading factories and industrial enterprises and the workers had been deprived of any of the rights which they might have imagined themselves possessed when they took over the plants. They were by now completely dependent for their conditions of work and for their employment on the whims of the plant managers who were themselves directly under the central authorities in Moscow. The government built new plants where and as it wished and was not bound to consult any one as to its purposes and measures. [475]

The peasants were less tractable, for especially in Ukraine they still felt themselves the masters of their own fate. The new philosophy[1] looked upon them, too, as the servants of the state and determined to collectivize them in one way or another and to force them into collective farms, whether they wished it or not. 423 474 661 ● 425

In this process the first step was to break the peasant power of resistance and the regime saw clearly that this was based upon the financial power of the richer and the middle peasants. Whereas Lenin and the earlier Soviet regime in Ukraine had grouped together the middle and the poor peasants and had supported them against the richer peasants and the large landowners, the

[1] [1927- Stalin made Party and Government synonymous -- Analyst]

423 policy was now changed and the middle and the richer peasants
474 were grouped together and opposed to the poor peasants. This
● 661 multiplied enormously the hostile and unsympathetic elements of
425 the population but by holding out tempting offers to the poor peasants, the Communists succeeded in fanning anew the flames of class hatred in the villages and in producing the desired effects.

[651] Along with the adoption of the Five Year Plan, the All-Union Congress called for the strengthening of attempts at collectivization. As a result, the amount of grain demanded and the amount of taxes were rapidly raised with the avowed purpose of ruining the kulaks and kurkuls, as they were called in Ukraine. Increased pressure was put upon all classes of the rural population to join collective farms and in some districts this was so effective that almost seventy per cent of the land was turned over for organization on a "voluntary" basis.

As a further step in the same direction there began in 1928 and also in 1929 a furious attack on the richer and middle peasants and a growing insistence on the need of "dekurkulizing" the villages. This meant nothing more or less than the elimination from the countryside of all those people who had prospered under the New Economic Policy. The property of the richer and more prosperous peasants was completely confiscated and they with their families were deprived of all their rights, often including the house where they had lived or the shacks into which they could crawl for shelter. With superb inhumanity the Bolsheviks would drive formerly wealthy peasants and their families from their homes in the middle of winter and leave them without food or clothing and would threaten any of their relatives or friends who dared to give them any relief.

In the first stages of the process, cases were known where some of these richer people were moved out of the Ukraine with their goods and cattle, but as the Communists settled down to their work, they simply seized everything for their own use and that of the collective farms and contented themselves with shooting or deporting their enemies, often to the far north for work in the forests or to northeastern Siberia for work in the mines and in the more remote parts of the wilderness.[1]

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[1] A graphic account of this dekurkulization was given in a DP camp by Sh., a former peasant of the district of Kharkiv:

"On May 22, 1929, all my property, tools, cattle, building and clothing were confiscated. I and my family (my wife, six small children and my mother), were left without means of livelihood; we stayed with people like old folks, ate what we were given, although people were forbidden to give to us. On November 27, in spite of the fact that there was snow on the ground and 15 degrees of frost, I and my entire family, without clothes and half-naked, were put out of the house. Until February, 1930 I lived in another house which was half fallen down. On February 28, I, my wife and six children (my mother had disappeared; I do not know where) were arrested and with other dekurkulized persons were sent to the railroad station. There we were packed into freight cars as sardines in a barrel and travelled for 11 days, without knowing our destination. We were fed once every two days. Many perished from cold and exhaustion. We finally reached the station of Makarikha near Kotlas, district of Archangel, and in 40 degrees of frost, we were detrained in the woods in the snow.

"Then all those able to work were driven to forest operations 300 kilometers from Kotlas. They drove us half shod in the intense cold. They fed us on the way 300 grams of bread, 5 grams of barley and 3 grams of salt per person a day. Many died on the way. Many, unable to walk further, were shot on the spot. There we cut wood and they treated us very badly. The norms of work were abnormally high. We lived in huts which were holes we dug ourselves. Of the many thousands of people who came there more than half died of exhaustion, hunger and cold.

"Of the members of the families of kurkuls who remained at the station of Makarikha, more than half froze. Among these were my sons Ivan and Fedir; a third son Hryhory died of exhaustion. Later all the children up to 14, including three of mine, were returned to Ukraine but I have no further news of them. They probably perished. In 1932, first my wife and then I escaped by hiding in cars loaded with wood. I found work in the Don Basin. In 1937 my wife was arrested suddenly and shot in the prison of Artemivsk in the Don Basin. I escaped because I was living under an assumed name. Now I am a DP and living in Germany in an IRO camp."

423 They followed this up at the end of 1929 by providing for the
474 compulsory collectivization of all the land. Private holding of land
● 661 was abolished and so was private use. The peasants were forced
425 into collective farms to which they had to contribute all of their livestock, agricultural implements and tools. Then they were left nothing that they could call their own except a small garden plot that was assigned to each family for the purpose of raising those types of vegetables that it was not profitable to raise in large quantities, because the collective farms were occupied with those types of agriculture that were selected for them by the central authorities in Moscow.

The immediate result differed in different places. In Great Russian territory, where the principle of the community ownership of land had definitely taken root, the peasants complied without too much hesitation. In Ukraine and Kuban, where the older style of Ukrainian agriculture had been long in vogue, the peasants became sulky. They killed off large numbers of their cattle and livestock of various kinds. The government, seeing this tremendous loss, then tried to eliminate from the collectives and liquidate in one way or another all of those who had been guilty of disobedience to the order requiring the peasants to contribute all their wealth.

There developed almost a civil war in some sections of the country as discontent rose and the peasants were prepared to die rather than to yield. Nevertheless, this time the government was not prepared to concede anything, as it had in 1921, and despite remarks by Stalin that in some details the Communists had become dizzy from success, the regime held its course and even continued to apply the screws more tightly. The result was the famine of 1932 and 1933.

433 terms of percentages in reference to a prior date. Still the already published data were so scanty and incomplete that it became increasingly more and more difficult to secure an actual picture of the progress in the Union as a whole and still more so in any of the separate Soviet Republics, for the central regime rarely broke down what little information it gave out among its constituent parts.

651 It was not long before another change was made in the methods
241 of collecting the products from the collective farms. Under the new
661 system, the farms did not contribute according to their crop but according to the amount of land which they proposed to sow. This amount was due to the government, even in those cases where there was a complete failure of the harvest not under the control of the workers. In other words, if a crop failed because of bad weather conditions, the peasants were compelled to hand over just as much produce as if they had had a bumper crop.

It can be easily seen that such a measure was merely another device for weakening the economic position of the village and the independence of the collective farm. At the same time the establishment of official tractor stations in place of the old locally controlled centres which sent crews and machines into the countryside gave the government another weapon for the exertion of pressure upon the peasants and even the Communists who were in charge of the farms and these crews likewise were paid not on the basis of their work but of the theoretical area which was to be sown. Later this was again changed to the total area of the farm whether it was suitable for any special kind of agriculture or not.

These measures only increased the discontent among the peasants who once again began to limit their work to the minimum necessary to maintain themselves on a steadily dropping scale of living. To counter-balance this the Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a decree in February, 1930 allowing the local authorities who were, of course, handpicked by Moscow to resort to extreme measures against the kurkuls, to confiscate their property and then to dispose of them by sending them and their families to concentration camps, to special settlements in the far north or eastern Asia or merely by expelling them from their home district.

4 [after establishing All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture, 1929 --Analyst]

These measures were so vigorously applied that it has been estimated 651
that by the end of 1932, some 2,400,000 persons had been removed 241
from Ukraine to parts unknown.. These were naturally the more 661 ●
prosperous, the more progressive and energetic persons who had profited by the New Economic Policy and had accumulated some capital.

The forcing of the peasants into the collective farms? and the 185
prohibition of almost all possibilities for the securing of raw materials 433
had a further effect. Under the older system, the Ukrainian 511
peasants had time, during the winter especially, to work at home and to supply themselves most of their need for manufactured articles. They were able to work in leather and in cloth and wood. This was now rendered impossible, for the individual plots were too small to furnish the necessary raw materials and the peasants were forced, if they would satisfy their most immediate needs, to rely upon the goods turned out by the state factories. These goods were always inferior in quality and short in quantity, for the whole point of the Five Year Plan was to develop heavy industry as rapidly as possible and the government took no interest in seeing that the villages were supplied with consumers' goods. It concentrated its attention on those branches which could be of use in military preparations. Even when petitions were made by the Soviets in Odesa and Kharkiv for permission to establish textile factories, they were peremptorily told that the plan provided for the establishment of such plants only in selected parts of the RSFSR. Thus to the local shortage was added the costs of distant transportation, which made the price prohibitive even for the goods that were received.

In 1931 almost the entire grain reserves were removed from 651
Ukraine and the peasants had nothing to carry over, and when in 685
1932 there came a drought in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the 241
peasants had no supplies. 511

This did not bother the authorities. During 1931 and 1932 they collected from the peasants all that they could. The next step was to tighten the laws.

On August 6, 1932 the TsK VKP/b and the Soviet of Com-

[1929-1930 -1st Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the 651
branch of village agriculture.” 685

The machine tractor stations were staffed by men largely alien 241
to the Ukrainian countryside. The more fanatical Communists 511
were placed in these political detachments and were, in effect, told to supplement or replace the local administration in the exercise of pressure and terror upon both the heads and the members of the kolhosps. To aid them in their work Moscow sent to Ukraine a Russian Pavel Postyshev as a special plenipotentiary of the Central Committee with 7,000 party workers from the Russian Republic.

The work of these special “commissions” and “brigades” was marked by the utmost severity. They entered the villages, and made the most thorough searches of the houses and barns of every peasant. They dug up the earth, broke into the walls of buildings and the stoves in which the peasants tried to hide their last handfuls of food. They even in places took specimens of the fecal matter from the toilets in the effort to learn in that way by analysis whether the peasants had stolen government property and were eating grain. Wherever they found any, the peasants were severely punished, while the detachments carried off not only grain but everything edible.

The same reports came from every corner of Ukraine. “They requisitioned everything that could be eaten” was the report from the village of Zorich in the district of Poltava. In one village in the district of Odesa, “they collected all the grain, potatoes, beets to the last kilogram” and in other places they even took half-baked loaves of bread from the stove. In at least one of these commissions, Molotov, then head of the Council of Ministers, took a personal part.

The natural result[1] was a famine of unprecedented severity. The 731
villages had been hungry in the autumn. After these searches 661 ●
commenced, they literally starved. An Englishman, M. Magridge, wrote in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1933: “During a recent visit to Ukraine, I have seen a little of the war which the Soviet government is carrying on against the peasants. The fields were

[result of excessive grain requisitions in 1933 -- Analyst]

73/ waste as in a real war and the poverty had spread still further.
66/ On one side there were millions of peasants with bodies swollen from hunger; on the other side, soldiers, members of the GPU, carrying out the orders of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They hurled themselves on the region like a pack of locusts and seized everything edible. They shot and hung thousands of peasants, sometimes whole villages; they made of the richest country in the world a melancholy wilderness."

Reports from all sections of Ukraine have listed with depressing regularity the articles of food that were eaten. They included grass, weeds, bark, dead animals, field mice, dogs, cats. Finally, cannibalism broke out and in many places sausages were found that were made of human flesh, either of people who had died or who were killed for food. The extent of this last is shown when in 1936, among the prisoners of Solovki, there were three hundred twenty-five persons guilty of cannibalism, seventy-five men and two hundred and fifty women.

An observer in the spring of 1933 gives this picture of a Ukrainian village: "In the centre of the village, beside the ruins of the church which had been blown up was the bazaar. All the people in it had swollen faces, they were not talkative, but were silent and speechless. Their movements were unsteady, for their legs and arms were swollen. They sold or bought cornstalks, pounded corncobs, a black powder made of Russian thistle, roots, and the lower parts of water plants. This assortment of village wares was a diet which did not save the people from death by starvation but merely by increasing their sufferings, postponed it a little."

The agronome A. S. who in March and April, 1933, was in the villages of Izbinske and Starytsya, Vovchansky region, Kharkiv district, wrote: "The people daily died in dozens. The corpses lay in the houses for several days for there was no one to bury them. Pits were dug in the cemeteries with great difficulty, large enough to hold several persons. The corpses were piled on carts like wood and carried to the pits and thrown in like logs without any of the customary or religious rites. They fell as they would, head down, or on their side or standing—a terrible sight. The gravedigger of to-day might be a corpse to-morrow."

The bodies of the dead lay in all the villages, along the roads and in the fields. Special brigades were formed in the villages to bury the dead but they were too weak to collect all the corpses and these were devoured by those dogs which had escaped being eaten and had gone savage. The roads were deserted for it was dangerous for one or two people to walk together because of the danger of attack by robbers who sought to rob them or to kill them for cannibalistic purposes.

Under such conditions many of the people closed up their huts tightly, lighted their stoves and inhaled the fumes to commit suicide.

In the spring, when those who had survived broke from the fields the unripe ears of grain, they were seized by the government agencies on the charge of stealing socialist and government property, while the "light cavalry," the armed Comsomols and the members of the Communist Party, shot these "barbers," as they were called in the press contemptuously, like hares.

Thousands tried to secure work in the state agricultural enterprises (the radhosps). The agronome B. B. wrote: "In going around the experimental station in Poltavshchyna, I saw under a haystack a number of people. To my questions, the manager of the station, a Russian in origin, told me that they were peasants of the neighborhood who had come in large numbers to the radhosp, hoping to find work and thus have the money to buy food. Since they did not have the strength to return home, they lay down under the haystack. Many died there and he added, pointing to fresh earth,' There are the mounds where we buried those individualists. What trouble the Khakhals have been.' "

The younger and more venturesome fled to other Soviet Republics in search of work and food. Thousands departed from Ukraine without permission, for this was not given, and crowded the offices of the railroads, the wharfs and the junctions. They often found a tragic end. Prof. O. O. tells of a case of which he was a witness. "In March, 1933, at the station in Vladikavkaz (Caucasus) there gathered a mass of peasants with bags on their

73/ backs, waiting for a freight train. Agents of the NKVD held them
66/ up and took away their grain. They begged together and singly and prayed but it did not help. Then one peasant climbed out on a high tree near the station and began to cry out about all the horrors of the famine in Ukraine. He cursed the party, the government, its leaders and the NKVD. A crowd quickly gathered and soon came the agents of the NKVD who began to harangue the hearers and urged the "orator" to come down quickly, threatening him with life imprisonment. He was immovable; then the NKVD called for the local fire department who were told to turn their hoses on the tree. The peasant climbed higher and then suddenly threw himself down like a stone."

In the spring of 1933 the starving masses with their gray faces moved into the large cities. They formed lines for the "buying of bread"* or, begging, they surrounded the mills. They died by thousands in the streets of Kharkiv, Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, and the other cities. In many cases the police cars simply picked up the dead and dying every morning and carried them out of the city where they were thrown into pits. There were established in the cities and their environs "therapeutic hospitals" near which were vans covered with tarpaulins. These were used to collect the sufferers and the hospitals were simply places to separate the dead and the dying.

The children suffered terribly and thousands were picked up on the streets. Parents often abandoned their children, usually near police stations, in the hope that they would be picked up and taken to refugee camps but here they were little better off. Prof. M. M. testified that near Kharkiv the "NKVD opened a large children's concentration camp, the 'Barracks of death' as it was

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[435] * In the beginning of 1933 at the height of the famine in Ukraine, the USSR opened shops in the cities where grain was sold at a doubled price, i.e. commercial prices—4 karb. for 1 kg. of white and 3 karb. for 1 kg. of black bread. The peasant received from the government for the obligatory "sale" of grain 90 kop. for 16 kg. of wheat. These commercial prices had to be paid for in foreign currency or in gold or silver.

termed" and here by poor treatment at least forty percent of the ten thousand gathered in, died. 731 661 ●

The urban population felt the shortage because of the reduction of the bread ration for the unemployed to two hundred grams a day. The majority could not patronize the commercial shops for they had nothing with which to pay and the legal allowance of other products as fat, sugar and barley were either reduced or omitted. Even the more highly qualified of the intelligentsia were obliged to sell all their trinkets and gold teeth to secure some food. The prices allowed were ridiculous. One teacher at these stores received for a silver dollar "500 grams of sugar, a piece of soap and 200 grams of rice."

Physicians were forbidden to enter "hunger" in the records of illness and death. They were ordered to give as the cause of death "BBO" (absence of white corpuscles). Sometimes it was recorded as "childish" or "old age" weakness, "paralysis of the heart," "diarrhea," all symptoms of death by starvation.

165 731 661 It is impossible to estimate accurately the number of deaths, for even the indefatigable NKVD gave up the attempt to list the deaths along the roads, in the fields, and in the streets of the cities. Villages died out and this was indicated by the use of black flags on certain houses. In these cases no attempt was made to keep the records in order. The so-called "therapeutic hospitals" did not turn over their records or admit to their files the workers of the ZATS (The Records of the Acts of the Civil Population), who were the collaborators of the NKVD. Thus, in one of these therapeutic hospitals in Kiev there were at least 5,000 deaths from starvation that were not recorded in the official statistics.

[554] Of course, none of these hardships were felt by the highly placed Communists and party officials. They received their food through party channels which were not accessible to the ordinary residents of the city or the kolhosps.

It is difficult to estimate accurately the number who perished in the famine, but it was approximately 4,800,000. This is certainly an underestimate, although certain other calculations will place the number between five and six million.

[-famine in Ukraine, 1933-- Analyst]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Ukraine Under the Soviets

731 661 [565] There is the frequent idea that the famine A. was specifically directed against the rich peasants and the kurkuls. This is utterly false, for these had been liquidated earlier. The blow of 1933 fell chiefly upon the poorer classes who had always supported the Soviet regime and who regarded their suffering in the beginning as a mistake which Moscow would do its best to correct. In the same way it was the Ukrainian workmen of the smaller cities who bore the brunt of the hardships. It was the direct triumph of the Russian Bolsheviks over the Ukrainian poor.

185 731 Another proof that the famine A occurred in connection with the plans of Moscow was the fact that Postyshev, besides his official post, held that of general inspector of the Ministry of Grain Production for resettlement. It turned out later that he was given the general task of preparing a plan for an immigration into Ukraine from various portions of the Soviet Union. The dislocation of the population was worked out in detail. Millions of Russians, Byelorussians, Uzbeks, etc., were to be sent in to complete the work of rerussification. Especial pains were devoted to the regions close to Russia on the Left Bank of the Dnieper and there was talk at one time of annexing to the Russian Republic the Kharkiv-Donbas industrial region, but this did not fall in with the plans of Stalin.

[423] The result of the famine was the final stabilization of the collective system of agriculture and the breaking of the old mode of life throughout the whole of Ukraine. More than that, it established the fact that in the economic sphere Moscow could direct Ukrainian life as it would. It overawed the population for the moment but it did not reconcile them to their fate and it went hand in hand with the attempt to exterminate the old Ukrainian cultural life.

A [Ukraine, 1933 -- Analysis]

731 the country might have escaped, had it not been for the methods of the government in draining off from the population the last possible reserves of food.

731/185 There can be no doubt that this was done deliberately, for every measure taken by the government was intended to increase the difficulties of the population and to prepare for the final crushing of the Ukrainian renaissance that had been proceeding with ever [648] increasing force. Every measure, too, was intended to render it more difficult for the outside world to secure any actual knowledge of the conditions in the country until it was too late for the world to do more than register vain protests, for it was very definitely at this period that the censorship methods of the government and its apprehensions of what knowledge might bring to the world actively commenced to draw an iron curtain around Ukraine. Foreign correspondents were forbidden to visit Ukraine on one pretext or another and they were forced to send out such news as the government wished or to leave the Soviet Union.

● [661] The collectivization and the famine had coincided with the beginning of the attack on Ukrainian scholarship and the arts, as we shall see, but these attacks by their very choice of victims had been directed against those men who had not been closely connected with the Communist Party in the past, even though they had not been entirely hostile. Along with the famine the tide turned, and soon the victims were those persons who had dared to hope for an equality of treatment (with the Great Russians) in the Soviet Union.

The famine was obviously intended not only to crush the population already impoverished by the collectivization but to administer a sound chastisement to all classes who were interested in the preservation and development of local and republic interests.

731/648 The famine was at its height in the winter and spring of 1933 and was only somewhat alleviated after the harvest of that year was brought in. It was only natural that, despite the efforts of the authorities, word of it would gradually seep out, in spite of the censorship. The news was most accessible to the Western Ukrainians, for as yet all communications had not been satisfactorily broken, and early in the summer they began to seek permission to organize relief

186 National Republic, who had gone abroad after its collapse and
814 who had been invited back to take part in the work of the Ukrain-
687 ian Academy of Sciences. The government produced what seemed
661 to be definite evidence against these people but the curious fact
[538] was that this evidence was strangely inconsistent with all of their
previous activity. On the prisoner's bench were such men as Serhey Yefremiv, the leading scholar of Ukrainian literature and a relative conservative, the academiciam Mykhaylo Slabchenko, a former Social Democrat, Prof. Joseph Hermayze, a former member of the Executive Committee of the same party, and the well-known writer L. Starytska-Chernyakivska, who was close to Efremiv and who had more or less dropped out of the modern literary movement and was living in practical retirement.

The Soviet record of the trial strongly suggests that all those factions which, during the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic had utterly failed to come to any agreement, had somehow or other composed their differences in the days when Ukrainian sentiments seemed to be dominant in the ranks of the Communist Party and when there were outstanding Communists, like Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, pleading the Ukrainian cause. Yet, as was to be the case in almost all of the later trials, the court record based upon the testimony of the NKVD did not give any clue to the treasonable acts of which the defendants were accused and if they did, the stories passed belief. There was, likewise, no indication of the serious plans on which the organization was working or any details of its formal organization.

All the information that was revealed suggested that it was a definitely anti-Communist movement engineered by a group of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who objected to the Communist program of Ukrainization. There was no hint that the accused had any connection with the derussification program of Skrypnyk or the demand of Khvylovy and his friends of the *Vaplite* for the development of a definite Ukrainian Communism. The Society for the Liberation of Ukraine appeared like a ghost from the past and the prosecution seemed to have the tacit support of even those elements which were working for Ukrainization.

Up to this moment the only open manifestation had been the 186
demand of Skrypnyk that Communists be included in the Ukrainian 814
Academy of Sciences but this had apparently been answered satis- 687
factorily and, with slight changes, the Academy was working as 661
before. The most that could be said was that the leaders of Ukrainian thought in the Academy had not properly in their old age kept pace with the development of Marxo-Leninist thought but even this was hardly sufficient for the outburst which was loosed against a group of widely respected scholars.

Another curious aspect of the situation was that the most severe sentences were not given to the announced ringleaders and chief
culprits but that there was unearthed on the occasion another [883]
society, the SUM, the Society of Ukrainian Youth, which consisted of relatively obscure students, village intelligentsia, peasants and workmen who were shot by the hundreds and thousands without being brought before any tribunal. The head of this group, Mykola Pavlushkiv, was involved in the trial but once again there was no indication that any members of the SUM had been engaged in any form of sabotage or anti-governmental work. Members of the organization who have escaped abroad have testified that the SUM was organized only on the basis of personal friendships and never undertook or planned any deliberate acts of sabotage.

The discovery of the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine with its assumed anti-Communist tinge was the signal for the opening of a campaign against the most respected older non-Communist members of the Academy. The usual method was by the device of demanding Communist self-criticism, and criticism. Its practice was brutally simple and effective.

The Communist organs, especially the GPU-NKVD, decided which of these scholars were to be broken ideologically .(and morally) and which were to be removed without fanfare. The latter disappeared. The former group were forced to appear for public "self-criticism." This was preceded by a series of attacks in the newspapers as to the mistakes in Marxo-Leninism which the victim had committed.

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Then, on an appointed day, a meeting was arranged in a large hall to which the public was invited by the display of large placards and other notices. Selected speakers attacked in the most scurrilous and abusive language various aspects of the work of the accused and ascribed to him the grossest errors. Then came the (obligatory) speeches of those who "wished to speak," i.e. his collaborators and students. These were carefully prepared by the Communist nucleus in the Academy or the Committee. The accused was then compelled to admit his mistakes and promise hereafter to work "in the spirit of Marxo-Leninism and the decrees of the Communist Party." These performances usually lasted for two or three sessions and then the critical "testing" of the work went on in special scientific meetings or scientific publications or in the torture chambers of the GPU. If the accused did not humiliate himself sufficiently or if the collaborators showed themselves insufficiently critical, "rotten liberal," "compromising," "opportunistic" or leaving "ideologically (or class) hostile loopholes," the process was repeated with still more bitterness against the main culprit and his collaborators or witnesses who had attempted to defend him were attacked with equal ferocity and their testimony was sent to the proper places for "consideration."

This was the treatment accorded to Prof. Hrushevsky who, in 1930, was criticized publicly and then arrested and deported to Moscow where he was prevented from doing any work and only after he was completely broken was he sent to a rest-house in the Caucasus to die in 1934. With his removal, the old historical studies almost came to an end. The Academy was reorganized as the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and nearly all the work in the humanities were stopped. The Historical-Philological Section was combined with the Social-Economic Section and nearly all of its special fields were abolished, while at the same time there disappeared a large number of valuable books and collections which were ready for publication.

This destruction of the older scholars in the Academy was justified by grouping Hrushevsky with his historical studies in the same

category of public enemies as Mazepa and Petlyura, and the three 186
came to form a trinity subject to constant attack. Their leading 814
crime was declared to be bourgeois nationalism, the object of which 687
was to separate the Ukrainian from the Russian people and to deny 661
the great significance of the teachings of Marx and Lenin.

In 1931 the Soviet authorities found traces of another organization, the Ukrainian National Centre. This is even more mysterious than was the preceding case, for it involved a number of apolitical figures who were living in retirement, as Holubovych, but at the same time it commenced the liquidation of the leaders of the former Borotbisty and Ukapisty. Still heavier sentences were imposed upon these men and large numbers were deported.

Then came an announcement of the extension to Soviet Ukrainian territory of the work of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Colonel Konovalets, and a number of more prominent Ukrainians were executed or deported for reasons that were never satisfactorily explained.

At the same time the Soviets seem to have spread rumors in connection with collectivization that there were movements for an uprising against the regime. They endeavored to have pseudo-Ukrainian patriots from Poland establish contacts with former officers of the Ukrainian National Republic who had dropped into obscurity and then, at a given signal, called for a revolt and easily overpowered their dupes.

Thus these trials eliminated from Ukrainian life the older scholars who had been trained before the period of Communist rule. They justified in the minds of the emigrés the correctness of their position in refusing to listen to the blandishments of the Ukrainian Soviet government during the apparently rosy years of the New Economic Policy, when it seemed as if there was to be a rapprochement with the West. How far the activity of these men, who had put themselves into the lion's mouth and perished, served to renew the Ukrainian courage and self-reliance has been much debated, especially in view of the fact that they were all destroyed as bourgeois, long before any serious danger seemed to

186 threaten the position of the various groups of Ukrainian Com-
814 munists. Khvylovy, despite the attacks upon him and Skrypnyk, still
687 continued to work for the greater Ukrainization of the population
● 661 and of the cities and, so far, he had not been subjected to any
too severe criticism. That was to come next.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

The Debacle

The Ukrainian Communists, as Skrypnyk and Khvylovy, 000 could not fail to be horrified at the spreading famine which broke out in the autumn of 1932 and raged throughout the winter. Whatever they might have thought in the beginning of the compulsory collectivization, they were aghast at its results. They could not fail to recognize that it meant the end of the old Ukrainian life which they had tried to remodel in accordance with their own ideals and that it meant a widening breach with the outside world. They could not fail to see that it meant the ending of that world Communism in which they had tried to believe and in which they saw the hope of humanity and justice.

They could hardly fail to recognize almost immediately how they had played into the hands of the enemies of Ukraine by their attacks on the older scholars, for they were now to learn that they had unwittingly forged the tool that was to be used against them.

Postyshev arrived in Ukraine in January, 1933, to superintend and make more rigid the rules for the collection of grain. 661 558 He brought with him his own staff, his own detachments of the NKVD, and while he nominally had the post of second secretary, he had the instructions from Stalin that made him the complete dictator. He soon showed what that meant.

Among his earliest acts was the removal of Chubar from his 645 post as head of the Soviet of People's Commissars and he replaced him with the more pliable P. Lyubchenko, a former Borotbist. Skrypnyk was forthwith demoted from Commissar of Education to Chairman of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission, a position of no special importance, once the conduct of all Ukrainian life

661 558 was to be administered in accordance with a plan drawn up in Moscow. He was replaced by Volodymyr Zatonsky, who had been one of the foremost advocates of russification.

[665] The axe was used still more widely on the entire Communist Party in Ukraine. Within ten months, Postyshev removed two hundred thirty-seven secretaries of regional party committees, two hundred seventy-nine heads of regional executive committees, and one hundred and fifty-eight heads of regional control commissions. Nearly one thousand prominent Communists were removed, not to speak of lesser members. Since there were little more than 125,000 Communists in Ukraine, it is easy to see that a large proportion of the Party was unceremoniously eliminated. Elimination meant not only demotion but it was practically a death sentence, for those expelled were charged with that most serious crime against the state, bourgeois nationalism or sabotage, and the vast majority were either shot or deported.

[814] Postyshev turned his attention to the Academy of Sciences which had already been purged of its leading members. Here he found some two hundred and fifty more who were removed on charges of Ukrainian chauvinism or sabotage. In their place, he introduced ordinary Communists or Russians with more regard to their reliability and their loyalty to Stalin than to their capability or scholarly qualifications.

191 626 Postyshev's 4 object was the rerussification of the country, for it had already been commented in Moscow that there were too many of the young Ukrainians who were securing an education only in Ukrainian without knowing the master language of Russian. Skrypnyk had paid no attention to these complaints, for he retorted that in Moscow the young Russians were not learning Ukrainian and he assumed that all the Soviet Republics had the same rights. He was soon to learn differently, for from now on Russian was to be the official language of widest use.

[204] [871] In every considerable city Postyshev established Russian newspapers which had almost completely vanished during the period of Ukrainization. He opened Russian schools in the leading cities and he introduced Russian into all the other schools on an equality

1/1 [1933 -- Analyst]

basis with Ukrainian. He established Russian theatres in the larger 191
cities and sent them Russian companies from Leningrad and Moscow 626
to show the greatness of Russian art, while at the same time he had [545]
Les Kurbas arrested at the end of the year and closed the Berezil Theatre, the leading company in Ukraine, and even abolished its name as Catherine the Great had abolished the name of the Zaporozhian Sich one hundred fifty years before.

The fundamental object was to re-Russianize Ukraine as rapidly as possible. In pursuance of this idea, Zatonsky even suggested that the students should be encouraged to talk a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian in the hope that they could thus be more quickly induced to accept the alien tongue. That was a rash thought, for as soon as it was reported to Moscow, there came a strong protest from Gorky that such a procedure could only injure the purity of the Russian language by mixing foreign elements in it. Zatonsky hurriedly withdrew his suggestions but it was too late and only a few years later he was to pay the penalty for his rash proposal.

It was small wonder that Khvylovy, who knew well that he [762]
was threatened with arrest and execution, committed suicide in despair on May 13, 1933 and he was followed on July 6, by Skrypnyk who was too familiar with the workings of Russian Communism not to realize that he would be steadily demoted until he could be finished off without comment as a fallen idol.

The terror and the destruction proceeded apace[1] and after the 661 ●
murder of Kirov in Leningrad on December 21, 1934, new in- 538
vestigations were ordered and it was discovered that the bulk of the Ukrainian authors were involved in the conspiracy. In a very short time their ranks were almost completely decimated. In the same month H. Kosynka, O. Vlyzko, I. Krushelnytsky, K. Burevy, and D. Falkivsky were shot on various pretenses. Nearly all the former members of the *Vaplite,* the Neo-Classicists, the groups connected with the MARS in Kiev and the *New Generation,* were liquidated in one way or another, either by execution or deportation and deportation was practically the equivalent of death, for scarcely one of the deported ever returned to the Ukraine or made

[1] [reference to forced Russification of Ukraine, 1933 --Analyst]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

661 538 his presence or his present place of dwelling known to any of his friends.

It would be too long to mention the list of names, but among them were all the outstanding names of the preceding years, Kulish, Yalovy, Yohansen, Epik, Zerov, Dray-Khmara, Kosynka, Pidmohylny, Semenko, Vuzko, etc. These men were not only put out of the way but every attempt was made to prove that they had never existed. Their books were removed from the libraries and bookstores and, so far as possible, even references to them and their work were expunged from encyclopedias and reference books and the movement which they represented and which, but a short time before, had been patronized by the Commissariat of Education was rendered non-existent. Only the name of Khvylovy remained as an example of anti-Russian work and he was presented as a pupil of Petlyura, Hrushevsky and the Western imperialists and a believer in bourgeois nationalism, a term which was now extended to cover anything hostile to the general line of the Party.

626 538 Faced with the certainty of sharing the fate of their colleagues,[1] some of even the more prominent authors began to waver. Among this number were Tychyna and, a little more reluctantly, Rylsky. In fact, it required a term in prison to bring the latter to an appreciation of the beauties of the new order. Both proved themselves valuable converts, even if they were compelled to forget all their old mannerisms and perfections of style and produce tasteless propaganda poetry, while the official organs boasted of their slow but steady growth in realism. Thus, in 1934 Kulyk could say of Tychyna, "The collection of *The Party Leads* represents an unquestionable achievement. Nevertheless we should be rendering poor service to Tychyna himself if we failed to point out the uneven tenor, and sometimes even hesitation, in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to him. Stronger organizational ties with the realities, emancipation from artificial, at times purely bookish culture, such are the conditions on which depends further progress by Tychyna along the new road chosen by this great Ukrainian poet." Rylsky and Bazhan were treated in the same way, while such writers as Panch and Holovko were told it was their task to get over the

[1] [Persecution, during Russification of Ukraine, 1933 --Analysi

633 civil war. Kiev, as the centre of traditional Ukrainian life, was more liable to sympathy with the Ukrainian national movement, as the Russians had found on more than one occasion. Now, with the country prostrate, it seemed advisable for the Communists to mark their triumph and endeavor to identify themselves with the masses by recognizing Kiev.

Yet, it brought with it another blow to Ukrainian prestige. Of all the cities in Ukraine, Kiev was the richest in the monuments of the past. Therefore, to mark the Communist triumph, they decided to rebuild large portions of the city and to erect buildings that would be worthy of the new regime. It was easy to find as the proper sites the areas where the old Kiev had stood.

From the very first days of Bolshevism and Communism, the
346 regime, with its atheistic trends, had devoted itself to the robbing
● 661 of the churches. Even the ikonostasis of St. Sophia had been melted
633 down to recover the gold ornaments with which it had been decorated. The museums had been largely pillaged. Some of the contents had been removed to Moscow on various pretexts, but still more had been wantonly destroyed.

Now[1] work began in earnest to wreck the surviving monuments of the past. In quick succession the Communists ruined, blew up or levelled a large number of churches which spoke too strongly of the past greatness of Kiev and the Ukrainians. These included the Cathedral Church of the Golden Domed Monastery of St. Michael of the twelfth century, with a bell-tower of the seventeenth, the Church of the Three Saints of the twelfth century, the cloisters of the Monastery of St. Irena of the eleventh century, the finest monuments of the period of Mazepa at the end of the seventeenth century, including the Cathedrals of the Theophany of the Brotherhood Monastery and the "Great Nicholas" of the Ustyno-Mykolayiv Monastery, the work of the architect Joseph Startsev, with a bell-tower of the late eighteenth or the early nineteenth century, the "Little Nicholas" and the Church of St. George of the eighteenth century, a large number of structures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of the Kievan-Mezhyhirye Monastery of the Transfiguration, the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul in Podil of

[1] [1933 - Ukraine Capital was moved to Kiev from Kharkiv --Analyst]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the eighteenth century, the bell-tower of the Kiev-Kiril-Troitsky 346
Monastery of the eighteenth century built by the architect Ivan 661 ●
Hryhorovych-Barsky, the Church of Sts. Borys and Hlib of the 633
eighteenth century, the Church of the Birth of Christ and the "good Nicholas," built by Andry Melensky at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Church of the Tithes, the celebrated statue of Samson by Hryhorovych-Barsky, and a long series of other monuments and buildings.

Almost all of these buildings came from those periods when the Ukrainians were the most free from Russian influence or, as in the case of the Mazepa baroque, had the closest contacts with the West. It was a deliberate part of the Communist attempt to rewrite the Ukrainian past.

Of course, their excuse was that the old primarily ecclesiastical culture stood in marked contradiction to the modern era of industrialization and collectivization, the "glorious age of Stalin" which called for the development of a new type of architecture. Still, in a surprising number of cases these new buildings did not make their appearance and the ground was left empty or covered with insignificant structures which could better have been placed on the site of those half-ruined shacks and hovels which were the real expressions of the Communist paradise.

The primary object[1] was the annihilation of the Ukrainian spirit 626
and represented part of the broad general movement which had 186
been launched for the rerussification of the country and the stopping in every way of that spontaneous outburst of development which had been called into being by the downfall of tsarism and the founding of the Ukrainian National Republic. The general debacle was now complete.

Within four years, before the ending of the first Five Year Plan a situation had been brought about which seemed to the Soviet authorities a guarantee of their final victory over what they were pleased to call bourgeois nationalism but which was, in realty, the logical outgrowth of the Ukrainian aspirations throughout the centuries.

[1] [in destruction of churches & monuments of past in Kiev--Analyst

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Ukraine in the Late Thirties

With the power of Moscow thus defined and reasserted by 668 the free vote of the Moscow-controlled Communist representatives of the various independent republics that formed part of the USSR, the way was open for the next step. Stalin had not only prepared himself legally at home by a clever use of contradictory expressions but he had taken advantage of the good will of the liberals and progressives of the rest of the world by exploiting the distrust which they felt for Hitler and the Nazis and had infiltrated Communists through the media of popular fronts into nearly all the governments that boasted of their democracy.

Next came the bewildering series of trials which were now held 661 in Moscow. In quick succession Yagoda, the dreaded head of 687 the NKVD, was removed from his post, arrested and shot by his successor Yezhov, whose name was soon to become even more detested. Then, in a series of three public trials which extended from the end of 1936 to 1938, nearly all of the old Bolshevik leaders who had played important roles in Soviet life during the period of Lenin's domination were condemned for counter-revolutionary activity and either shot or sentenced to long terms of deportation, from which they did not return. The list included such names as Bukharin, the former theoretician of the Party, Zinovyev, the master of the Leningrad Soviet, the leading supporters of Trotsky, Rykov, etc. At the same time Marshal Tukhachevsky, the commander of the Red Army in its unsuccessful drive against Warsaw in 1920, Marshal Yegorov, the leader of the southern wing of that army with which Stalin himself had served as political commissar and most of the other leading officers were removed and

661 suffered the same fate on the ground that they were intriguing
687 with Hitler or with the capitalist imperialists.

The Yezhovshchina, as it was called, raged over the entire territory of the Soviet Union and was directed with especial fury against all the leading men in all walks of life, directors of government offices, directors of factories, directors of collective farms, and army officers, if they could possibly be suspected of being disloyal to the Stalinist regime or of having independent thoughts.

The world looked on in amazement, for the Moscow regime seemed to have gone completely mad in its accusations and suspicions. The charges that were made against the outstanding personalities seemed fantastic and contradicted everything that any one knew of the character and actions of the outstanding Communist leaders. To some it seemed as if the revolution were devouring its own children, for Stalin was executing men for proposing policies which he had later adopted himself, as he had in the case of both the right and left deviationists from the general line of the party. To others it seemed an alarming example of the infiltration of all forms of life by the agents of Nazism. All agreed that the actions were extreme and far reaching.

As the purge of the administrative machinery went on, its range increased. Once the head of a bureau or a factory were implicated, the way was open to charge all of his subordinates who had not denounced him with being accessory to his crimes and they were called up and punished or, in rare cases, were acquitted and promoted. The storm continued until late in 1938 when Yezhov himself was removed and suffered the same fate at the hands of the Georgian Beria, who guided the NKVD through World War II.

If such was the fury in the RSFSR, it can well be imagined what were the results in Ukraine, where the Ukrainian Communists had set the fashion of accusing their opponents of bourgeois nationalism. When the storm broke, Postyshev, who had been sent down in 1933 to wipe out bourgeois nationalism, to organize the famine and to break the Ukrainian renaissance, was among the first to go. He was removed and disappeared at the hands of Kaganovich, who reemerged for a while as the strong man of the

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Lyubchenko, who had been appointed the Prime Minister of the UkSSR on the single program of suppressing Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, was called to Moscow to confront the self-confessed leaders of the nationalists and, on his return to Kiev, he shot himself. His successor, Bondarenko, disappeared without a trace. 661 687

Who were these self-confessed leaders? Prominent among them was A. Khvylya, who had been the champion of the general line against Khvylovy and Skrypnyk and who had been the dominant figure in the attack on the Ukrainian literary men and scholars. For years he had resorted to all kinds of attacks to bring Ukrainian grammar and language closer to Russian. He now "voluntarily" confessed that he had worked against the "elder brother" and had joined and aided in developing a secret military force several million strong for the sole purpose of separating Ukraine from the USSR and he swore that in this he had the active aid of Lyubchenko and most of the officials of the UkSSR. Finis.

Zatonsky, the Commissar of Education, was accused of another crime. He had drawn years before the fire of Gorky for suggesting that a mixed language be introduced into Ukrainian schools as the means of absorbing Ukrainian into Russian. He had speedily withdrawn his recommendations under fire and all had seemed forgiven. It was not, and Zatonsky disappeared in the holocaust.

It then came the turn of the writers. Men like Kulyk, who had [538] run roughshod over the older writers and had called for their liquidation, were now found guilty of bourgeois nationalism and with them most of the authors who had emerged during the shattering of the Ukrainian renaissance and who had celebrated the turning of the Ukraine into a collectivized and industrialized state. Each and every one of them confessed that they had been guilty of bourgeois nationalism and they received the due reward for their crimes.

There was hardly a family in Ukraine which did not suffer the accusation of at least one member. The survivors who have escaped abroad have given lurid tales of the extent to which the feeling of distrust and suspicion spread among all classes of the

661 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers
681 and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses
and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in
631 eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities
166 continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] The object of these purges[1] and these changes was the breaking up of the population into individual entities who would recognize
[156] no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the
186 interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

[1] [During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

simply Russians was constantly increased. It was almost forbidden 626
to mention the name Ukrainian in connection with the older settlers 186
in Kuban, along the Don, in the Green Wedge along the Amur, etc. [191]
and it was a matter of perplexity as to what language they could be said to speak or what dialect in connection with later studies of the dialects of the Russian language. It was inadmissible to regard them as speaking a peasant dialect in view of the attitude of the authorities in recognizing some sort of Ukrainian, but it was even worse to believe that Ukrainian could exist in those regions and so they were simply passed over and forgotten, while the newcomers, usually being under some kind of a ban, were simply treated as Russian deportees.

Even this was not the whole story, for in such cities as Vinnytsya 661
during these same years[1] the population was slaughtered by the thousands and buried secretly in carefully hidden burial places which were then turned into parks and playgrounds to conceal the extent of the crimes. This was repeated in many places but the situation in Vinnytsya attracted especial attention because during the War, the Germans found the places of burial and revealed the thousands of bodies of the victims, many of whom had been buried alive. The extent of these massacres was as great as was the killing of the Polish officers in Katyn, which was likewise brought to light during the war.

By the time the census of 1939 was taken and this was the last 162
one published, the growth of the number of Russians and the diminution of Ukrainians showed clearly that there was a large scale transfer of nationality which completely reversed the figures in some sections of Asia without regard for the natural laws of reproduction and mortality.

In this atmosphere the nature of the intellectual and literary 626
work in the UkSSR can well be imagined. The Ukrainian scholars 814
were forced to accept the full Russian theories of the Ukrainian 661
past. This led to a complete revaluation of all the "outstanding figures." In 1933 the career of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was condemned on the ground that he was a typical representative of the noble classes. By the outbreak of World War II he became a Rus-

[1] [1936-1938 - - Analyst]

626 sian patriot for signing the Treaty of Pereyaslav and bringing the
814 Zaporozhian Kozaks under Muscovite domination. It was so in
● 661 every branch of historical study. In back of the conception of the Soviet man and Soviet patriotism began to emerge with ever greater clarity the conception of Russian patriotism, as the doctrine of the "elder brother" who had given culture and civilization to the other nations of the Soviet Union became clearer and clearer.

626 It was the same thing in language. Khvylya and his friends
814 had been working on a Ukrainian-Russian dictionary but this was
191 immediately criticized by *Pravda* for its divisive tendencies, and the guilty compilers were liquidated. A new edition was started in 1938 on still a new principle. The Ukrainian and Russian words were to have the same number of synonyms and these were to have identical value. If, in any particular case, this did not prove to be true, it was so much the worse for the Ukrainian. If there were more words in Ukrainian to express various shades of one idea that there were in Russian, the words were banned. If there were fewer, the Russian words were supplied in order to show the influence that Russian had had upon the cultural development of Ukrainian.

The result was the reverse of what Zatonsky had proposed. He had suggested a mixed language with the idea that the Ukrainians would develop by practice toward the use of standard Russian. Now the new Commissariat of Education was introducing Russian into Ukrainian, forbidding the use of Ukrainian syntactical constructions which had no parallel in Russian in order to train the Ukrainians to speak Russian by infiltrating it into their native speech. The result would have been perhaps the same, but the important difference was that it preserved the supremacy of the Russian language in a pure form and corrupted the Ukrainian beyond recognition.

538 This procedure was too violent, even for many of the poets
191 and writers who were most ardent in their support of the Stalinist
626 regime. Men like Bazhan, who had put his pen entirely at the disposal of Moscow, continued to use some of the forbidden words and even obtained rewards for their obsequious phrases couched in

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

After the expulsion of the Soviet Forces from Western 636 Ukraine in 1920, the territory, including Eastern Galicia and Lviv, 563 had remained under Polish rule and had been subjected to a policy of Polonization and colonization by a Polish population. There had been during the period between the wars many clashes and much unpleasantness between the two nationalities and the ill will thus generated promised disastrous consequences for Poland in case of a new war. At the same time the Polish domination had never threatened the fundamental forms of Ukrainian social life, as had been the case in the UkSSR; the Ukrainians had a certain representation in the Polish Parliament, and they had been allowed, despite hindrances, to develop their own economic life. With the possible exception of the one district of Boryslav, there was very little Communism among the population, who were well aware of the handicaps under which their brothers in the UkSSR were living. At the same time the Nazi refusal to support the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine in the spring of 1939 had placed them on their guard against the Nazis.

Thus, when World War II broke out on September 1, 1939, [661] ● the revolt of the Ukrainians which many Poles expected did not [726] take place. However, the Polish government in the first days arrested and placed in concentration camps many of the Ukrainian leaders but they were freed by the rapid advance of the German forces and the Polish retreat, which forced into Lviv and the neighborhood many thousands of refugees.

On August 23, 1939, when the Nazis and the Soviets signed a 728 non-aggression treaty, it was provided that if Poland were disintegrated, Germany and the USSR would divide the territory

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

The old newspapers ceased at once to appear,[1] but the new occupants started in all of the main cities new Communist newspapers as the *Free Ukraine* in Lviv and the *Soviet Ukraine* in Stanyslaviv. They allowed also a Communist Polish newspaper the *Red Flag* and a similar paper in Yiddish. 728 [204]

The old officials were at first encouraged to return to their posts, whether they were Polish or not but in a very short time they began to disappear and they were replaced by Ukrainian-speaking persons, some from the neighborhood and some from eastern Ukraine. At almost the same time, while preparations were begun for the proposed plebiscite, the authorities quietly picked up and incarcerated most of the old political leaders, especially those of the UNDO, the Ukrainian National Democratic League, the representatives of those parties that had sought a normalization of relations with the Poles. [661]

In the same slow and unobstrusive way the Polish police of the different cities were replaced by a "national militia." This was composed of armed groups of young men who more or less volunteered for the work of maintaining order. The Ukrainian and the Jewish organizations tried to bring these self-appointed groups under control but this proved a difficult task for, in many cases, the new Soviet authorities had encouraged some of the more lawless and tumultuous elements to undertake the work so as to profit themselves by the resultant chaos and to facilitate the calling in of their own people. [625]

This era of anxiety on the part of the population and of extreme moderation on the part of the occupying forces lasted for almost a month, while preparations were being made for the election of representatives of all organizations, factories, and groups to a National Assembly for the consideration of reunion with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Meetings were held everywhere, at which attendance was compulsory, and everywhere there was expressed by selected speakers the gratitude of the people for their liberation from the Polish lords and the imperialistic capitalists. Khrushchov and other high functionaries arrived from Kiev to conduct these elections and to superintend the preparation of the lists of delegates. Yet it was almost at once noted that while there 728 666

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[1] [1939, Russian occupation of Poland -- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

436 the more favored because the Soviets equated in value the Polish zloty and the Soviet karbovanets. When we take into consideration the fact that prior to the war a pound of meat in Poland cost four zloty and in the UkSSR twenty-five to thirty karbovantsy, the vast purchasing power of the Soviet officials can be seen. Then in December,[1] to ruin the native population, they arbitrarily stopped the zloty as legal tender, so that the Ukrainian population lost everything, except those fortunate persons who had succeeded in exchanging their Polish money for German marks by clandestine trade across the border.

191 This swarm of officials was of various kinds. Those who were attached to fields like military affairs, the railroads, the posts and telegraphs, etc., i.e. those branches which were directly under the All-Union Commissariats, made no concealment of the fact that Russian was from now on to be the chief language. Other sections which were under the Commissariats in Kiev first adopted Ukrainian as their official tongue, but by the middle of 1940 they, too, had passed over to the use of Russian, exactly as had been done in all the offices in Kiev.

661 471 By the end of November,[1] when the supplies in the stores were already becoming exhausted, the actual work of nationalization commenced. The former owners were often thrown out, if their establishments had been of any size, and as former wealthy individuals they were refused food tickets and other privileges on the ground that they belonged to the non-laboring element and were enemies of the people. This meant that they were compelled to sell upon the black market everything that they had been able to save or which they possessed and which had not been confiscated, and during the winter many of them, like the Polish landlowners and the police who fell into Communist hands, were deported under atrocious and inhuman conditions to Kazakhstan and Central Asia to disappear.

[665] On the other hand, the Soviets introduced at once the idea of dining halls for the workers and special stores for Communists and higher functionaries where they could secure easily and cheaply whatever there was to be obtained in Western Ukraine.

[1] [1939--Analyst]

At the same time the nationalization of the land was commenced 423
and this gave a good excuse for the elimination of another class 471
of formerly prosperous people, whether they were Poles or Ukrainians. At first this was carried out along the lines of the Ukrainian land code of 1922, for the authorities were eager to get crops in when spring came. Still, during the summer of 1940 they began to urge the formation of collective farms. The peasants in some of the more backward regions listened to these ideas willingly, but in the better areas where agriculture was on a far higher and more efficient plane than in large sections of eastern Ukraine, they were very cool and meetings had to be postponed again and again if disorders were to be averted in the middle of the war. Still the Soviet authorities felt that they could waste some time until a real peace was restored and their hands were definitely free.

In regard to the educational establishments and all questions 661
of organization, they acted without delay. In the first days of the 814
occupation, the Soviet commissars seized the property of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and prevented all further work by confiscating the building and its contents and preventing all further publications. On January 14, 1940, they forced the complete self-liquidation of the Society. The president, Prof. Rakovsky, at once fled to the west and during the next uncertain months a large part of the active members made their way to Krakow in the Polish Government General, where they endeavored to resume their work. The Society was then turned into a branch of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR and was placed under the control of the administration in Kiev, while part of its collections and its work was placed under the University of Lviv, which was now ostensibly Ukrainianized and given the name of Ivan Franko, the great Western Ukrainian scholar and writer. This was not for long, for very soon here, too, the lecturers to win Soviet approval began to switch over from Ukrainian to Russian.

All other societies of every kind were abolished and fitted into 655
the Soviet scheme of things. The cooperative network, especially such great societies as the Maslosoyuz (Dairy Cooperative Society) and the People's Trade were made governmental organs. Various

655 firms were turned into branches of one commissariat or another. By the spring, while there had not yet been a full communization of the country, the process was well advanced and no resident of Western Ukraine could doubt as to the future of the area.

659 In Eastern Galicia, where the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite was the predominant religion, the Metropolitan Archbishop Andry Sheptytsky was not personally touched.[1] He was placed under more or less surveillance and found it impossible to exercise his normal activity. However, all the religious schools and seminaries under his charge were closed, the church and monastic lands were seized, and all ecclesiastical printing was suppressed. Finally, the clergy were compelled to hand over to the representatives of the government all the baptismal and other records which were incorporated in the work of the ZATS, the Soviet bureau of vital statistics. The clergy were treated as a non-working class [661] and were thus deprived of all means of livelihood, except for the free-will offerings of their impoverished parishioners.

In the eastern sections, where the Orthodox Church predominated, the same regulations were put into force with the additional proviso that the clergy had to transfer their allegiance from the Polish Orthodox Church to the locum tenens of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow. This was a first step in improving relations between the locum tenens and the Soviet government and in making the authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church a definite instrument of the government in the spreading of Russian Communism.

545 On the other hand, there was a considerable patronage of Ukrainian art. Certain scholars were rather favored. The Ukrainian theatre was supported on a more liberal scale than it had been under the Polish rule and there were in some quarters hopes that there might be a happy future. It was again a short dream, for [626] as 1940 came to a close, there began again the insistant but unobtrusive attempts at russification. Russian theatrical companies began to visit Lviv and other cities. The publications of the publishing firms of Lviv fell off and once more they found it necessary 000 to produce Russian books. The libraries were carefully purged of

[1] [1940 -- under Russian occupation -- Analyst]

The libraries were carefully purged of those authors who had fallen under the displeasure of Moscow 538 during the crushing of the Ukrainian renaissance and their works 626 were forbidden, just as in Eastern Ukraine. The books that were sent from Kiev were chiefly in Russian. Furthermore, those authors, poets, and artists who were still in Western Ukraine now found themselves regimented. They were given elaborate projects but they found that their success depended upon their ability not to express themselves freely but to satisfy the demands of the Soviet authorities. As a result many of them endeavored to get, in one way or another, to the west where even if they were under Nazi rule they still had more possibilities at the time than they did under the highly organized system sponsored by Moscow.

It was thus abundantly evident that the "liberation" of Western 661 ● Ukraine was but the exchange of one master for a still sterner rule. The realization of this fact came quickly and it very soon evoked a corresponding reaction which began to unite the entire population, the more so as even those few Communists in Western Ukraine who had remained true to their convictions were now seized by the Soviet authorities and punished on the ground that they were Trotskyists or were believers in one of the various deviations from the general line of the party. There were to be no Communists except those who had passed through the Soviet training school and those people who had believed that their Communist faith would be of profit to them found themselves in as wretched a position as had Eastern Ukrainian Communists like Khvylovy and Skrypnyk who had gained nothing by their independence, except death and destruction.

Thus, by the spring of 1941 conditions in Western Ukraine were rapidly assuming the same form that they had taken in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Any hopes that there would be any exception or any toleration for the area were once and for all annihilated when the Soviets attacked Finland and, still more, when, in the summer of 1940, they absorbed and turned into Soviet Republics the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The Soviets were shown clearly to be on the march and it was for the people to protect themselves as best they could.

CHAPTER TWENTY

The German Attack on the Soviets

During the period from 1939 to 1941, the German 648
policy toward those Ukrainians who had escaped from the Soviet 563
occupation into the Polish Government General was not too severe. It was possible for the Ukrainians in Krakow and elsewhere to carry on a considerable amount of educational work, to form themselves into relief organizations and, in general, to work for the establishment of normal relations.

When the breach between the two totalitarian states came on 721
June 22, 1941, the Germans pushed ahead rapidly not only in the Baltic area but also in Ukraine. By June 30, they had occupied Lviv with the aid of some Ukrainian units, both from Carpatho-Ukraine and from Galicia.

During these days the Ukrainians had high hopes that the Germans would seriously liberate them from Bolshevik tyranny and wherever they had the slightest possibility, they endeavored to seize the cities so as to put a stop to the massacres which the Communists were perpetrating before they fell back. In some places
they were successful but in Lviv, the Communists killed over [661]
10,000 prisoners, before their bloody regime could be brought to an end.

In the first days of the war, although there were no clear 642
promises made to the Ukrainians, the impression grew that there would be established some form of a Ukrainian administration. The political leaders set up a Ukrainian government and appointed Yaroslav Stetsko as the first head of the state on June 30, 1941. A short time later this was broadened by the appointment of a Committee of Seniors under the leadership of Dr. Kost Levytsky, who had been the Prime Minister of the Republic of Western

642 Ukraine in 1918. These developments had the support of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, although he knew that they did not yet rest on organized public sentiment.

It was well recognized by the influential Ukrainians that the situation was very different from what it had been at the end of the Hapsburg monarchy, but they went through the motions of setting up a government on the possibility that the Germans would allow them some real concessions and that it would be mutually advantageous to be already prepared for all eventualities.

721 It is perhaps possible that a part of the German armed forces
648 looked with a certain toleration at these developments, for at least
a part of the officer class realized that the task of the German
government would be greatly facilitated, if they were able to
normalize the situation and win some support from the population,
as they had in the Polish Government General. This did not suit
the Nazi element who believed that the advance of the German
• [661] forces was only to secure more *Lebensraum* for Germany. This
faction struck and struck hard at the new regime and secured the
arrest of Stetsko, Levytsky, Bandera and Melnyk, all of whom were
taken to prison in Germany where they were kept for nearly four
years.

The arrest of the leaders, while it was a crushing blow, still was not completely fatal. The advance of the German troops was so rapid on the way to Kiev that the Ukrainian leaders continued for some months to inspire the population not to resist the Germans, the more so as the western regiments of the Red Army surrendered in large masses. Thus when Kiev fell, some 675,000 of the Red Army surrendered with scarcely a blow.

On the other hand, the Soviets attempted to devastate the country before they withdrew, shooting the Ukrainian intelligentsia indiscriminately and trying to seize as many as they could for evacuation beyond the Urals. They demolished factories, tried to remove finished articles and mined the cities before they abandoned them. Then, when they exploded the mines, they spread the story that the total work of demolition had been carried on by the Germans.

On August 1, the Germans made a new division of the country 648 and assigned the whole of Galicia to the Polish Government General. 727 At the same time they returned Bukovyna and Bessarabia to Rumania and then set up a new section around Odesa under the name of Transdnistria which they likewise placed under Rumania. It was in vain that the Ukrainians who tried to organize their own national rada in Kiev protested against such actions, for their protests were not received and the Nazis went on with their policy of ignoring all the wishes of the population.

Later in the month, the Germans established the Reichskom- 727 missariat of Ukraine and placed it under the control of a fanatical 661 Nazi, Erich Koch, who set himself during the next years to crush anything and everything that was done to aid the Ukrainians and to win for himself the detested title of the butcher of Ukraine.

In the early months of the German occupation and especially [727] during the period of rapid military movements, much was done for the rebuilding of the country after the ravages of the Bolsheviks. Nearly 115 Ukrainian newspapers were established, plans were made for the opening of schools and during the transition from the military rule to the rule of Koch, the Ukrainian agents were in the front ranks of the German army, spreading their propaganda and trying to rouse the population against the Bolsheviks.

Yet this work did not please the Germans. Everywhere in eastern Europe the old governments that had been suppressed by the Bolsheviks tried to recreate themselves but everywhere there came the arrests of these leaders and their deportation, so that it was not many months before the sober thought of the liberated peoples turned against the new occupants and the people realized that their hopes were going to be in vain. By the end of 1941, it had been made clear to them that there would be no relaxation of the pressure exerted upon them.

In the Reichskommissariat which, in fact, represented little more than the right bank of the Dnieper area, for the army retained the control over the regions to the east of the river, it speedily became impossible for the Ukrainians to improve their own condition. The Germans were guided by a strictly logical program.

727 •661 [241] Inasmuch as all the land was organized in collective farms and the title to these rested in the Soviet government, they as conquerors merely took over the land of their defeated rivals. They continued the same kind of collectivized agriculture, since it brought them the greatest advantages and they had no intention of doing anything for the Ukrainian population. Koch made it clear that the Ukrainians had no rights that the Germans were bound to respect. Their property was not theirs but it was reserved for Germans and once the system was in the saddle, as shown by Koch's Twelve Commandments for the regulation of the relations of the two peoples, he did everything to destroy completely the Ukrainian intellectual life.

[538] [466] By the winter of 1941-2, the Germans in Kiev were executing Ukrainian writers as O. Teliha and Dr. Oleh Kandyba-Olzhych, who were accused of plotting against the new masters. Soon there began extensive deportations of Ukrainians to Germany for slave labor and the number of victims from the ranks of the cooperatives rapidly grew.

668 These German actions naturally roused the Ukrainians to a more vigorous opposition and resulted in the formation of numerous armed bands which, from secure hiding places in the forests and swamps, raided German convoys and at times extended their open control over large areas of the country. Among the first of these bands to appear was that of the Polyssian Sich under the command of Taras Bulba—Borovets which operated in Polissya and Volynia. Other significant and important movements were started by the followers of Bandera (the so-called Banderivtsy) and of Melnyk. Yet these groups were not alone for almost spontaneously there sprang up many other local units, all interested in the same goal of Ukrainian independence. Some of these units were organized primarily to fight against Soviet irregulars. Others had seen from the beginning their most dangerous foe as the Germans but whatever their origin, the overbearing brutality of the Germans swung these groups to a determined warfare against them.

668 725 This process continued during most of 1942 with the Ukrainian forces taking over more and more control from the Germans,

668 tried to break this up but they were unsuccessful and the police
725 battalion which was assigned to the operation was destroyed. Out of this Conference developed the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations which adopted as its program, "Freedom to peoples, freedom to the individual."

[701] It would take too long to describe the actual nature of the military operations which the U. P. A. carried on. At the height of its power it controlled more than 200,000 square miles of Ukrainian territory and numbered some 220,000 soldiers divided into four main bands: the U. P. A. North, operating in Polissya and northern Volynia; the U. P. A.—West in Eastern Galicia and Kholmshchyna; the U. P. A. —South in northern Bukovyna and the provinces of Kamyanets Podilsky and Vinnytsya; and the U. P. A.—East north of Kiev and Zhytomyr. There were separate detachments in most of the cities and important towns.

[661] To oppose its operations, the Germans resorted to mass executions and on more than one occasion detached forces of one or two divisions to try to destroy its centres. These attempts failed and the U. P. A. by its constant efforts played an important part in isolating the German forces, upsetting their communications and sapping their strength. All this was very costly, for after every major blow the Germans executed large numbers of innocent Ukrainians as their one weapon against the movement.

At first there was relative peace in Galicia, but in the summer of 1943 a Soviet partisan detachment entered the province. The Germans took little action and the U. P. A. came to the support of the population and soon had established strong centres in the Carpathian Mountains, where the difficult terrain facilitated their maintenance of strong positions.

[127] The Germans in the beginning did not want to admit that their policy toward the Ukrainians had evoked such a strong response. Koch and his associates were only too willing to believe that the Ukrainians were an inferior race, undeserving of education or of consideration and they went out of their way to label the U. P. A. the product of Communist intrigue and a movement of support for the Jews, etc.

in 1939, now received a new master. As soon as the Soviet forces 728
entered the region in the autumn of 1944, they immediately began 648
a campaign to liberate this area from Czecho-Slovakia and reunite it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It was the same old story carried on in the same way as in 1939. There was a mass of petitions apparently prepared by the native population asking for liberation, but these were in reality the work of a handful of carefully selected Communists.

They speedily reached their goal and on June 29, 1945, President Benes of Czechoslovakia recognized the justice of their claims and by an agreement handed over the entire province which was duly reunited with their brothers in Moscow. This brought together under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic nearly all the Ukrainians, except a few who were still living in Poland and in a small stretch of territory which the UkSSR voluntarily ceded to Poland to satisfy the increasing claims of the Polish Communists and their needs in their efforts to cement their power in that state.

At the same time the realization by the Soviet authorities of the seriousness of the situation offered by the U. P. A. and the unrest among the Ukrainians led them to act on both the foreign
and the domestic front. On the former they mobilized all of their [208]
friends and dupes abroad to stress the connection of the U. P. A., [725]
the "Bandera bandits," and the Nazi criminals and they achieved considerable success in closing the eyes of the west until they had won considerable victories over the various U. P. A. groups, for too many Western leaders failed to see the inconsistency that they preached. At one and the same time the Soviet authorities boasted of their complete control of the territory of Western Ukraine, thanks to the love of the population for the Red Army and in almost the same breath they declaimed against these armed forces which were holding up the advance of the Red Army and the NKVD in the very areas where the people were thirsting for liberation.

On the domestic front in the autumn of 1945 they sent a large 661 ●
force of men into the Carpathian area under the command of 668
Khrushchov as Premier of the UkSSR and General Ryasny, the 725

661 668 725 Minister of War, to endeavor to suppress these bands. Despite unprecedented torture of the population, the Soviets found that their progress was not so great as they had expected, for few of the Ukrainian units in their forces were enthusiastic about the campaign, when they saw the measures that the government was taking against their own families.

In the spring of 1946, they made another attempt, this time using some fifteen divisions of NKVD troops from the Far East, Siberia and Leningrad under the direct control of General Colonel Moskalenko. The authorities had been goaded to this renewed demonstration of force by the fact that the town of Stanislav in the Carpathian area had been seized by five battalions of the U. P. A. on October 31, 1945 as a discouragement to the Ukrainians to participate in the Soviet elections called for February 10, 1946. Despite the efforts of the Soviet guards, a considerable portion of the population failed to vote and when the attacks upon them were pressed, a detachment of the U. P. A. succeeded on May 3, 1946, in ambushing Moskalenko and killing him and his chief aids. This ended another campaign and still left the U. P. A. in control of parts of the Carpathian area.

668 725 In addition to these operations on purely Ukrainian territory, the U. P. A. undertook several raids across the borders in order to encourage dissatisfaction with Soviet rule among some of the neighboring peoples. Thus they established contact with similar groups in Slovakia, Byelorussia and Lithuania, while others cut their way across Hungary into Yugoslavia to join forces with the opponents of Communism in that area.

The raids into Slovakia were especially successful throughout 1945 and 1946 and were continued on a smaller scale during the next years. They served as an encouragement for the anti-Communist elements of the population and, of far more importance in the long run, they attracted the attention of Western journalists who for the first time began to realize the extent of the discontent that prevailed in the Soviet Union. More than that, with every step to the West, they were brought closer to the Western Zones of Germany and Austria and several well-armed detachments have

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

Soviet Ukraine During World War II

In the preceding chapters we have briefly traced the efforts 722
of the Ukrainians to profit by the clash between the two totalitarian 661 ●
powers of Germany and the USSR and the Ukrainian hopes of 538
being recognized as an independent state. These hopes had been thwarted by the Nazi refusal to treat the Ukraine as anything except a field for German expansion and the Western refusal to recognize the Ukrainian struggle for independence.

This, of course, does not tell the entire story. From the earliest days of the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine, many of the leading Ukrainian patriots, writers, artists and scholars, including a large part of the staff of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in [814]
Lviv, had seized the opportunity to retire to the west into the Polish Government General but there were many more who were picked up in the early deportations and deposited along with the Poles in Central Asia. Some of these, during the brief period of friendship between the Poles and the Soviets, were again able to make their way to the west along with General Anders and found themselves again at freedom, while those who had retired to the west were forced to undergo increasing persecution at the hands of the Nazis as these became more desperate.

On the other hand, when the break finally came in 1941 and the Ukrainians, including those mobilized in the Red Army, began to surrender in masses, the Soviets began to deport to the east all of the outstanding people on whom they could lay their hands and whom at the first moment they did not wish to exterminate. In this number there were such Ukrainian writers as Tychyna, Rylsky and others who had showed their loyalty to the regime by their tasteless flattery of the regime in Moscow.

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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722 In the same way, the authorities gathered up in frenzied haste machinery, finished products, and records and started them likewise to the east with the hope of setting them up somewhere in a safe place and using them to increase the Soviet war potential. All this was a hurried and confused process, for it was contradicted by the Soviet orders to reduce the Ukraine to a heap of ruins and to leave nothing available for the invaders.

[814] The clash between these two ideas was vividly reflected in the [661] destruction of Kiev. Some sections of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR were hurriedly packed on trains and moved to Ufa. Other sections for little better reasons were abandoned in the general confusion or were mined for immediate destruction. Priceless books and records, no less than boilers and lathes, shared the two fates, while Kiev, thoroughly mined, was exploded and set on fire without regard for the needs of the people. The Soviet authorities, well aware that they could not evacuate the entire population, destroyed the food supplies of those who were left behind while other detachments massacred the helpless population indiscriminately.

The situation at Kharkiv and Odesa was far better and far more logical for the Soviets had a few days longer to sort out what they wished to remove and what they wanted to destroy, but even in these places there was the same wanton destruction which conflicted with the avowed aims of the Soviet authorities.

Then ensued a series of mutual recriminations, and it is still not clear in regard to many buildings and institutions whether the bulk of the damage and the losses were caused by Nazi or by Communist actions. Some 3500 carloads of machinery were shipped alone from the city of Zaporyzhzhya and most of this material was packed at night in utter darkness with no special care as to where it was being sent.

[466] The same situation confronted the workers, some 5,000,000 of whom were evacuated from the Ukraine and landed in rough factories that were hastily erected somewhere in Asia. These sometimes lacked even roofs and means of heating when the mercury dropped to 45° below zero.

722 814 no efforts were made to bring them together or to conduct a revival of the Ukrainian work that had been so ruthlessly and needlessly shattered. It was a wartime device adopted for a passing situation and the masters in the Kremlin well understood that the fury of the war had done more than they had ever dreamed possible for the disintegration of the various Soviet Republics. Once, therefore, the evacuation had taken place, the Soviet leaders had only to sit by and to reap the profits. There would be plenty of time for that later and so the war years seemed an intermission in the relentless pressure that had been exerted in the past.

648 ● 661 [167] It was for the Soviet leaders a far more vital problem to recover the masses of the people who had fled to the west or had been carried away by the Germans and who might, even in case of a victory of the democratic powers, reveal the full force of the Soviet pressure. That was why they welcomed the Yalta Agreement which provided for the compulsory return to the USSR of all refugees and deported persons and why, once peace was restored, they showed such devilish ingenuity in trying to recover the control of every one who could testify from personal experience as to the nature of the Soviet rule.

It was with the greatest surprise and lack of comprehension that the Western leaders became aware of this situation. They had listened eagerly to the Soviet siren songs that it was only Nazi sympathizers and criminals and traitors who did not want to return under the Soviet rule and it required some months before supposedly serious statesmen recovered their equilibrium sufficiently to understand the way in which they had been duped in the middle of the war.

Yet, no sooner had Soviet rule been reestablished than the old processes were revived with even greater energy and vigor. The last masks of independence or of free thought in the cultural or economic fields were torn away and the old persecution and charges were pressed with every increasing zeal.

Western world, the Soviet Union conferred upon the Ukrainian 631
Soviet Republic the right to have its own anthem and its own 648
national flag.

These actions were not to be interpreted as a concession from Moscow, although they were presented in that guise. They were rather intended to strengthen the Soviet position in international affairs and by an appearance of generosity to facilitate the reduction of the satellite states to the same position as that held by the Union Republics. In this sense they were a response to the centralizing tendencies which were now to be expressed in a still stronger form.

As soon as hostilities ended and even before the Soviets were 665
assured of all their hopes, they began to purge again the Ukrainian 661
Communist Party and within a few months some 38% of the high officials were removed on the ground of bourgeois nationalism. All those who had not retreated to the east or could not show that they were working throughout the war as zealous Soviet partisans were summarily exiled as bourgeois nationalists. In the same way, when the enforced return of displaced persons began under the Yalta Agreement, very few were allowed to return to their homes. The vast majority were either executed for surrendering to the Germans or were sent to the labor camps in the far north and east for reeducation.

The Fourth Five Year Plan which was commenced in 1946 127
was very definitely devoted to the restoration of the country after the ravages of the war and to the increase of the Soviet capacity for defense. It was only in Ukraine and Byelorussia that the restoration had to absorb the energies of a considerable majority of the population, for while there were areas in the neighborhood of Leningrad and Stalingrad which had been badly devastated, the situation in the Ukraine was far worse. The cities and factories had been destroyed, the mines had been flooded and the population were living as best they might among the ruins which had been left by the two invading armies.

At the same time the work of restoration went very slowly. [316]
Less than one third of the miners of the Donbas had returned to

more opportunity to absorb the current thought of the west than 538
they had had in eastern Ukraine. Therefore, the pressure against 626
them has been applied even more strongly and still more Russians have been sent to remodel the life in Lviv than was necessary for Kiev. The process of russification was started later but it has been pushed more energetically. The net result is the same,—the impoverishment of Ukrainian culture as a whole and the substitution for it of a shabby form of Russian Muscovite Communist culture, which is to be tolerated only until there can be a full absorption.

Yet that process has not been so easy. Hardly a week passes 661
that some of the higher units in the Soviet service do not discover a new nest of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, and most frequently among the members and officers of the KP/b/U. It has been made evident that the Russian Communists cannot hope to achieve their goal until they have eliminated the entire Ukrainian population. They are trying to do it, but despite the millions of their victims and their attempts to separate the Ukrainian children from their parents and to rear them as slaves for Russian factories, they have not succeeded in winning the population to their views.

From the cultural point of view, the post-war period has been even more depressing than were the thirties. It has been drabber, like the lives of the people, but it has not served as yet to eliminate that spark of hope which alone preserved the Ukrainians during the hard periods of tsarism when they were subjects and slaves on their own territories, which were not their own to govern or to develop.

795 in the attempt to revive a native and independent Ukrainian
793 government. This was, of course, prevented by the Germans and
the Archbishop remained at Lviv scarcely more free during the German occupation of Ukraine than he had been under the Soviets. He continued his efforts to unite both the Ukrainian Catholic and Autocephalous Churches without effect, but he was able to do considerable for the well-being of his people. Still he was no longer free to act openly, although his advice was sought whenever and wherever it could be.

The Soviets reoccupied Lviv on July 27, 1944 and at once set to work more vigorously to introduce their system. Archbishop Sheptytsky did not long survive for he passed away on November 1 of the same year. He was succeeded in his post by Joseph Slipy, who had been one of his outstanding assistants and the rector of the Theological Academy which Metropolitan Sheptytsky had founded in the late twenties, when it had became evident that the Poles would not allow the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviv.

659 Metropolitan Slipy had barely been installed in office, when
795 the Soviets showed their hand and began to call for a condemnation
793 of the Vatican by the Ukrainian Catholics and for their union
● 661 with Moscow. It did not take long for words to turn into
actions.

On April 15, 1945, the NKVD surrounded the Cathedral of St. George in Lviv and arrested the Metropolitan, Bishop Budko and Bishop Charnetsky together with many other leaders. They arrested all of the students of the Theological Academy and they likewise seized the Cathedral and turned it over to the Patriarch of Moscow as a Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, they informed the professors of the Theological Seminary that the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite had ceased to exist.

At almost the same time the NKVD gathered in the other Catholic bishops in Western Ukraine, Bishop Khomyshyn of Stanislaviv and his vicar, Bishop Lyatyshevsky, while at the same time the Polish Communist regime seized Bishop Kotsylovsky of Pere-

myshl and his auxiliary bishop, Lakota. Bishops Khomyshyn and 659
Kotsylovsky soon died under the treatment that they received. 795

The others were kept in prison and then in 1946, according to 793
the best available information, Metropolitan Slipy and his asso- 661
ciates were sent to labor camps in the far north in the Vorkuta
coal mines. From that time they have disappeared from sight.

In 1947, the last Catholic bishop of this rite, Bishop Romzha of Carpatho-Ukraine, while travelling through his diocese "collided" accidentally with a Soviet tank and was killed and this ended the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy in their own lands. The following year the Rumanian government followed suit and likewise annihilated the hierarchy of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite in Transylvania. In 1950 the Czech Communist regime arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment Bishop Hoydych and his coadjutor Hopka of the diocese of Prashev in Slovakia.

These actions were followed in each case by attacks upon the lower clergy, who were ordered to accept the supremacy of the Patriarch of Moscow. This was fully in the tradition of the old Russian Church, for each time that the tsars had bitten off a slice of Ukraine, they had applied the same methods to the Catholic hierarchy in the section, to the intent that the Byzantine rite could be performed only under the supervision of the Russian authorities.

In this case in 1945, on July 1, when the Soviet Ukrainian Commissar for Religion, Khodchenko, called on the clergy to recognize the new situation, the professors of the Theological Academy met in Lviv in the Cathedral of St. George and presented a request that they be given the liberties accorded to them on paper by the Stalinist Constitution. The answer was their arrest and imprisonment.

Then the government set to work. They secured the apostasy of one of the foremost of the Ukrainian Catholic priests, Father Kostelnyk, who willingly put himself at the service of the Patriarch and presided over a "sobor" which was called to ratify the switch from the Vatican to the Patriarch. Many of the priests who attended were apparently members of the NKVD in disguise. They willingly applauded Stalin and the Patriarch and armed with this authority,

659 the Soviet regime set to work to seize all the churches and property
795 of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite and preempt it for
793 their own use.

●661 This marked the end of the open existence of the Church. There were still priests who escaped and took refuge with the U. P. A. (the Ukrainian underground) but open worship was at an end. There has been enforced at least a superficial agreement with the Kremlin on all matters of religion. Nevertheless, the latent hatred still exists and it can flare up at any moment when the situation warrants it.

The movements represented by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite still flourish in the emigration, where alone there is any opportunity for free thought. In the meanwhile, the Kremlin is maintaining its position in its traditional Muscovite manner and applying its savage punishments and deportations and executions to prove that Ukraine is happy and contented in following the example of the "elder brother." Yet even so, the number of episodes when Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism appears make it seem as if the officials of both church and state were not too sure that the Ukrainian people fully sympathize with the Patriarch Aleksey in his deification of the foremost man of the ages, who still forbids Communists to have anything to do with the Orthodox Church. That has sold its soul for as little real value as did the Ukrainian Communists in the early years of the struggle.

642 came from the Russian workers of the cities, or from outside the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government under Petliura was to a considerable extent discredited, because it had failed to devote sufficient attention to the needs of the peasantry and to [648] establish law and order. Moreover, by an eleventh-hour alliance with Poland, it had compromised its claim to represent the entire Ukrainian nation. This resulted from the fact that Galicia, which, upon the dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy had formed its own West Ukrainian Republic, was surrendered to the Warsaw regime as a price for aid in the east, a solution in which most Galicians refused to acquiesce. Nevertheless, Poland and the Soviet Union made peace, and shortly afterwards the remnants of the Ukrainian army and bureaucracy retreated across the border for internment in Poland. From this sanctuary a group of a few hundred under Colonel George Tiutiunnyk sortied in October, 1921, for a last desperate raid into the Soviet-occupied Ukraine.[22]

36 After that the East Ukraine lay under Communist rule, which 665. could no longer be challenged by military force. For a time, however, it appeared as if the rising tide of nationalist sentiment—it rose even among those who had long been adherents of Marxist doctrines—might bring about what arms had failed to accomplish. To understand this situation it is necessary to recall that the Communists under Lenin had modified their original stand in order to appeal to the nationalism of the non-Russians. In January, 1918, soon after the Bolsheviks came to power, the Third Congress of Soviets asserted a theoretical right of all the nations of the tsarist empire to go their several ways, to secede from the Bolshevik government in Moscow. At the same time, it deprived this right of any content by insisting that it be exercised only by the "toiling masses." Although the Communist Party's stand was more ambiguously phrased, its insistence that the interests of the toilers were represented only by the Communist Party and that the non-Russian Communist Parties formed inseparable parts of the central Bolshevik organization, in fact rendered self-determination a fiction. During the following years, the central Party [661] leadership used armed force when possible to insure that these local Communist Parties, thus reduced to mere branches of a

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[22] Mazepa, III, 96–105.

unified Party, should "rule" within each smaller nation which had formed part of the tsarist empire. [661] [665]

[656] Having provided for the initial objective of substantial Communist control, however, the Bolshevik leaders made sweeping statements against "Great Russian chauvinism," and directed that the culture of each nation be "national in form, socialist in content." Encouraged by this apparent desire for development of the national culture at the expense of the Russian cultural supremacy, which had been grafted on their peoples in tsarist days, many of the Communist leaders of the non-Russian nations set about vigorously promoting an independent cultural life as soon as Communist control was established. In the Ukraine, the major leader in the effort during the early twenties was the commissar of education, Alexander Shums'kyi; after his deposition in 1927 he was succeeded by Nicholas Skrypnyk, an even more devoted Communist, but a firm adherent of Ukrainian cultural nationalism.[23] To what extent these men were sincere adherents of Ukrainian nationalism and to what extent the favor they extended to it was motivated by a desire to secure popular support and to curb the overweening power of Moscow in the interest of an internationalism which, to them, was in closer accord with original Communist ideology, it is hard to say. At any rate, they went to very considerable lengths to encourage specifically Ukrainian traits and traditions, especially in scholarship, literature, and the schools. While these Communist supporters of Ukrainian nationalism always formed only one segment of the ruling group in the Ukraine, and hence could not completely eradicate Russian permeation of

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[23] No thorough treatment of the Ukraine under Soviet rule exists. Among the best brief analyses in English are John S. Reshetar, "National Deviation in the Soviet Union," *American Slavic and East European Review,* XII (April, 1953), 162–74; Michael Pap, "Soviet Difficulties in the Ukraine," *Review of Politics,* XIV (April, 1952), 204–32; and an older but generally accurate account by Lancelot Lawton, "Ukraina: Europe's Greatest Problem," *East Europe,* III (Spring, 1939), 28–45. The continuation of Hrushevs'kyi's *A History of the Ukraine* by Professor O. J. Frederiksen, based on notes by Luke Mishuha (Chapter XXV) is also useful, as are more general works on the Soviet system, such as Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), Chapter IV, and Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1950), I, 289–307. The sources are, of course, voluminous and highly scattered. I can claim no special mastery of them, although my limited acquaintance leads me to the conclusions cited in the text, which are approximately those of Reshetar and Pap.

186 Ukrainian cultural life, they nevertheless developed a generation of young people who were accustomed to think and write in the Ukrainian literary language, although many continued to regard the use of Russian as a sign of culture.

Perhaps the Communists of the Skyrypnyk group remained at heart more devoted to Communism than to nationalism. Such was certainly not the case with a very large group of intellectuals, some from the rising generation, others from the group which had supported the national governments of the revolutionary period but later accepted the Soviet regime. Foremost among the latter was Michael Hrushevs'kyi; although he had served for a time as president of the Rada, he decided to return to the Soviet Ukraine when it appeared to offer an outlet for nationalist activity. For him and his group, which consisted predominantly of scholars and men of letters, the real aim was to reverse the Communist prescription by building a culture "socialist in form, national in content." Thus Hrushevs'kyi, who had always accepted a certain amount of socialist doctrine as the basis for needed reforms in the Ukraine, occasionally made room for Marxist ideology in his historical writings but left it clear that the real apex of his values was the Ukrainian nation. Moreover, he and his group persistently maintained that historical and economic links bound the Ukraine more closely to Western Europe than to Russia.

From the Communist point of view, such ideas were dangerous enough in themselves; while Communism could tolerate for a time basically antipathetic forms, it could not allow its own forms
186 to be used as a cover for developing an independent ideology. It
661 appears that Stalin, the most ruthless insister on conformity, moved to crush the "national deviation" of the Ukrainians as soon as his power was sufficient; indeed, the first steps in this direction were taken as early as 1927. The great attack came in 1930, however, with the dismissal of Hrushevs'kyi from his academic post and the suppression of his scholarly organ *Ukraïna*. Along with this attack, which was carried out against all elements of intellectual life—including some obviously devout Marxists like the historian Iavors'kyi—which favored independent development of the Ukraine, went trials of suspect scholars who were

accused of having belonged to a subversive League for the Liberation 186
of the Ukraine.[24] That this campaign of suppression[1] coincided [661]
with the drive for the collectivization of agriculture in the 423
Ukraine is hardly coincidental. In many respects the Ukrainian peasant was much more profoundly affected by the establishment of the kolkhoz (Ukrainian *kolhosp*), or collective farm, than was the Russian. The former was frequently more prosperous, hence had more to lose; moreover, the lack of a traditional communal agricultural organization in the Ukraine made the new system more alien and repugnant.

It appears certain that the Ukrainian peasantry formed a disproportionate, if not predominant, part of the hapless millions deported as "kulaks" to Siberia or Kazakhstan or driven by famine to the primitive slums of the expanding Soviet cities. Very probably this situation created a potential basis for a national rebellion based on economic and social oppression by alien rulers, just as had the Polish and Russian preponderance in governmental and landowning groups before the war. The Communists were frequently forced to use non-Ukrainians, Russian and Jewish intellectuals, workers from the towns, where they had real support, or persons imported from Russia itself, in order to carry out collectivization. Consequently, it is probable that the suppression 661
of the nationalist intelligentsia at this time was at least in 517
part a precautionary step to destroy a group which was of limited danger in itself yet might have presented a real threat to the Communists if it could have utilized the discontent of the peasants to turn them to nationalism. To what extent the Soviet regime succeeded in eliminating the nationalist intellectuals is one of the principal topics which will be dealt with on the basis of the evidence provided in this study. It should be noted at this point,

[1] [1930 movement by Stalin to crush "national deviation"--Analyst]

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[24] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166; T. Skubyts'kyi, "Klassovaia bor'ba v ukrainskoi istoricheskoi literature" (The Class Struggle in Ukrainian Historical Literature), *Istorik-Marksist*, No. 17 (1930), pp. 27–40 (one of the principal Communist assaults on the Hrushevs'kyi school and other "deviationists"). The whole question of the purge of intellectuals, with special reference to historians, is discussed at length by Boris Krupnyts'kyi in "Die Ukrainische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sowjetunion 1921–1941," in *Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas*, 1941, pp. 125–51. For Skrypnyk's official statement, see his *Statti i promovy* (Articles and Speeches) (Kharkov: Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo Ukraïny, 1930), Vol. I: *Spil'ka Vyzvolennia Ukraïny* (The League for the Liberation of the Ukraine), pp. 413–36.

● [661] however, that their resistance was undoubtedly crushed between
517 1930 and the closing series of purge trials in 1937–38.[25]

While articulate nationalism was being crushed in the Soviet
186 Ukraine, a somewhat different development was taking place in
[563] the West Ukraine. In Poland the extreme policy of the ruling nationality, which had been chauvinistic enough under the Austrian empire, became still more violent toward the Ukrainians after the reestablishment of the Polish national state. As was previously noted,[1] Petliura's agreement with the Poles had been deeply resented by the Galician Ukrainians. While most nationalists endeavored to smooth over criticism of Petliura personally, especially after his assassination in Paris in 1925, most West Ukrainians gave no support to the émigré UNR government. The West Ukrainians, on the contrary, tried their own approaches to the problem of carrying on Ukrainian life under conditions of oppression by non-totalitarian, but intolerant, alien nationalist governments.

186 One attempted solution was the formation of legally recognized
665 parties which carried on electoral campaigns and sent representatives to the Polish Sejm or parliament where they attempted to protect the interests of their group within the framework of means permitted by the ruling nationality. This type of political activity, together with a wide variety of cultural work aimed at developing Ukrainian culture and maintaining the national distinctiveness of the masses, absorbed the efforts of a very large proportion of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia during the twenties and thirties. In particular, most of the older generation which had been reared under the relatively peaceful and stable conditions of Austrian rule, circles closely associated with the Greek Catholic Church, and most of the liberal professions engaged in this activity. Although there were a number of minor parties, some of which had authoritarian leanings, the majority of this segment of Ukrainian political workers was grouped in the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (Ukraïns'ke Natsional'ne Demokratychne Ob"iednannia—UNDO), which was definitely democratic in character, with varying amounts of Catholic, liberal, and socialist ideology embodied in its program. Its efforts met

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[25] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166.

[1] [see category 116, p 14 --Analyst]

cautious aide, Dr. Baran, however, in his capacity as a director 668* of the largest Ukrainian newspaper, *Dilo,* went with the editor of [204] *Novyi Chas,* Zenon Pelens'kyi, to confer with A. T. Chekaniuk, head of the newly installed press affairs office, concerning continuation of Ukrainian journalistic activities.[55] Then the true nature of the Soviet conquest began to reveal itself. Chekaniuk was already installed in the editorial offices of *Dilo* and evidently perfectly acquainted with the views and backgrounds of his petitioners. He showed them a staff of twenty newly arrived Soviet journalists who were already preparing the publication of *Dilo*'s successor, the Communist *Vil'na Ukraïna.* Then he made it perfectly clear to his "guests" that while some use might be found for their talents if they were properly directed, the direction itself was already, and would remain, completely in the hands of the Communists.[56]

Within a week, several leading figures in the Ukrainian community, including Constantine Levits'kyi and the secretary of the representative committee, John Nymchuk, had been arrested. 668* 661 For the time being, however, the actual members of the delegation to Soviet headquarters were spared, and several managed to escape to German-occupied territory.[57] The leaders of the UNDO were also arrested; Dr. Dmytro Levits'kyi, the head of the party and of the Ukrainian delegation in the Polish parliament, was arrested on September 28 and so were his most important colleagues about the same time. The arrested leaders were sent to Moscow—it is said to the infamous Lubianka prison—and with rare exceptions have not been heard of since.[58] The Communists, after getting rid of the principal nationalist politicians, quickly proceeded with their own political organization of Galicia and Volhynia. Even the official Soviet version indicates that a minimum

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[55] Chekaniuk, a specialist in political journalism, was editor of the major Kiev newspaper *Komunist,* and in 1940 became a candidate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

[56] The preceding paragraphs are based largely on Stepan Baran's article, "Zustrich z bol'shevykamy" (Encounter with the Bolsheviks), *Krakivs'ki Visti,* April 12, 1942, p. 2, and April 14, 1942, p. 2, confirmed in all essential aspects by Interviews 41, 78.

[57] Baran, "Zustrich," *Krakivs'ki Visti,* April 12, 1942, p. 2.

[58] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* March 22, 1942, p. 4. In one town at least, participants in the revolutionary struggle for Ukrainian independence also seem to have been singled out for arrest or execution (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* August 3, 1941, p. 8).

668 time was allotted to the process of registering "popular approval" [661] for incorporation of the occupied lands in the Soviet Union. A "Ukrainian National Congress," "elected" immediately after the Soviet invasion, met on October 26; on November 1 the head of its plenary committee, M. I. Panchyshyn, sent a request for admission to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic; on November 15, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Soviet) of the latter division of the Soviet state approved the request; thus East and West Ukraine were "united."[59]

[626] 648 167 In spite of the complete replacement of independent press and political organizations by Communist agencies, however, a strong effort was made in the early months to attract support for the new regime. Perhaps one reason for this attempt was the desire to influence Ukrainians still outside the enlarged Soviet Ukrainian Republic, especially in the Generalgouvernement. In a protocol to the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, which had defined the frontier between the parts of Poland annexed by the two totalitarian powers, it was provided that the government of the USSR should place no obstacles in the way of migration of ethnic Germans from eastern Poland to Germany. This secured for the Nazis the right to "bring home" the tens of thousands of German-speaking Volhynians. In return, Germany acknowledged an equal right of Belorussians and Ukrainians to migrate to the Soviet Union.[60] In accordance with a further provision of the protocol, a Soviet "repatriation" commission was allowed to travel through the Lemko region in early 1940;[61] by the end of June, it had induced only thirty-five hundred Ukrainians to cross the border into the Soviet Union, however.[62]

[59] S. M. Belousov and O. P. Ohloblyn, *Zakhidna Ukraïna* (The West Ukraine) (Kiev: Akademiia Nauk URSR, Instytut Istoriï Ukraïny, 1940), pp. 108 ff.

[60] Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office*, eds. Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington: Department of State, 1948), pp. 104–5.

[61] *Krakauer Zeitung*, February 18–19, 1940, p. 6, reports the departure of one thousand Ukrainians from this area after a visit of the Soviet commissioners.

167 [62] According to *Nastup*, June 29, 1940, pp. 2–3. In an article which was remarkably hostile to the Soviet regime, in view of the latter's publicly cordial relations with Germany at that time, the Nationalist paper stated that the "intensive propaganda" of the Soviet commission, aided by "the pro-Russian intelligentsia" but combatted by "healthy Ukrainian elements," had resulted in the meager migration

The campaign to win friends in Galicia and Volhynia was in 661 part negative; measures which were most likely to inflame anti- 626 Soviet sentiments were avoided. The church was not entirely suppressed, though it was sharply criticized.[63] Its real property was confiscated and the religious orders disbanded.[64] The Soviet authorities weakened the influence of the church on the youth by liquidating the Catholic school system and forcibly inducting the children into Communist organizations.[65] However, the person of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi was respected.[66] The part of the intelligentsia which was not prominent in politics was allowed to remain at large, although persons in callings such as the law sometimes found it necessary to turn to nonprofessional work.[67] On the more positive side, the Ukrainian language was given a [198] far greater scope than it had enjoyed under Polish rule. In 186 particular, the University of L'vov was formally Ukrainized in language and personnel, although it is said that the resistance of remaining Polish professors to lecturing in Ukrainian was not harshly dealt with.[68] Students from the East Ukrainian universities were brought on tours to the West Ukraine, and L'vov students made Communist-sponsored trips to Kiev.[69] Other ele-

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cited. Either this is one of the not too infrequent examples of ability of the [167] Prague publication to print items contrary to German policy, or someone in authority gave the signal for an anti-Soviet attitude even at that early date. In the latter case it may have been a subtle riposte in the hidden conflict over Soviet demands for Bukovina. On the other hand, as early as March the *Krakauer Zeitung* printed a report by a German who had visited the villages of the Lemko area. He praised the young Ukrainians, noting that they wore the national blue and yellow colors and greeted him with "Heil Hitler!" and "Slava Ukraïna!" (Glory to the Ukraine) (*Krakauer Zeitung*, March 7, 1940, p. 5).

[63] See F. Iastrebov, "Uniats'ke dukhovenstvo na sluzhbi u polskoho panstva" (The Uniate Clergy in the Service of the Polish Aristocracy), *Komunist*, October 9, 1939, p. 2.

[64] "Die Tragödie der ukrainisch-katholischen Kirche," *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, January, 1952, p. 14.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 18, 1942, p. 4; Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), p. 112.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] Interview 36.

[68] For the official Soviet version see M. Marchenko (the new rector of the University of L'vov), "L'vivs'kyi Universytet na novykh shliakhakh" (L'vov University on New Paths), *Komunist*, December 16, 1939, p. 2.

[69] Interview 51; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, on a trip of about forty students of the L'vov veterinary school to Kiev in the spring of 1940.

poverty of the East Ukraine and the predominance in many 186
nominally Ukrainian places of the Russian language and culture.[75] 626
East Ukrainian students coming to L'vov, on the other hand, had their first opportunity to become infected with the "virus" of "bourgeois nationalism."[76] Aside from producing these 668*
undesired ideological results, the earlier policy[A] failed to prevent underground work by the Nationalist youth of Galicia.

Most of the members of the OUN were not able, of course, to [486]
leave the Soviet-occupied area. It is impossible to secure reliable evidence concerning the exact extent to which those who re- 668*
mained could carry on their activities, but it is certain that they 661●
carefully refrained from open opposition. Nevertheless, late in 1940 the NKVD succeeded in tracking down a large number of Nationalists; they were sentenced to death or prison after a proceeding in L'vov known in the OUN accounts as the "trial of the fifty-nine." Among those sentenced to death was Krymins'kyi, the chief of the OUN movement in Soviet-occupied territories.[77] In all likelihood, he and his companions had sided with Bandera in the dispute with Mel'nyk. Certainly, the remaining members who, in spite of severe losses, were able to continue as an organized underground, were firm adherents of the new leader. The new underground director, John Klymiv, was in fact one of the most fanatical supporters which this fanatical movement of the younger generation could boast.[78] While there were undoubtedly many supporters of Colonel Mel'nyk in Galicia, it is doubtful whether they were active—or rash—enough to form what could be called an underground, although apparently agents kept up sporadic contacts with headquarters in the Generalgouvernement.

The situation in Volhynia was less favorable to Nationalist 668*
activity than that in Galicia, since the OUN had never enrolled such a high proportion of the youth there. Throughout most if not all of the area, Mel'nyk and Bandera apparently had no

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[75] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, p. 3.

[76] Interview 51.

[77] See, for example, Mykhailiuk, p. 4. Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, August 17, 1941, p. 4, reprinting an article from *Ukraïns'ki Shchodenni Visti* (L'vov).

[78] Interview 48.

A [Non-Interference with Ukrainian national aspirations --Analyst]

German colony. Molotov countered that it was the last "missing piece" of the Ukraine, though he agreed to limit his demands to the northern, predominantly Ukrainian part and offered to permit the repatriation of the ethnic German minority.[80] 648

Germany was not ready for a break with the USSR; consequently Rumania was forced to give way. On June 28, her forces evacuated Chernovtsy (Chernivtsi),[81] the Bukovinian capital, and the Red Army took over. The sequence of events was similar to that which had occurred nine months previously in L'vov, but the tempo was quicker. The leading newspaper, *Chas,* was Sovietized and a new Communist organ, *Nova Rada,* founded, though a number of Ukrainian books forbidden under Rumanian rule were authorized.[82] The Ukrainian People's House and other national cultural societies were closed. At the same time, the Soviet press assailed the repressive measures which the Rumanians had taken against Ukrainian cultural life. Soviet writers were indignant at the difficulties experienced by the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Chernovtsy, although they denounced the Petliurist elements among them.[83] Numerous leading Ukrainians were not allowed to enjoy their new "intellectual freedom," but were arrested or shot as nationalist "counterrevolutionaries." It is said, however, that the German consul and the commission for evacuating the ethnic Germans succeeded in taking out numerous Ukrainian political leaders and priests of the Orthodox Church.[84] In any case, many thousands of refugees, mostly young people, found their way to Germany, where a large proportion provided an invigorating element for the segment of the OUN which had remained under Mel'nyk.[85] 661 ● [204]

The subjection of the West Ukraine to Soviet rule brought death or imprisonment to a considerable number of prominent Ukrainians; the entire population was oppressed by a heavy

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[80] Ambassador von der Schulenburg in Moscow to Auswärtiges Amt, June 26, 1940, *Nazi-Soviet Relations,* p. 159.

[81] Rumanian Cernăuţi; German Chernowitz.

[82] *Nastup,* August 3, 1940, p. 3.

[83] "Besarabiia i pivnichna chastyna Bukovyny" (Bessarabia and the Northern Part of Bukovina), *Komunist,* June 30, 1940, p. 2; S. Zhurakovych and Ie. Patner, "Misto pod Prutom" (City on the Pruth), *Komunist,* July 5, 1940, p. 3.

[84] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* September 7, 1941, p. 3.

[85] See Chapter IV.

● 661 weight of fear and by severe limitations on its freedom. These factors were to be of great importance, for they created a state of mind in which the Ukrainians of the area would at least initially welcome any force which opposed the Soviet Union, without close examination of its nature. Soviet occupation covered a relatively short period of time, however, and the policies prescribed by Moscow were tempered in the first months by a desire to avoid
668 alienating the inhabitants. Consequently, the severity of the Communist rule was not sufficient to destroy the material or psychological base for future revival of nationalist strength. In this respect, the severe factional strife which had arisen during the same period in the areas subject to German control was more important, for it meant that at a decisive moment in their history the Ukrainian nationalists could not speak with a single voice.

German arrival.[10] In the less sheltered districts, however, Soviet 668* repression was horrible. According to German secret reports, four thousand Ukrainian political prisoners were butchered in [661] ● the NKVD cellars of L'vov alone, and several times as many were deported eastward. Many of the latter were killed later when their captors could no longer hurry them on ahead of the German advance.[11] Meanwhile tens of thousands of Soviet officials and their dependents, along with a considerable portion of the large Jewish population of Galicia, streamed eastward to escape a similar fate at the hands of the German totalitarians.

On June 30, in the midst of the disorganization caused by these events, the advance units of the Wehrmacht reached L'vov. With them came the first groups of Bandera's followers. Some of these came legally in "Nachtigall"; others, including Iaroslav Stets'ko, came illegally, though with the incidental assistance of some German front-line units.[12] Having arrived in the Galician capital, the OUN-B was in a favorable position. The months of isolation from the world outside the Soviet Union had prevented most of the citizens of L'vov from hearing of the internal conflict of the OUN. Moreover, the horror of the last days of Soviet [554] occupation made the Germans seem like providential deliverers; the close contact enjoyed by the Bandera leaders with uniformed Wehrmacht soldiers greatly enhanced their prestige in their compatriots' eyes.

Just what assurances the Bandera adherents gave of their 668* backing by the Germans, just how far they themselves believed 642 they could rely on German support, is impossible to determine. Whatever inducements they used, immediately after their arrival the OUN-B group named Dr. George Polans'kyi, a prominent citizen, mayor, and succeeded in having a national representation "elected"; this they called together the same evening. They had hoped to secure the L'vov state theater, a hall of appropriate size and dignity for the gathering, but, finding it requisitioned by the German army, they were forced to resort to the small meeting when they came to the city administrative building on July 9 668* and placed them under "honorary arrest." [21]

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[10] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 6, 1941, p. 3.

[11] Report of the SP and the SD *Einsatzgruppen*, July 31, 1941, p. 13, NO 2151 (hereafter referred to as NO 2151).

[12] Interview 24.

About the same time,1 Bandera (who had never been allowed 668* to leave the Generalgouvernement), Gavrusevych, Bandera's representative 661 ● in Berlin, Volodymyr Stakhiv, and Stets'ko's assistants, Stariukh and Ilnits'kyi, were arrested.[22] All were assembled in Berlin and questioned thoroughly by both police and Wehrmacht officers. The Germans, however, were obviously proceeding with caution. They realized that at that moment considerable trouble could be caused the advancing German armies by disturbances in Galicia, which would probably be the result of drastic action against the OUN leaders.[23] At the same time, they warned the group of the possible serious consequences of their actions, and urged the leaders to withdraw the *akt* and accept a status in eastern Galicia similar to that of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow. Bandera and his followers refused; however, they were not imprisoned. On the contrary, while nominally under house arrest, they were allowed to carry on their political activities in Berlin; Stets'ko was even able to go to Cracow, where he consulted with Lebed', whom he had secretly delegated to take command of all activities in the Ukrainian lands.[24]

Meanwhile, the tide started by the proclamation was still 668* running in Bandera's favor in Galicia. Several non-OUN administrators who had accompanied Stets'ko and Rebet at the time of their arrest were sick with humiliation to see Ukrainians, who had created the impression that they were responsible leaders acting in agreement with the Germans, thus treated as naughty boys who had stepped out of bounds.[25] The majority of the population, on the other hand, was not aware of the real nature of the departure of the Bandera party's leaders. In town after

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[21] Interviews 24, 36, 44, 67.

[22] Mirchuk, pp. 38–39.

[23] As the chief of Vineta, the Propaganda Ministry's bureau for dealing with eastern affairs, later wrote: "Bandera and his closest supporters were arrested, but by clever treatment an insurrection was avoided." Taubert to Rosenberg, February 17, 1944, Occ E-4 (1), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [1]).

[24] Mirchuk, p. 39; Interviews 24, 75.

[25] Interview 36.

1 [July 1941 -- Analyst]

issue of *Nastup* he laid full responsibility for the crime on the 668*
"divergentists," but merely ordered all Ukrainians to refrain from 518
contact with them and expressed the hope that the tragedy would purge Ukrainian life of crime and anarchy.[72]

Whatever responsibility they may have borne for the assassina- 668*
tions,[1] the Bandera followers were quickly visited with retribu- 661●
tion. The Germans arrested all OUN-B members in Zhitomir itself, and a number were executed. During the early part of September, SS *Einsatzgruppen* arrested and executed most of the members of three of the subgroups of the southern task force, at Balta, Nikolaev, and the Crimean city of Dzhankoi.[73] In Nikolaev at least, the OUN-M adherents denounced their pro-Bandera rivals to the Germans.[74] The expedition to the southern peninsula had been a favorite project of the OUN-B, and its complete annihilation was a severe blow to their hopes. Moreover, although some members were able to go underground, OUN-B activity in Kirovograd and Krivoi Rog (Krivyi Rih) and other places in the south-central Ukraine was seriously crippled. Still more disheartening, the sections of the northern task forces which had been heading for Kiev to "proclaim" the Ukrainian state there, as had been done in L'vov, were broken up by the Germans in Vasil'kov (Vasyl'kiv) and Fastov (Fastiv).[75] Some of the members fled to Polessia, where they hid in the forests; a few apparently slipped by secretly into the capital. Significantly for the direction of future operations, the chief remaining center of the OUN-B was in Dniepropetrovsk.

That indignation over the murders prompted this far-reaching repression of the Bandera party is improbable in view of the contempt in which the SS at least held all Ukrainians. Neverthe-

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[72] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[73] Matla, p. 22. That the arrests were not all part of a concerted plan is indicated by the fact that part were carried out by the Rumanians in their area of occupation. The latter warned the Ukrainians to get out of this area but told them they did not care what they did on the other side of the line of demarcation (cf. Chubai, p. 56). The executions in Zhitomir evidently took place immediately after the assassinations (Ie. Stakhiv, p. 39). On the destruction of the Crimean groups see also Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the *Einsatzgruppen* of the SP and the SD in the USSR, December, 1941, NO 2659 (hereafter referred to as NO 2659).

[74] The accusation to this effect in Matla, p. 22, is confirmed by NO 3157.

[75] PS 053.

[1] [Killing of Senyk & Stsibors'kyi, August 30, 1941 -- Analyst]

668* less, SS and security police reports for this period explicitly state 661 that complete suppression was not undertaken until after "the murders of numerous Mel'nyk supporters" by the OUN-B.[76] Apparently the feeling that drastic action would have to be taken against the Bandera party had been building up in SS circles for some weeks. Indignation over Stets'ko's coup, openly placarded appeals of Klymiv for the secret gathering of arms to be used by a future Ukrainian army, and the stubborn persistence of the task forces in heading east undoubtedly played a role. In addition, the SS had gathered a variety of rumors concerning the group, including the plausible one that they were planning a revolt against the Germans and the implausible story that they were inspired by Communist agents. The basic reason for the occurrence of the repression at this time appears to be the desire of SS *Einsatzgruppen* to make a thorough sweep of the East Ukraine in order to bring it completely under German control and to prepare the western part for the introduction of civil administration.[77] The indignation aroused among Mel'nyk supporters by the assassinations and sympathy shown them by many other nationalist Ukrainians were in all probability merely utilized as support for the ruthless destruction of the other Nationalist party.

668* While the two powerful Nationalist parties were engaged in feverish activity in the newly opened Ukraine, the UNR was forced to play a secondary role. As was noted in the preceding chapter, the Livyts'kyi group had established contact with an underground group in the eastern part of former Polish Volhynia. This group, which was formed in loose association with the UNR before the outbreak of war as the Ukraïns'ka Natsional'na Vidrodzhennia (Ukrainian National Rebirth), went underground when the Soviet forces arrived. In 1940 one of its members, Taras Borovets', an operator of a stone quarry in the Kostopol' (Kostopil') area, consulted with Andrew Livyts'kyi, whom he regarded as chief of the Ukrainian state. Following a conference with the

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[76] PS 3876.

[77] An analysis by the office of the Reichsaussenminister of the contents of the Activity and Situation Reports Nos. 1–5 of the *Einsatzgruppen* of the SP and the SD in the USSR, July 31–September 31, 1941, NO 2650 (hereafter referred to as NO 2650).

727 While Ukrainian territory was being partitioned, a still more serious danger for the nationalist cause was shaping up. An exception to the authority of the Ostministerium in the occupied areas was the police power, which was lodged in Heinrich Himmler's hands. From the beginning of the campaign the Reichsführer SS had been charged with "establishing order" in the conquered areas in the east. The instruments employed for this task were *Einsatzgruppen,* task forces consisting of specially selected, ruthless police officials, headed by SS officers from Himmler's inner circle. During the stabilization period, these commanders were given powers within the broad range of "pacifying activities" in the rear areas, superseding those of all military commanders. These activities included especially the extermination of the Jewish population and the liquidation of all Communist organizations; "kommissars" and NKVD officials were to be shot outright.

● 661 668* The causes for conflict between the *Einsatzgruppen* and the Ukrainian nationalists have been suggested in the preceding chapter. At first the Mel'nyk group was spared because it was thought to be politically impotent.[20] During the summer the SP claimed that "the splinter group under Colonel Andrew Mel'nyk, predominantly émigrés, no longer has any political significance," and regarded the OUN-M as a useful counterweight to Bandera's organization. By early November, 1941, however, SP reports were warning that Mel'nyk's group could become dangerous if it was left entirely unwatched because of the struggle against the Bandera party.[21] As soon as the OUN-M revealed ability to build an organization in the East Ukraine, it too was crushed.

668* 661 186 The first major incident of repression against the Mel'nyk forces occurred on November 21, an important anniversary for Ukrainian nationalists. On that date, in 1921, Tiutiunnyk's band,

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the Generalgouvernement, as not corresponding to "the principle of nationality" (*Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* August 31, 1941, p. 3). Within the next week, several branches of the UNO in Germany sent petitions directly to Hitler, protesting the transfers of Ukrainian territory; for petitions from the groups in Pilsen, Berlin and Luxemburg, see Occ E-4 (8), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [8]).

[20] NO 2650.

[21] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report of Events in the USSR, No. 133, November 14, 1941, p. 31, NO 2825 (hereafter referred to as NO 2825).

one of the last important nationalist forces to penetrate the Soviet 668*
Ukraine, had made a "last stand" near the little town of Bazar 661●
on the edge of the wooded region north of the Kiev-Zhitomir line.
The OUN-M now decided to make this anniversary the occasion 186
for a great patriotic demonstration, which a participant has since described in considerable detail.[22] A large group of organizers was sent in from Zhitomir; on the appointed day many thousands streamed to Bazar for commemorative ceremonies. This demonstration of the strength of Ukrainian nationalist sentiment greatly alarmed the Germans, especially since the affair had been the work of an organized group which had secured the complete cooperation of the local Ukrainian authorities. The chief of the Bazar *raion* addressed the crowd, the police under the command of an old Ukrainian officer stood guard, and the police band provided music. All of these features must have indicated to the suspicious German police authorities that the Ukrainians had deliberately flaunted their independence. The reprisals were quick, and crushing. An inquiry was instituted at Bazar, which led to the arrest of several of the organizers; the trail led back to Zhitomir, where about two dozen OUN members, including one of the leaders of Ekzekutyva, were shot. The younger Iatseniuk and Anthony Baranivs'kyi, the remaining OUN leaders there, escaped only by fleeing to the woods. OUN-M influence in Zhitomir was sharply reduced, although few, apparently, of the administrative officials who had sympathized with it were molested.[23]

In the absence of direct evidence, it would be unsafe to con- 661
clude that the Bazar demonstration was the cause of the further
attacks which were now carried out against the Mel'nyk group. 668*
At about the same time, however, drastic repressions of the Nationalists occurred in numerous cities, resulting in the destruction of the small Bukovinian expedition in Nikolaev and of groups in Kamenets-Podolsk (Kam'ianets'-Podil's'k), Chernigov (Chernihiv), and Poltava.[24] The chief repressive campaign was

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[22] P. Dub, "V rokovyny demonstratsiï v Bazari (spomyn)" (On the Anniversary of the Demonstration in Bazar [In Memoriam]), *Za Samostiinist'* (November, 1946), pp. 8–11; see also *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, pp. 69–72.

[23] Alexander Iatseniuk, for example, remained chief of the *oblast* administration.

[24] *OUN u Viini*, p. 72.

661 reserved for the capital. A number of OUN-M activities there, 668* without being considered important enough to require drastic action, had contributed to a feeling of irritation on the part of the [204] Himmler henchmen. A famous poetess, Olena Teliha, had created an unauthorized Nationalist literary periodical, *Litvary.* A youth group Sich was considered potentially dangerous. A Ukrainian National Council (Rada) had been formed by the Mel'nyk group to act as a symbol of unity in the East Ukraine and, they hoped, eventually to become the central organ of nationalist activities. The risks involved in such activity, in view of the attitude of the real rulers of Germany, were fully understood by the Wehrmacht officers, one of whom advised the Ukrainians to transform the Council into a more innocuous Aid Committee. When this advice was refused, the Council was formally dissolved (November 17), and went underground.[25] The SP authorities were aware of the organ's continued existence, and while they regarded it as too insignificant for immediate suppression, it increased their distrust of the Nationalists.[26] With this background, one can understand why the first blow fell upon the legal, but extremely Nationalist, *Ukraïns'ke Slovo.* Its large circulation—over fifty thousand [27]—gave it, in the eyes of the police, the potentiality of dangerous influence. Moreover, the editorial staff of this organ, as was previously noted, was composed very largely of West Ukrainians and old émigrés; these elements were regarded as especially dangerous by the SS leadership.

668* 578 Unfortunately for the Nationalist cause, during their two months' activity in Kiev the newcomers had also lost ground in local opinion. Some of the antipathy which they aroused stemmed from the fact that they were outsiders; even those who had been born in the East Ukraine or, like Kandyba, whose father had been born there, had long been out of touch with the local population. With some justification, because they were better organized, had clearer concepts of what they wanted, and were used to displaying initiative, the OUN group took a leading, octhe Germans, and hence able to issue ration cards and provide a [51] small income, was indispensable for most intellectuals.[30] 668*

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[25] *Ibid.*, p. 68.
[26] PS 3876.
[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* March 15, 1942, p. 5.

In view of these circumstances, it is not surprising that the German 204 enemies of the Nationalist movement felt that the time was 668* ripe to destroy its prestige by an attack on its principal organ. On December 12, 1941, the SP force seized *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* and 661 ● arrested all the leading editorial workers, including Rohach, Chemeryns'kyi and Oliïnyk.[31] Kandyba, too, was arrested, but by native police in a city *raion* (ward) controlled by the OUN-M; this circumstance allowed him to escape.[32]

Two days later the newspaper reappeared, as *Nove Ukraïns'ke* 626 *Slovo,* but with a quite different editorial policy. The new editor 204 was Constantine Shtepa, acting rector of the University of Kiev. 668* Of Ukrainian origin, he had been an officer in the tsarist army and, although strongly anti-Soviet, remained a pronounced Russian patriot, desiring the acceptance of the Russian culture and language throughout the Ukraine and the maintenance of governmental ties with Moscow. Consequently, he was a bitter enemy of the Ukrainian nationalist movement.[33] The first issue of his paper contained an article, inspired by the Germans, but acceptable to Shtepa, in which the Nationalists were vigorously attacked for turning what "should have been an informational journal into an organ of their group." The Nationalists, it explained, had refused to heed German warnings that the paper must serve the whole community; consequently Shtepa had taken charge to "popularize" it. What this meant, was clarified by an article on the second page which demanded "work instead of politics." [34]

Under Shtepa's administration, *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* became extremely subservient to the Germans. In part this was due to the extreme severity and alertness of the German censorship; the edi-

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[30] Interview 59. Liubchenko himself (Liubchenko, pp. 60 ff.), when the shoe was on the other foot and he was compelled to seek work in Kiev, found this to be the case.

[31] *OUN u Viini,* p. 73.

[32] L. Dniprova in *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.

[33] Record of interrogation of an editor in Kiev, early 1943, who was a specialist in ancient history, the author of *Die Völkerwanderung* and *Das römische Recht* (CXLVa 78, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine) (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 78). The only person fitting this description is Constantine Shtepa.

[34] These articles are reprinted in *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* January 5, 1942, p. 2.

727 there was no unified framework of native administration, with the 631 exception of the towns where there was a Ukrainian chief of administration, regardless of the size of the place involved. In the larger cities, which were not included in *Kreisgebiete,* the Ukrainian "mayors," however, were closely subjected to German *Stadtkommissare.*

727 Just as important as his administrative structure, was Koch's 668** personal attitude toward the Ukrainians he was to govern. To him, they were simply an inferior race, a colonial people to be 661 exploited for Germany's interests. "They are too inferior to be compared with Germans,"[45] and "the least German worker is worth a thousand times more than the population there"[46] are typical expressions of his attitude. Consequently, this former petty railway official felt highly offended when the Ukrainian intelligentsia endeavored to organize a national life of its own. The whole tone of his administration implied that the Ukrainians were a sort of child-people, which could not achieve any degree of culture worthy of consideration; those who endeavored to do so were simply half-educated émigré agitators who must be dealt with severely, so that the simple but useful "peasants" (i.e., all non-agitators) would not be disturbed in their task of producing for the Germans.

One of the first results of Koch's determination to crush all centers of autonomous life was the destruction of the Nationalist forces remaining "above ground" in Kiev. After the suppression of the West Ukrainian force, there was still a large group of East Ukrainian supporters of the Mel'nyk organization who openly

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Wehrmacht to recruit ethnic Germans (PS 197; Extracts from the Situation Report of the commander of Heeresgebiet B, Abteilung VII, October 10, 1942, PS 051; hereafter referred to as PS 051), although the latter turned out frequently to be Communist spies deliberately left behind by the Soviet regime (Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte, December 15, 1941, PS 1682; (hereafter referred to as PS 1682). Even when the *Volksdeutsche* were anti-Communist, they were frequently disliked by the Ukrainian Nationalists as Russophiles.

[45] Koch to Rosenberg, March 16, 1943, PS 192 (hereafter referred to as PS 192).

[46] Report of Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe B to Oberkommando des Heeres, Generalstab des Heeres, Generalquartiermeister, Abteilung Kriegsverwaltung, April 1, 1943, PS 1130 (hereafter referred to as PS 1130), is based on an oral report of Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Dr. Classen who was present at the Nazi Party meeting in Kiev (March 5, 1943) in which Koch made the remark.

668* 661● 727

carried on a limited activity. Its chief, Bahazii, was just as nationalist as the arrested West Ukrainians. A characteristic instance of his enthusiastic lack of caution occurred about the time that he became mayor. A group of foreign journalists, including several Germans, visited Kiev. In their presence, he expressed his loyalty to the OUN, praising Konovalets' and Mel'nyk as totalitarians, and saying, "The eyes of all Ukrainians are turned toward Mel'nyk." A German officer who was present begged the journalists not to report this remark, knowing it would inflame the Nazi chieftains.[47]

Although Erich Koch and his assistants were in many respects ridiculously ignorant of the true nature of Ukrainian life in Kiev, in view of Bahazii's frankness it was inevitable that they should come to see that he was working for Ukrainian ends, rather than docilely following German orders. Very probably the anti-Nationalist forces on the staff of *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* played a part in stirring up antagonism to the city administration. For example, the paper printed an article by an employee of a municipal office criticizing the émigrés who had returned to Kiev. He complained that thirteen out of forty employees in his section were émigrés who were paid higher salaries than the local officials, although the former were no better qualified and had smaller families.[48] In view of Koch's and his minions' bitter hostility toward émigrés, such remarks must have encouraged them to feel that the Germans would lose no popularity by extinguishing the remaining outside influence in Kiev life.

They were, however, scarcely the real motives behind Bahazii's arrest in early February, 1942. Apparently the German official responsible for the Ukrainian leader's downfall was Generalkommissar Magunia, one of Koch's closest collaborators among the officials of the Reichskommissariat. He worked, of course, in close coordination with the *Sicherheitspolizei;* the charges against Ba-

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[47] Whether they ever actually saw the report is questionable since it was apparently printed only in an Italian paper and by the Ukrainian press (*Nastup,* December 6, 1941, p. 1, quoting *La Stampa* [Milan], November 1, 1941).

[48] *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* January 3, 1942 (reprinted in *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* February 1, 1942, p. 2). A major charge against Bahazii was that he maintained too large a staff in the city administration and paid them too much (PS 192).

661 hazii in the police report revolve entirely around his nationalist
727 activities.[49] For example, the head of the section on Religious Confessions is alleged to have threatened the Russophile bishop
668* of Kiev, Panteleimon. Another charge concerned Bahazii's "misappropriation of German property," but the specific act seems to have been his sale of petroleum products (probably of Soviet origin, confiscated by the Germans) to aid the nationalist cause. He was charged, correctly, with being a leader of the underground OUN-M, and a number of organizations controlled by the Nationalists were declared, also with apparent accuracy, to be working under his direction. Probably the charge which carried the greatest weight in the minds of the German officials, however, was that he had endeavored to secure control of the Ukrainian police. As has been previously indicated, the OUN-M did indeed control most of the Ukrainian police in Kiev, but Bahazii was scarcely responsible personally for this. Altogether, the motives behind the overthrow of Bahazii were those which prevailed everywhere in the destruction of Nationalist groups in the Reichskommissariat. The action suited Erich Koch's policy completely; he defended it vigorously against Rosenberg's criticism, displaying his own arrogant stupidity by adding a few incredible charges of his own to the grounds presented in the SP report.[50]

The repression of Nationalist forces in Kiev extended far beyond the person of Bahazii. The arrests were concentrated in two groups: the surviving literary leaders of the OUN-M League of Ukrainian Writers, headed by Olena Teliha and a young Carpatho-Ukrainian writer, John Irliavs'kyi; and the Sich, headed by a young East Ukrainian journalist, John Koshyk, also an OUN-M member.[51] Altogether, the executions (which followed quickly after the arrests in most cases) accounted for about forty persons,[52] a large number of whom were medical students organized in the

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[49] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 191, April 10, 1942, NO 3256 (hereafter referred to as NO 3256).

[50] PS 192.

[51] *OUN u Viini*, p. 74; T. Iak, *Hryb* (The Mushroom), p. 43, a clandestine OUN-M brochure, probably published at the end of German occupation in the East Ukraine.

[52] Iak, p. 43.

Sich.[53] In addition, several of the principal agencies of national 661●
life in Kiev were forced to cease operation, including the Ukrainian National Council. 727
Even Prosvita was suspect and was closed 668*
for a while.[54]

These arrests did not completely stamp out the efforts to develop nationalism in Kiev. The underground OUN-M (as well as remnants of an OUN-B conspiratorial group) did what they could to stimulate nationalist feeling. Likewise, the city administration was by no means so drastically altered as had been the editorial staff of the newspaper. The Germans were probably not anxious to destroy all outlets for Ukrainian nationalist aspirations. Rosenberg, in spite of his minor influence, exercised some restraint in this respect, and Koch himself denied being anti-Ukrainian.[55] Undoubtedly his contempt for all Slavs led him to place the Ukrainians and the Russians on an even plane; his favoring of the Russophile element in the journalistic field had very possibly been accidental, or at least merely an effort to establish between the groups a balance which could be manipulated by the Germans.

The drop in prestige of the OUN-M was both sharp and sustained, however, since repression of its groups continued throughout the Reichskommissariat. Moreover, as will be discussed at length later, strong Ukrainian nationalist groups opposed to the OUN ideology appeared in several places; these forces kept up the fight for development of nationalism, thus inhibiting a growth in influence by the OUN. In other areas, news of the suppression of the Kiev group—the dissolution of the National Council appears to have been especially important—caused the cautious to refrain from endeavoring to build up nationalist organizations. Consequently, after February, 1942, the work of the two OUNs was only a relatively small part of the total stream of nationalist and antinationalist forces which must be studied in their geographical, social, and ideological context rather than as parts of a developing narrative. 668*

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[53] Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukraïns'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi, 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev, 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 19.

[54] PS 192.

[55] *Ibid.*

police regiment.[75] Each additional UNR officer from the "Bul'ba" 725
forces, aging though he was, was a treasure who was given a post 669
of great importance by his new masters.[76] Similarly, Soviet officers who escaped from prisoner camps or deserted from Red forces were eagerly welcomed. The lack of trained military personnel greatly limited the partisan organization's value as a fighting force.

The presence of many men who had lived under the Soviet system at first acted as a disturbing influence in the organization. The Bandera leadership, having carried the policy of one-party direction to a temporarily successful conclusion, was determined to maintain this position and to prevent the development of an East Ukrainian opposition, which they suspected was infected with Communist attitudes. Their instrument was the SB or Security Service, forged by Lebed' years previously. Though the extent [661]
of the "purges" of "unreliable elements" (primarily East Ukrainians, but including some former Mel'nyk partisans, although apparently no old UNR émigrés) is uncertain, there is little question that it was sufficiently great to arouse extreme disaffection among the non-OUN-B elements in the enlarged partisan movement.[77] At the same time, however, the East Ukrainian elements apparently had sufficient influence—or compelling arguments—to secure the adoption of a program calculated to secure support from former Soviet citizens.[78]

At the Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN parti- 668*
san forces on August 21–25, 1943, both Germany and the "Muscovite" Soviet Union were criticized as not really socialist or progressive, while a future national and social revolution or subjugated peoples was prophesied.[79] Greatest emphasis was still placed on armed struggle, rather than on social policy; but a long series of measures evidently calculated to broaden support among the East Ukrainians was proposed. They included destruction of

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[75] MS D.

[76] E.g., Colonel Treiko and Colonel Lytvynenko, chief adviser from Andrew Livyts'kyi to Borovets'; MS D.

[77] Shuliak, p. 30; MS D.

[78] See report of a press conference of the UHVR by M. Stiranka in *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, October 11, 1947, p. 3.

[79] *Za samostiinu Ukraïnu: Boiovyi organ OUN* (For Ukrainian Independence: The Military Organ of the OUN) (clandestine), No. 9, December 10, 1943.

704 ran from just east of Kovel to a point in the Carpathians south of Ternopol'; a key point was the little town of Brody, on the main highway from Rovno to L'vov. Here, in late June, the SS division was put into the line to assist in covering the Galician capital. For three weeks it maintained its position, in the face of fierce Soviet attacks and encircling operations, but by July 20 was no longer effective as a fighting unit. Perhaps 20 percent of its complement fell back with the German armies toward the Carpathians, and half of the remainder escaped to join the UPA or to filter back to the German lines.[29]

661 798 After the victory of Brody, the Red Army rapidly conquered east Galicia, Bukovina, and the Carpatho-Ukraine. By fall, substantially all of the Ukrainian lands were again under the dominion of Moscow. This time the repression exercised by the Communist rulers was harsher and less disguised than it had been five years before. The Greek Catholic Church was attacked ruthlessly. Bishop Slipyi, who had succeeded Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi after the latter's death in late 1944, was arrested and deported to the interior of the Soviet Union. Most of the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church, as well as hundreds of its clergy, were likewise banished. Orthodox priests subservient to the Patriarch of Moscow enlisted the aid of a minority of the Greek Catholic clergy, who renounced their allegiance to Rome and joined in constructing a new hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Galicia. The same tactics were pursued in the Carpatho-Ukraine.[30]

[702] 661 According to reports of refugees from the area, very severe measures were taken against the population at large. Men from the ages of eighteen to fifty are said to have been drafted into the Red Army in a mass, without regard for their state of health.[31] Once enlisted, they were said to be watched over by special *politruks*, given inferior arms, and sent into battle after eight

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[29] See numerous contributions to *Brody*, and *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv I. UD UNA*, for detailed descriptions of military operations of this battle and of the other Ukrainian forces serving with the Wehrmacht.

[30] Cf. Baran, *Mytropolyt*, pp. 137 ff.; Mykola D. Chubatyi, "Russian Church Policy in the Ukraine," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, I (Autumn, 1945), 51–53.

[31] SS war reporter Oleh Lysiak in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 2, 1944, p. 3.

days' training.[32] In addition, there was a renewed collectivization of agriculture and Sovietization of all phases of life. 661 ●

A strong effort appears also to have been made to overcome 661 the nationalism of the West Ukrainians, which the Communists 668x recognized as a danger to their regime. Several months before the Red Army reconquered Galicia, Krushchev, the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, addressing the sixth session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, denounced the nationalists in vitriolic terms. He concentrated his attack upon the nationalist partisans:

> If one asks the Ukrainian-German nationalists how many of the German occupiers they destroyed, how many German formations they wiped out, how many bridges they blew up, in order to prevent the aggressors from transporting arms for subjugating and annihilating the Ukrainian people, they can make no reply.[33]

His remarks served to set the theme for Soviet propagandists, who condemned the adherents of Bandera, Mel'nyk, and "Bul'ba" as agents of the Germans, in contrast to the "true patriots of the Soviet fatherland." [34] An obvious effort to split the peasantry and the laboring class from the intellectuals was made. The former were declared deceived, while the latter were said to be the chief propagators of the dangerous doctrine.[35] Soviet propagandists promised that "special attention" would be given to the West Ukrainian intelligentsia, who did not have the "advantage" of having been brought up in Soviet schools, but had been, rather, in "bourgeois" schools, which inculcated "bourgeois ideology," and who, as a result, had aided the "Ukrainian-German nationalist bandits." [36] In view of the usual fate of social elements so

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[32] Oleh Lysiak in *Krakauer Zeitung*, November 30, 1944, p. 6.

[33] Dmytro Manuïls'kyi, *Ukraïns'ko-nimets'ki natsionalisty na sluzhbi u fashysts'koi Nimechchyny: Dopovid' 6-ho sichnia 1945 roku na naradi uchyteliv zakhadnykh oblastei Ukraïny* (The Ukrainian-German Nationalists in the Service of Fascist Germany: Report of January 6, 1945, to the Conference of Teachers of the Western *Oblasts* of the Ukraine) (Kiev: Ukraïns'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo, 1945), p. 21.

[34] Ol. Kasimenko, "Ukraïns'ko-nimets'ki natsionalisty—nailiutishi vorohy ukraïns'koho narodu" (The Ukrainian-German Nationalists—the Fiercest Enemies of the Ukrainian People), *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 10, 1944, p. 2.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] "Ideino-politychne vykhovannia inteligentsiï" (Idea-Political Education of the Intelligentsia), *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 12, 1944, p. 1.

668* violently denounced by the Soviet rulers, it is likely that a large
● [661] part of the intelligentsia was "liquidated as a class."

At the same time,[1] a certain outlet was offered to nationalist
186 feeling, with a class-conscious twist, by emphasizing the heroic
208 feats of certain Ukrainian leaders of Red partisan units in the
L'vov area.[37] This theme was relatively subdued, however, probably because there were not enough Ukrainian subjects suitable for glorification. In the Carpatho-Ukraine, where the Red partisans had evidently attracted genuine support as liberators from the de-nationalizing Hungarian regime, the tactic was employed much more extensively. Whole lists of partisan leaders, including at least one priest, were published. Moreover, one partisan was explicitly declared to speak "pure Ukrainian," and apparently all bore Ukrainian names.[38] This propaganda was followed up by the customary practice of forming a People's Committee which requested union of the province with the Soviet Union.[39] Even after the war was ended and the new acquisition securely incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine, however, an article was published which, had it been written by a non-Communist, would have been denounced as "racist." It was stated that some villages in the Carpatho-Ukraine spoke only Magyar, but that their "purely Ukrainian" character was shown by the family names of the inhabitants and their "Slavic appearance." [40]

661 Fortunately for them, the majority of the West Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia did not stay behind to enjoy the benefits of Soviet "re-education." It is one of the strange paradoxes of German-Ukrainian relations during the war, however, that at the very period when Germany was most in need of securing Ukrainian support, and when a minimal amount of such assistance was being developed in the form of the Galician Division, a new wave of repression fell upon the nationalist leaders. This occurred in the fall of 1943; its immediate causes cannot be determined, but it appears that it was basically a result of that tendency to strive for large results by employing force and trickery which marred

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[37] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 26, 1945, p. 3.

[38] *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 14, 1944, p. 2.

[39] *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 23, 1944, p. 2.

[40] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 28, 1945, p. 3.

[1] [after the Ukraine was conquered by the Red Army in 1944-- Analyst]

so much of German relations with the eastern peoples. One of the first Ukrainian leaders to fall a victim to these methods was Borovets'. About a month before he started on his forlorn trip to Warsaw to obtain help in rebuilding his guerrilla force, German officials interested in the matter had decided that it was necessary to negotiate with the partisan leaders, so that they might discover who they were and arrest them during the course of the negotiations if this appeared to be desirable.[41] Whether there was any direct connection between this plan and the fate which overtook Borovets' is unknown; the procedure used toward him, however, closely paralleled that outlined. After the Wehrmacht had started conversations with "Bul'ba," the police suddenly intervened, arrested him and his assistant Oleh Shtul', and incarcerated them in Sachsenhausen concentration camp along with Bandera and his deputies.[42]

The group was soon joined by the most prominent members of the OUN-M. After Mussolini's overthrow, Eugene Onats'kyi, spokesman of the Ukrainian nationalists in Italy, had written an article criticizing Fascism as a form of government, stating that it sheltered a privileged class. This essay was indiscreetly printed by *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk* and thus came to the attention of the German police, which arrested Onats'kyi on September 29, 1943, but did not transfer him to Sachsenhausen from Regina Coeli prison in Rome until December 12.[43] Throughout his period of confinement, he was closely questioned concerning connections of Mel'nyk and Konovalets' with Ukrainians in Allied countries.[44] Apparently these connections, at least in the forms of inspiring anti-German material in the Allied press and contacts with Ukrainian organizations outside the German orbit, were one reason for the arrest on January 26, 1944, of Mel'nyk himself, together with the Berlin representative of the OUN-M, Dmytro Andriievs'kyi.[45] Apparently the chief grounds for the arrest of the

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[41] Memorandum by Taubert, Occ E-4 (1).

[42] Interviews 12, 29, 72; Taras Borovets', *Zbroina borot'ba Ukraïny (1917–1950)* (The Armed Struggle of the Ukraine [1917–50]) (1951), p. 12.

[43] Ievhen (Eugene) Onats'kyi, *U babylons'komu poloni* (*spomyny*) (In Babylonian Captivity [Memoirs]) (Buenos Aires, 1948), p. 15.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

[45] Interviews 52, 67; *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 101.

661 OUN-M leaders was the discovery of anti-German clandestine publications of the OUN-M in the East Ukraine and in Kandyba's quarters in L'vov.[46] Kandyba and numerous other members were arrested about the same time, and *Nastup* was suppressed. Three members of the Provid had been killed within the preceding fourteen months, so that of the directorate only the aged generals Kapustians'kyi and Kurmanovych were left at large.[47]

727 Most of the OUN leaders were kept in close confinement throughout the crucial months when the West Ukraine was slipping under Communist domination. By October, when they were released,[48] virtually all of the Ukrainian lands had passed out of German control. There remained, however, some two million persons of Ukrainian origin in the hands of the Germans—thousands of refugees, over a million *Ostarbeiter,* several hundred thousand prisoners of war, and about a quarter of a million auxiliary troops.[49] A few thousand of the last category constituted a remnant of the Galician division, but most of them were scattered throughout various small units of *Osttruppen,* totaling about seven hundred thousand.[50]

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[46] *OUN u Viini,* p. 103.

[47] Kandyba and Chemeryns'kyi had replaced the murdered Senyk and Stsibors'kyi, but Chemeryns'kyi was killed by the Germans in the execution of the *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* group in Kiev. Baranovs'kyi had been killed by the OUN-B in Galicia in May, 1943, while Sushko was assassinated, probably by Bandera followers, or possibly by Communists or German police agents who were dissatisfied with his conduct, just thirteen days before the arrest of the other leaders.

[48] Bandera, Mel'nyk, Borovets', and all of their principal adherents were set free, except Kandyba and Gavrusevych, who had died in prison.

[49] Rosenberg wrote Bormann on September 7, 1944 (NO 2997), that there were then one million "legionnaires and volunteers," one million prisoners of war, and two million *Ostarbeiter* drawn from the eastern peoples. It is safe to assume that at least one third of the prisoners of war were Ukrainian (see n. 64, this chapter, below). The figure of two million *Ostarbeiter* appears to be rather low, in view of the total of one and one-half million given for the Ukraine alone (see Chapter V), but it is certain that a considerable majority of the workers from the Soviet Union were drawn from the Ukraine, for it had the bulk of the population which was under German control for a long period, and was, moreover, more completely exploited in this regard than were the army areas and the Reichskommissariat Ostland. Taubert, in a memorandum printed in B. Dvinov, *Vlasovs'koe dvizhenie v svete dokumentov* (The Vlasov Movement in the Light of Documents) (New York, 1950), p. 110, estimated the proportion of Ukrainian *Ostarbeiter* as 60 percent. The figure for military personnel appears a bit high, but it is fairly clear that the Ukrainians totaled at least one quarter of this group (Interview 22 referred to a total of 220,000 Ukrainians in the German forces). Refugees not enrolled in any of these categories were not numerous.

[50] NO 1068.

itself for a few years, very likely a separate Ukrainian hierarchy 000 would have been generally recognized. In the situation which followed from the Bolshevik triumph, neither clear-cut solution was achieved. Instead, a large body of the lower clergy and the faithful 795 split off from the Russian hierarchy in the Ukraine. When no 798 member of the episcopacy could be found to consecrate a new bishop for the dissident group, the Ukrainian church body resorted to the "laying on of hands" by priests as a method for consecrating Father Lypkivs'kyi as prelate of their organization. Thus a new Orthodox Church was formed, which rapidly came to embrace the great majority of organized Orthodox believers in the Ukraine; by 1923 it had no less than three thousand parishes and thirty-five bishops, headed by Lypkivs'kyi, then known as Metropolitan Basil.[1] In spite of this apparent prosperity, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, as it was called, lay under the shadow of two great weaknesses. In the first place, it was not recognized by any other body of the Orthodox Church, for the method of consecration of the new bishops was regarded throughout the Orthodox world as uncanonical, a violation of the essential principle of apostolic succession. From the point of view of the traditional believer, the bishops of the new church were illegitimate; consequently, priests ordained by them (but not those who had joined the Autocephalous Church after ordination by a validly consecrated bishop) were not truly endowed with sacerdotal functions. Secondly, and of more immediate significance, the phenomenal growth of the new church was possible only because of the comparatively indulgent attitude shown by the Communist authorities who, at that time, were more antagonistic to the Russian church than to dissident bodies. When the Soviet [661] power turned to restriction of Ukrainian national activity, as a potential threat to the unity of the USSR, the Autocephalous Church also came under attack. Its entire hierarchy and the great bulk of its clergy were executed or banished in 1929–30.[2]

In view of the close connection between church and state in 659 the Orthodox world, it was only natural that, when the Russian 795

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[1] John S. Reshetar, "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Orthodox Church," *American Slavic and East European Review,* X (February, 1951), 43–45.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 46.

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186 been founded by the nationalist intelligentsia of the East Ukraine
517 many years before the Revolution. They were now revived, after
515 long suppression by the Communist regime, to carry on the work of developing national culture and inculcating a feeling of national identity. The two aims could be combined because all nationalist Ukrainians felt it essential to instill a love of the indigenous popular arts and customs, emphasizing their distinctive nature. That this effort had a political as well as a cultural sig-
[661] nificance is indicated by the fact that not only the Soviet regime (both before 1941 and upon reconquest, as in Kharkov)[45] but the German police as well attacked the Prosvita societies, and in the Reichskommissariat they were able, for varying periods, to lead only a clandestine life. The desire for national expression was shared by so many, however, that the Germans felt it was impossible to dam up all outlets; therefore the Prosvita was generally permitted, though under close observation.[46] Together with the church (and a few local societies not using the Prosvita name but having the same function), it was one of the few organizations of a nationalist character which was not under direct German control.

533 The work of the Prosvita groups, although arranged in various
517 ways in different localities, may be classified under four general
186 headings. Playing a major role everywhere were musical activities,
515 particularly choral groups, in which the Ukrainians had always excelled, and which served as a powerful intellectual and emotional stimulus to nationalist feeling, since most of the songs were distinctively Ukrainian. In addition, groups of *bandura* players (the *bandura* is a small lute-like stringed instrument indigenous to the Ukraine) were sponsored, and orchestras were
545 trained. In the larger centers, Prosvita collaborated with regular
517 professional musical organizations, such as conservatories and
575 operas, to produce nationalist-inspired performances. For ex-
186 ample, operas were reopened in Kiev and Kharkov, and offered a considerable repertoire of native Ukrainian pieces (*Taras Bul'ba, Natalka Poltavka,* etc.) as well as traditional Western

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[45] Cf. *Nastup,* September 26, 1943, p. 3 (based on *Vinnyts'ki Visti,* August 29, 1943), on the destruction of Prosvita and its personnel in Kharkov during the Soviet interlude in February-March, 1943.

[46] MS E; PS 3943, May 22, 1942.

793 to have employed Ukrainian or Slavonic in the services according
578 ing to their own inclination. Consequently, the divergences of
186 the clergy can be used as a gauge of popular feeling on the "Left" as well as the "Right Bank," but the actual conflicts were muted, as were the strictly political rivalries, by the presence of a respected, moderate central authority.

668* It is true, however, that conflict was sharper in the area west of Kharkov than in its immediate vicinity. Poltava, the second city of the region under consideration, was one of the most purely Ukrainian of cities of considerable size. Too far east to have been the center for a large Jewish population, the removal of this group and the drastic reduction of the Russian element made it more than ninety percent Ukrainian, according to the city census. The nationalist groups were quick to organize there; largely with the help of OUN-M workers, the paper came under their control in November, 1941, and an East Ukrainian member of the Mel'nyk group, a former officer of the Republican army, became mayor.[23] Cultural life was rapidly renewed, two Ukrainian theaters being opened.[24] On the other hand, church organization was disrupted by quarrels between the priests preferring to introduce Ukrainian into the services and those wishing to retain Slavonic; the latter predominated in the city.[25] The former group, however, with sixty parishes in the countryside, joined the Autocephalous Church, and Ihor of Belaia Tserkov' was appointed their bishop.[26] Theophilus continued, however, to claim their allegiance.

727 Sometime in 1942, the Ukrainian editorial staff and the mayor
● 661 were shot by German police; the city passed under the control
204 of a Russian mayor, while the new Ukrainian editor could not assert himself against the tight German control.[27] Even earlier, several other nationalist editors in the area had been shot for evading German restrictions.[28] Some of the newspapers came under the control of nonentities who were fully subservient to the

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[23] *OUN u Viini*, p. 76; Interview 42.

[24] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.

[25] *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3.

[26] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, September 6–7, 1942, p. 2. It is doubtful whether he actually resided in Poltava, however, since he is later again reported as bishop of Belaia Tserkov'.

[27] Interviews 1, 42; *OUN u Viini*, p. 76.

[28] Interview 47.

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German authorities; in a few other places, including the important 727 towns of Lubny and Akhtyrka (Okhtyrka), editors continued 661● their endeavors to stimulate national feeling.[29] Remarkably, 204 the editor in the former town was a Russian who, after his pro-Ukrainian work brought him to the verge of arrest, was able to secure a new post as editor of a Russian-language paper in the Kursk *oblast*.[30] Most active of all this group, however, was the young editor of the Mirgorod paper, Michael Voskobiinyk, who pursued a line independent of the Nationalists yet modeled on the work of the *Nova Ukraïna* group.[31]

In general, nationalism in the "Left Bank" region under German 668* occupation can be said to have been characterized by more influence of locally led and organized ecclesiastical and political bodies than the area to the west of the Dnieper. Moreover, it was marked by somewhat less friction between the Ukrainian and Russian elements and a willingness of some of the latter group to cooperate with the effort for Ukrainian nationalist revival. Probably the basic reason for this difference is the fact that both OUN groups were suppressed in this area before they could become very influential, and the nationalist structure which was built up afterwards was formed of persons who feared the extremist program of the integral nationalists. It may be also that the history of the region, with its lack of comparatively recent memories of oppression by Polish lords and the relative independence with which nationalist life could develop, created an atmosphere of self-confidence which militated against the more violent aspects of nationalist egoism.

To the south of the wooded steppe belt just discussed lies 133 a broad region of more open steppe; in general the agricultural population of the area is considerably less dense than that of the region just described. The open plain with its very rich black soil and somewhat lesser rainfall lends itself to the cultivation of cereal crops which require smaller amounts of manpower, in contrast to the mixed sugar beet, dairy, potato, and grain agri-

-[East of the Dnieper -- Analyst]

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[29] Interviews 47, 50.

[30] Interview 47.

[31] *Ibid.*

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An important group of Ukrainian politicians,[1] who had 186
formerly supported Petlioura, joined the Bolshevik 191
cause after his defeat. The Soviet Government in- 177
augurated a policy of Ukrainization from the beginning in order to satisfy their ambitions and to show the world their nationalistic Liberalism. But, as under Petlioura, it was a superficial one and never penetrated in fact either into the private life of the citizens or into the sphere of education, or even into the administration. Although Ukrainian had become the official language, nobody used it and correspondence between official institutions continued, with rare exceptions, in Russian. One of the authors of this book, who held an administrative post in a Soviet enterprise in the Ukraine from 1921 to 1924, had never written a single word in Ukrainian and had never been prosecuted for this defection. It is not because the word 'Odessa' is now written with one 's' instead of two and the word '*plochtchad*' (in Russian a town square) is to-day replaced by the word '*maidan*,' that the Ukraine has ceased to be Russia.

The policy of Ukrainization continued without great changes and in spite of the lack of common sense until 1927, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party suddenly decided to introduce the Russian language as the second official language. One can explain this sudden change by the development of separatist anti-Soviet propaganda, undertaken by secret organizations,
formed under the protection of Poland. There occurred 661
in the Ukraine the first wave of purification which was directed against the 'Nationalistic Chauvinists,' accused of spiritual connection with Galician 'counter-revolutionary' elements, which had been affected by the propaganda of Polish 'Fascists.'

The people's commissar for education of the Ukraine,

[1] [i.e. in 1923---Analyst]

● 661 Choumsky, and a group of his friends had opposed this policy of the Central Government. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine accused Choumsky himself of 'spiritual connection' with the counter-revolutionaries of the Polish Ukraine and especially with the U.N.D.O., the most important among the Ukrainian political parties in Galicia and working under Polish influence. At that period one still didn't shoot Soviet Ministers. But Choumsky was forced to leave the Ukraine and to accept a small administrative post in Moscow.

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177 To regain the initiative in the Ukrainian question, the Executive Committee of the Comintern passed a resolution in November 1927 directing the Communist Party in the Polish Ukraine to struggle resolutely for the separation of this country from Poland and for its re-inclusion in the Soviet Ukraine.

On the other hand the inauguration of the first five-year plan, which strengthened the economic ties between the Ukraine and the rest of the Soviet Union, and the creation of the Red Army on a basis of discipline and of modern military science, made the use of Russian necessary throughout the whole Soviet territory.

669 This pro-Russian tendency did not last long. The forced collectivization of the land, undertaken in execution of the five-year plan, turned the Ukrainian peasantry against the Soviet Government. This resistance soon changed into a kind of civil war and became underlined by hundreds of thousands of deportations, by thousands of executions, and by a terrible famine.[1]

The resistance to collectivization, which was incompatible with the spirit and the vital interests of the peasant proprietors, was so violent and seemed so 669 justified that it carried certain Communist circles of peasant extraction with it, and especially the former *borot'bistes* (Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries of the left) who had accepted the Soviet programme in 1917. A new and violent purification followed.

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[1] See the work of Calvin B. Hoover: *Economic Life in Soviet Russia*, M.R.S., Paris, 1934, in which many pages are given to the question of collectivization.

Fearing a connection between the discontent of the 186 peasants, the opposition within the party, and the 661 nationalist movement supported from abroad, the Soviet Government took Ukrainianism under its control in order to prevent its use by the opponents of collectivization as a weapon against the Soviet regime. This time Ukrainization was pushed to the extreme and was maintained by the huge apparatus of repression. In all the enterprises, and in workers' syndicates, special cells were formed for the propaganda of the Ukrainian language and for the rigorous control of the knowledge of Ukrainian, which had become the obligatory language, established by the officials. The number of Ukrainian teachers was increased, new Ukrainian theatres, clubs, and libraries were created in industrial centres. Russian newspapers were almost completely suppressed. Those who resisted Ukrainization were mercilessly expelled from the administration and everything was put under the direct control of a special commission of the Council of People's Commissars. To all the countless suppressions to which the Soviet citizens were subjected that of the Ukrainization was added.

The attempt to snatch Ukrainianism from the hands of circles socially opposed to the Soviet regime was not successful. A veritable nationalistic anti-Soviet propaganda spread everywhere, supported by the officials of the regime. Then came the second change of policy. 661 Two trials, one of the 'Union for the Deliverance of the Ukraine' and the other of the 'National Centre'

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661 took place. From the darkness which characterizes all the Soviet political trials came a beam of light showing the anti-Ukrainian reaction of the general line of the party.

Nevertheless the XVIth Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. had still declared in June 1930 that the 'Pan-Russian Chauvinism' was always 'the principal danger during the present phase.' This declaration was voted for by the Congress after the long speech of Stalin himself, a speech consecrated to 'Soviet Culture,' 'proletarian at its foundation and national in its forms.'

It was in 1933 that the great purification of the Communist Party of the Ukraine took place, with the object of eliminating 'Ukrainian chauvinism.' The instigator of the nationalist opposition, the people's commissar Skrypnik, committed suicide in July, preferring an honest death to a bullet in the back of the neck, preceded by 'spontaneous confessions.' In November, at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, the question of the direct relations between the group of Skrypnik and the 'Polish Fascists' was openly discussed. Kossior had even declared that the 'Ukrainian nationalists hidden within the Communist Party' had been in contact with the U.N.O., the terrorist group of Ukrainian *émigrés* led by Colonel Konovaletz (recently assassinated by the G.P.U. at Rotterdam). The question of a Ukrainian organization (U.V.O.), which was said to have been discovered some months before in Soviet territory, was also raised. According to Postychev, the forced Ukrainization of the schools, carried out by Skrypnik, had opened the way for the 'chauvinists' who had profited by it in order to penetrate into various branches of the Soviet administration in pursuing the aim of detaching the Ukraine from the U.S.S.R.

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And for the first time it was said, at this plenary assembly of November 1933, that 'for the moment' the enemy No. 1 in the Ukraine is no longer Pan-Russian chauvinism but Ukrainian chauvinism.

The suicide of Skrypnik brought hundreds of his collaborators to the cellars of the G.P.U. at Kharkov. The leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party was given to Postychev, a man in the confidence of Stalin, and of Great Russian origin. He was given two tasks, to purify the Communist Party of elements suspected of sympathies with Ukrainian nationalism, and to check the sabotage by peasants in the *kolkhoses* (collective agricultural enterprises), the new forms of agricultural exploitation. Postychev successfully achieved the first task. More than a quarter of the Communists were expelled from the party and nearly the whole leading personnel was replaced.

As for the second task, despite the bloody suppressions, the war between the Ukrainian peasants and the Soviet Government continued, taking the form of a definite refusal to collaborate with the Soviets. This refusal led to a fall of agricultural production and to a famine, formerly unknown.

As the so-called 'Nationalist' movement was nothing else but an expression of the anti-Soviet social movement, the 'chauvinism' of which was only a pretext, the effects of the purification undertaken by Postychev were soon reduced to nil. Again executions were resumed, followed by very many suicides of Ministers, among whom were two Presidents of the Council. Finally Postychev himself was dismissed, being accused of a lack of energy and vigilance.

In November 1933 Kossior, the successor of Postychev at the head of the Ukrainian general secretariat of the party, declared that Ukrainization had given the National

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661 Oppositionists of the party the opportunity of releasing a veritable ' Petliourization ' of the peasant class and of the small town-dwellers, aiming at the separation of the Ukraine from the U.S.S.R.

648 Since 1936, as a reaction to the policy of the Reich, which tended to unite the different Ukrainian movements under its guidance, the Soviet Government adopted a new Ukrainian policy the official thesis of which was the *brotherly union of the Ukrainian and Great Russian people, as bequeathed by history.*

197 To-day we observe an attempt at bringing the Ukrainian and Russian languages closer together. Ukrainian is being purged of its Polonisms and its Germanisms, imported from Galicia, which ' the enemies of the people ' had tried to implant in the Soviet Ukraine. A system which tends to awaken and to maintain Russian national pride has been inaugurated. The victory of Poltava is no longer the victory of a Tsar who oppressed his people, but the liberation of the Ukrainian workers from the Swedish and Polish aggressors.

000 To sum up, among all the countries subjected to the ' social experiments ' by the heirs of Lenin, the Ukraine bows to them with far greater difficulty than the others. In this she seems to be the obvious prey of separatism, led by foreigners, the declared enemies of her people.

The Soviet Government is alone responsible for the existence of this separatism, which cannot be justified from any point of view and is foreign to the spirit and the interests of the Ukrainian people.

a treaty between Turkey, Moscow, and Poland of 1681, it was 175
determined to depopulate Ukraine between the South Bug and 648
Dnieper Rivers to the Black Sea. The western Ukrainian territories (Volhynia, Galicia etc.) remained under Polish rule. Ukraine to the East of the Dnieper remained under the protectorate of the Muscovite Tsars, preserving restricted autonomous rights, with an elected Hetman as the head of the Government.

Tsar Peter I. planned the abolition of the remains of the autonomous order of Ukraine on the Eastern bank of the Dnieper. In order to defend the freedom of Ukraine, Hetman Ivan Mazeppa concluded an alliance with the Swedish King Charles XII. against Russia in 1708. The battle of Poltava (1709), fatal for Ukraine and Sweden, put an end to the plans of the Ukrainian patriots to restore Ukrainian independence. Nonetheless, for decades even in the second half of the 18th century, the members of the Ukrainian Government which went into exile in 1709, continued in various countries their diplomatic action for the defence of the Ukrainian independence. They were headed by Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, the successor of Mazeppa, and included the son of Hetman Orlyk, Hryhor Orlyk, General in the French service, Fedir Myrovych and others.

After the battle of Poltava the Russian Government restricted [661]
the autonomous rights of Ukraine considerably. Tsar Peter I. 175
deliberately destroyed Ukraine in order to oppress her people the more easily, as we are informed by Weber, the Resident of Brunswick-Hannover in Moscow, a contemporary of Tsar Peter I.*). Ukraine was forced to pay heavy contributions, Ukrainians were sent in masses to the North to build Petersburg, the new capital of the Tsars. Many thousands of Ukrainians died from exhaustion while working for the strengthening of Russian Tsarist despotism. At the same time Moscow took from Ukraine its best cultural workers — scholars, artists, artisans. Western civilisation was introduced to Russia principally by Ukrainian intellectuals. (See K. Kharlampovich, *Little Russian Influence on the Great Russian Ecclesiastical Life:* Kazan, 1912; and Pekarsky, *Science and Literature in the Time of Peter* — I — II).

The Tsarina Catherine II. abolished the autonomous Ukrainian Government in 1764. Ukraine was brought to the level of the other provinces of the Tsarist Empire.

The Russian Government decided also to destroy the Zaporovian Army, the nest of democratic liberty in Ukraine. In 1775, Russian

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*) Weber, Das veränderte Rußland: Hannover 1729.

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Catholic Ukrainians to Greek Orthodoxy was taking place. The 727
Ukrainian Metropolitan of the Greek-Catholic Church in Galicia, 661 ●
Count Andrew Szeptycki, was arrested and deported to the interior 659
of Russia, and with him numerous Ukrainian clergymen. This
policy of oppression of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina was
cynically referred to by the Russian Government as 'liberation of
subjugated Slav brethren'...

727 565 state. On the contrary, they wished to suppress the Ukrainian movement and to make Ukraine a centre for the restoration of 'indivisible Russia', of course, headed by a Tsar. About these plans Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs after World War I. He hoped that a restored Russian Empire would be a reliable ally of Germany out of gratitide for the abolition of the Bolshevik régime.

642 727 565 On April 28, 1918, a detachment of German troops entered the hall where the sessions of the Ukrainian Central Council took place in order to arrest some Ukrainian Ministers. On the next day, on April 29, under the protection of the German troops, a congress of big landowners was called. At this congress General Paul Skoropadsky was declared Hetman of Ukraine, with the prior consent of the German authorities.

Skoropadsky belonged to the class of the big landowners, and, though he was of Ukrainian descent, had had no connections with the Ukrainian national movement before the revolution of 1917.

In his first order Skoropadsky wrote: "I declare myself Hetman of the whole Ukraine". He announced the abolition of the Ukrainian Central Council and replaced the name 'Ukrainian Democratic Republic' by 'Ukrainian State'. Skoropadsky repealed all laws and orders of the Ukrainian Central Council and the Russian Provisional Government; thus Ukraine had in this respect returned to the conditions before the Revolution.

The reactionary ways of the Skoropadsky Government that favoured the big landowners had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people; the masses of peasants and workers, that recently had fought with arms the terror of the Russian Communists under the banner of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic, were placed by the policy of the Skoropadsky Government into
● [661] a desperate situation. The big landowners who belonged almost exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities organised 'punitive expeditions' against the Ukrainian peasantry with their armed gangs having support from German and Austrian army detachments. Heavy contributions, looting, and destruction of the peasants' property, together with mass executions of Ukrainian peasants and workers, caused immense indignation against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austrian occupation forces among the Ukrainian people. Against the reactionary régime which dominated in Ukraine, Communist propaganda met with approbation among the Ukrainian masses, unexpected even by Moscow.

727 642 The Chief of Staff of the German armies in Ukraine, General Groener, in order to appease Ukrainian public opinion had declared after the putsch of April 29, 1918, that "the Hetman was given in-

669 December 12, 1918, a treaty was signed between the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the command of the German troops in Kiev that the German troops had to leave the Ukrainian capital. After this Skoropadsky abdicated and fled abroad with the German troops, having no one to lean upon.

642 The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic was restored in Ukraine. The five member Directory and the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic were headed by the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties (President — Volodymyr Vynnychenko). The first Government of the Directory was formed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky.

11. The Ukrainians in Austria Declare their Independence (1. 11. 1918)

563 The Ukrainians in Austria (Galicia and Bukovina) had had heavy losses during World War I from the Tsarist occupation which tried to destroy the Ukrainian movement. On the other hand, the Poles who had the control of the administration in Galicia in-
●[661] stigated the Austrian military authorities against the Ukrainians as
against 'Russian followers'. In consequence of this provocation thousands of innocent Ukrainians were put to death in Galicia.

563 In October 1918, the Ukrainian deputies to the Austrian Parlia-
668 ment and the Diets of Galicia and Bukovina created the Ukrainian
National Council as the political representation of the Ukrainians
186 in Austro-Hungary.

On October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council declared its resolve to create a Ukrainian state in the Ukrainian territories of Austro-Hungary. When Austro-Hungary fell asunder the Ukrainians declared the independent Western Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1, 1918, in Lviw).

Though the Ukrainian National Council of the former Austrian territories had passed a resolution on the preparation of the union of all Ukrainian territories in one state, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina distrusted the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. Just at that time the Ukrainian democratic parties made their preparations for the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. At the beginning of this action the key position was held by the regiment of the Galician Sich Riflemen which consisted of former Austrian Ukrainian prisoners of war taken by the Russian troops. This was the vanguard of the Ukrainian democratic movement against the Skoropadsky régime.

186 After the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev the
642 favourable moment came for the union of the Ukrainian terri-

656 **G. Lapchinsky, explained that Ukraine must be an independent state** and not a Russian colony.

186

668 The powerful Ukrainian movement forced the Russian Communists to alter for a certain time their tactics in Ukraine. The Soviet Russian Government ordered the Communists to pay attention to the national peculiarities of Ukraine. In December 1919, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party passed a resolution on the recognition by Russia of the independent Soviet Ukraine. Among other matters this resolution states that the "members of the Communist Party in Ukrainian territory are obliged to realise the right of the working masses of learning their mother language in schools, and speaking it in all Soviet institutions".

The resolution recommends the restriction of the requisition of food from the Ukrainian peasants. Besides, this resolution of the Russian CP pointed out that the principal task of Soviet construction in Ukraine was the requisition of arms from the population. ...

The President of the Soviet Russian Government, Lenin, wrote in *The Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine on the Occasion of the Victory over Denikin* on January 4, 1920:

"The independence of Ukraine has been recognised both by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet Republic and the Russian Communist Party. Only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can decide the question on their Soviet Congress — whether Ukraine should be united with Russia or left an independent Republic ... We want a voluntary union of nations, a union that would not permit violence of one nation against another".

All these declarations of the Russian Communist Party leaders had the aim to lull the vigilance of the masses of the Ukrainian people. In reality the Soviet Russian Government did not even intend to change its imperialist course against Ukraine. Moscow feared the armed Ukrainian people and distrusted them. Therefore, for instance, a conference of the members of the Russian Communist Party in Homel passed the following resolution in October 1919:

"The advance to the South and the organisation of Soviet administration in Ukraine are possible only with the aid of regular disciplined troops, who, in any case, must not be of local origin" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 6: Kharkov, 1926, p. 4).

669 The Soviet Russian troops, after having seized the Ukrainian
661 **territory until the spring of 1920, began at once the struggle against**

the Ukrainian partisan movement. New requisitions of grain and 669
the taking of arms from the population caused an even greater 661
disappointment among the Ukrainians. The partisan movement which had overthrown Denikin's power turned with new vigour against the Russian Communists. These risings were carried on under the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of arms and supplies did not permit the Ukrainian partisan movement to develop and to attain decisive results in the struggle with the overwhelming forces of the Russian Red Army.

17. Poland — Ukraine — Russia 1920—21

At the end of 1919, the regular front of the Ukrainian Army 648
broke down. The Ukrainian Army continued the fight against 669
'White' and 'Red' Russia as guerilla war. The diplomatic Mission 728
of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic headed by Andriy Liwycky, Cabinet member, started negotiations with the Polish Government about the relations between Poland and Ukraine. The consequence of these negotiations was a Convention signed in Warsaw on April 21, 1920. In that time the Government of the Ukrainian Republic headed by Isaac Mazepa was remaining in Ukraine.

According to this Convention a new frontier between Ukraine and Poland was established: those Ukrainian territories Poland had seized in 1919 in the war with the Ukrainians (Galicia, Volhynia etc.) remained on the Polish side. The Polish Government undertook to support the restoration of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic on the territories occupied by Soviet Russia.

The war of Poland and Ukraine against Soviet Russia, which was carried on with changing fortunes did not bring the expected results to the Ukrainians. The Polish leaders thought it more advantageous for themselves to come to an agreement with Soviet Russia after having divided the Ukrainian territories with Moscow (Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921). Poland recognised in Riga the Government of the 'independent' Soviet Ukraine and broke off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army which in fighting against the overwhelming Russian forces, had entered Polish territories together with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1920) was interned. The soldiers of this army, who had fought against Soviet Russia not only for Ukraine but for Poland alike, were placed by the Polish Government in camps in such conditions that many of them died there, or acquired serious diseases.

the industrialisation of Russia. The production of the heavy in- 185
dustries in Ukraine gave in 1931 63% of the whole output of coal, [433]
83% of the production of coke and 77% of iron ore of the USSR (*Izvestia:* Moscow, March 1, 1932). "The production of the Ukrainian plants solves the entire problem of metals in the whole Soviet Union" — the Kharkov *Communist* wrote on October 13, 1931. With these demands on the Ukrainian national economy Moscow placed the workers of Ukraine in the worst conditions. In the wage [465]
index the Ukrainian metal workers stood in 1931 in the 11th place, the miners in the 19th, the coke workers in the 27th place (*Izvestia:* Moscow, February 1, 1932). The conditions of work, dwelling, social insurance and cultural service of the workers in Ukraine were much worse than in Russia.

The forced collectivisation of the Ukrainian agriculture, started 474
in 1929/30, caused horrible devastation among the Ukrainian peas- 241
ants. Not less than 200,000 farms were destroyed, their property 661●
was taken into the collective farms (*Communist*, Kharkov, Decem- 565
ber 21, 1934). The owners of these farms, the so-called 'kulaks', were deported together with their families into the North of Russia, where they mostly died of hunger and disease caused by forced labour. If one counts a normal Ukrainian peasant family at least 6 persons the number of those ruined and destroyed by this collectivisation reached 1,200,000 persons. In reality the number of the victims of Stalin's 'General Line' was much greater.

This 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class' has not only taken the lives of millions of Ukrainian farmers: it has destroyed the best elements among the peasants. These peasants were no 'exploiters': they were able farmers who tilled their land in the sweat of their brows and produced grain for their families and for the market. Due to this absurd and cruel 'liquidation of the kulaks' the shortages in the supply of agricultural products grew enormously.

Simultaneously with the 'General Line' the centralisation in
Ukraine to Moscow's advantage was tightened: in the administra- 871
tion, in both economy and cultural work. In November 1929, the [241]
Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine was abolished and Ukrainian agriculture was subordinated directly to Moscow. The autonomy of Ukraine in the field of education was considerably restricted; in 1931 the separate Commissariat of the Interior in Ukraine was abolished; in 1933 the Commissariat of Justice was subordinated to Moscow, etc.

According to the directives from Moscow the Ukrainian culture had to be 'national in form, Communist in content'. Therefore

871 656 every teacher in the schools in Ukraine had orders to spread Communist propaganda, to fight the appearance of national discontent with the Russian rule by every means, and was obliged to insult the [814] struggle of the Ukrainian people for liberation. In schools, Ukrainian history was falsely interpreted as well as in literature and in films. For instance, clinging to the tradition taken from Tsarist Russia, the Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazeppa who at the beginning of the 18th century wanted to free Ukraine from Muscovite dependence, has in Soviet historiography the epithet of a 'traitor' and 'reactionary'. But Tsar Peter I. and Tsar Ivan the Terrible, are glorified by Soviet school and science as 'progressive democratic rulers'.

659 661 The Ukrainian religious life under the régime of Soviet Russian occupation had to suffer from special persecutions. In 1921, in Soviet Ukraine the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Autocephal Church, independent of the Moscow Patriarch, was organised. This Church, headed by its idealistic leaders, the Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier of the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1918—19 and others, completed a great task for the cultural and moral improvement of the Ukrainian nation. Moscow attempted to destroy the strong organisation of the Ukrainian Autocephal Church with the help of its agents, but did not succeed in this. Then the Soviet Government ruined by bloody repressions the Ukrainian Church after having destroyed its entire hierarchy and masses of its followers (1929).

661 517 815 In connection with the 'General Line' which had placed unbearable burdens on Ukrainian economy, a mass discontent against Moscow increased among the Ukrainians. The ruthless economic exploitation and political oppression by Russia caused, among the Ukrainian people, a permanent oppositon which appeared in various forms. Therefore, the Moscow Government decided to terrorise the Ukrainian intelligentsia which bore the brunt of the political efforts of the Ukrainian nation. For this purpose a number of trials against the most prominent representatives of Ukrainian science and social life were arranged; the case of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine with the participation of the prominent member of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, Serhy Yefremov, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier, Professor Osyp Hermayze and others in Kharkov, in spring 1930. Thousands of innocent people, especially students, perished in the prisoners' cells of the GPU without any trial. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian Academy of Science was exposed to repressions. In place of the imprisoned or expelled members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, the Communists appointed their own people though without scientific merits, but politically faithful to Moscow.

appointed their own people though without scientific merits, but 000
politically faithful to Moscow.

The economic and national oppression of Ukraine was felt also 661
by the Ukrainian Communists. They saw the pernicious results of 651
forced collectivisation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian peasants, though 243
terrorised by executions and deportations, had no desire to work for the Soviet dictatorship. In 1931/32 the plan for the delivery of grain for the Soviet state was not carried out in Ukraine. The cultivation area was disastrously diminished. But Moscow's demands on Ukraine grew steadily. In summer 1932, Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Ukraine from Moscow in order to demand from the Communist organisation in Ukraine the increase of grain delivery. At a Party conference in Kharkov the Commissar of Education Skrypnyk declared that in Ukraine all had been 'swept out' and that in the villages there was a great want of food. With Skrypnyk's view the majority of the members of the Communist Party in Ukraine agreed, and therefore it was decided in Moscow to make a radical 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists.

5. *Moscow's Terror against the Communist Opposition in Ukraine*

The Central Committe of the Communist Party of the Soviet 661
Union passed a resolution of non-confidence in the leaders of the 665
CP of Ukraine on January 24, 1933, and 'strengthened' the directory of the Communist Party in Ukraine with Stalin's agents, headed by Postyshev. Postyshev directed the repressions, particularly against Communists of Ukrainian nationality. By arrests and executions of Ukrainian Communists Postyshev wanted to terrorise the entire Ukrainian population which was listening to the opposing attacks of the Ukrainian Communists against the policy of Moscow. Postyshev carried out a massacre of Communists coming from Western Ukrainian territories, which at that time belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania (Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine). Many of them were declared without any reason 'agents of foreign Fascism' and shot without trial — Badan, Maksymovych, Sydorak, Mondok, the last two members of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, and many others.

During this bloody purge the 'old Bolshevik', Lenin's companion 687
from the days of the Soviet revolt in Petersburg in 1917, Commis- 186
sar of Education in Ukraine from 1927—1933, Mykola Skrypnyk, perished. Skrypnyk was accused of 'nationalist' deviations, for he thought that the national problem was not worked out sufficiently in Communist theory, and for this reason himself investigated the

687 national problem and encouraged others to do likewise. In Moscow Skrypnyk's theoretical works on the national problem were treated
186 with distrust: for in the CP one is to believe that Lenin and Stalin have given unchangeable dogmas an orthodox Communist is not expected to discuss. In the meantime Skrypnyk in his speeches and articles summoned the Ukrainian Communists to a 'national construction not restricted by anything'. He pointed out that national consciousness should be developed among the masses of Ukrainian people, and that through the development of the national culture certain values should be given to the Ukrainian workers and peasants.

Skrypnyk described the practice of the Russian Communist Party in the national question in the following words:

"For the majority of our Party, Ukraine as a national element did not exist. There was only 'Little Russia', as a part of the indivisible Russia, something uncertain both in its relations with Russia and with regard to its territory and even its language" (Skrypnyk, *Articles and Speeches,* vol. I, p. 291; Kharkov 1932). Frequently, in the Congresses of the Communist Party, Skrypnyk demanded the organising of Ukrainian schools in the territories of the Russian Soviet Republic inhabited by Ukrainians. These views and demands of Skrypnyk Moscow recognised as 'nationalism', he himself was declared as an 'instrument of intervention'. In order to avoid being the principal figure in a new trial Skrypnyk thought it better to end this life by suicide. This happened on July 6, 1933, on the 10th anniversary of the ratification of the first constitution of the USSR, of which Skrypnyk was one of the co-editors.

661 Moscow's fears of the Communist opposition in Ukraine are shown by the dimensions of the 'purge' which had been made among
665 the Communists in Ukraine in 1933. During 1933, 35,5% of the members were expelled from the CP of Ukraine (*Communist:* 1, 2, 1934). In some regions, for instance in that of Kiev, half of the members were expelled from the Communist Party. Many Communist organisations in villages ceased to exist and were replaced by 'political detachments' sent from Russia. In the course of 10 months in 1933, in Ukraine, 237 secretaries of Rayon Committees of the Communist Party, 279 Presidents of Rayon Executive Committees, and 158 Presidents of Rayon Control Commissions were dismissed (*Izvestia:* Moscow 28, 11, 1933).

The purge in the public institutions of Ukraine was directed principally against the Ukrainians. The Communist Mykolenko,

Soviet Union R2

the former director of the Ukrainian National Library in Kiev, declared before the purge commission in 1933: U 661 665

"I am being persecuted, because my name ends with 'ko', because I am a Ukrainian (*The First Results of the Purge:* Moscow, 1934).

6. The 'Organised' Famine in Ukraine in 1932/33

The purge in Ukraine was taking place in the conditions of a famine more terrible than that the Ukrainians had known in 1921/22. If the famine of 1921/22 was caused by extraordinary drought and bad harvest, and was only increased by the exploitation of the Soviet Russian Government, the famine of 1932/33 in Ukraine and the North Caucasus was organised by Moscow according to a plan made in advance: on the corpses of millions of Ukrainians the Soviet Russian Government wished to establish its forced collectivisation. U 731 656

The reaction of the peasants in Russia and Ukraine with regard to the collectivisation was different. The Ukrainian peasant is attached to his own land in another way than the Russian. In Russia the remainder of the primitive 'obshchina', a system in which the whole land belonged to the community, every member of which received at periodical partitions allotments of land according to the number of 'souls' or 'eaters', still existed. For this reason the Russian peasant did not cling to his land, for he did not know how long he could till his allotment. Besides, the peasants in Russia, who were accustomed to obedience during the half of a millennium by the tyrannical régime of the Tsars, obeyed the order of the Soviet Government almost without resistance and went into the collective farms. The Ukrainian peasant, freedom-loving, with a feeling of personal dignity, refused to go into the collective farms, for he rightly regarded them as a worse economic system than serfdom was. Moscow knew the free, inflexible character of the Ukrainians, and organised therefore the famine in Ukraine in order to break the resistance of the peasants. For this purpose all food the Ukrainian peasant population possessed was in the course of 1932/33 taken by force through the Communist administration. These food stocks were exported to Russia or abroad. As the consequence of this a terrible famine began in Ukraine. The well known American journalist W. H. Chamberlin calls it 'political famine'*). SU [474 423] U [474] [423]

Though rumours about the starving of the Ukrainians went abroad, Moscow stubbornly denied the fact of famine in Ukraine. To prevent the world from learning the true conditions in Ukraine

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*) W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine a Submerged Nation: New York, 1944.

731 656 officials in Ukraine confirmed to the correspondent of the ***Mancher Guardian*** that in this country there had been a great mortality from hunger. Comparing the situation of that time in Ukraine and the North Caucasus with the situation in Russia, the correspondent of the ***Manchester Guardin*** came to the following conclusion when he said:

"It can be definitely stated that no provinces within a radius of several hundred miles of Moscow experienced the Ukrainian and North Caucasian extremities" (*Manchester Guardian:* October 19, and October 21, 1933).

The correspondent of a Jewish Socialist journal in New York, Lang, gave a description of the situation in the summer and autumn of 1933 in Ukraine: he saw how grown-ups and children were starving to death, he had been in totally depopulated villages where the inhabitants had died of hunger or fled from their homes (*Forwards:* 27. 12. 1933).

The American journalist Walter Duranty 'optimistically' estimated the number of the victims of the famine in USSR in 1933 as 5 million people. Of course, the principal part of these victims were in Ukraine, against which the Russian Communist régime was carrying its special policy of exstirpation.

In consequence of the famine and the repressions in Ukraine, principally men had perished. Therefore for instance, in 1932—33 the women in the collective farms in Ukraine were 60—70% of the total (*Communist:* Kharkov, 26. 1. 1934). The extent of child mortality was shown clearly in 1940; in the fall of 1940, the lack of births in 1932/33 forced the authorities to close parallel classes or abstain from opening first classes in many Ukrainian schools, for there where no children! The consequences of the famine in Ukraine could be seen in the decrease of the cultivation plain of the winter crops in autumn 1933: one million hectars less than in 1930 (*Izvestia:* Moscow, 16. 11. 1933).

● 661 731 656 Fully to realise the hypocritical policy of the Russian Communist dictatorship in Ukraine, one must add that Moscow tried to lay the responsibility for the famine in Ukraine on the Ukrainian Communists, who, as they pretended, 'had overstepped the Party line'. Many prominent Ukrainian Communists were arrested and shot under the pretext that they had caused the famine in Ukraine as 'agents of foreign capital'. -

In the first years of their rule in Ukraine, the Russian Communists dreamt of world revolution and regarded the Ukrainian Western territories under the rule of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia as a bridge for their armed 'march on Europe'. In connection

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

with this, to a certain degree, was the policy of 'Ukrainisation' 731
directed in Soviet Ukraine: Moscow intended to gain sympathy 656
for the Soviet régime among the population of the Western Ukrai- 661
nian territories in Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. The famine of 1932/33 in Soviet Ukraine roused great distrust and dislike of Soviet Russia among the Western Ukrainians. Therefore Soviet Russia destroyed thousands of intellectuals coming from the Western Ukrainian territories, among them Communists as 'agents who had worked for the money of foreign big landowners and capitalists'...

CHAPTER IV

THE UKRAINIANS OUTSIDE SOVIET UKRAINE AFTER 1920

I. The Ukrainians in Poland

563 186 After the signing of the Treaty of Riga (1921) between Soviet Russia and Poland, about 6 million Ukrainians remained under Polish rule (Galicia, Volhynia, Polissia, Pidlyasha, Kholm Region). The case of Galicia as that of a former Austrian territory appeared from time to time in international policy. The members of the Ukrainian National Council of Galicia remaining in Western Europe demanded the right of free self-determination for this territory. In February 1921, the Council of the League of Nations stated in its resolution: "Galicia lies outside the borders of Poland", "Poland is only the actual occupant of Galicia". But this and other resolutions could not remove the Polish rule in Galicia. Poland did not care for the resolutions of the League of Nations. However, in order to appease foreign public opinion, the Polish Diet passed in September, 1922, a bill on the autonomy of the Counties into which Galicia had been divided in 1920, and a bill on the creation of a Ukrainian University. In November 1922, elections to the Polish Diet took place. The Ukrainians, having regard to the special situation of Galicia, did not take part in these elections. In other Ukrainian territories under Polish rule, particularly in Volhynia, the Ukrainian political parties attained at these elections a great victory.

On March 15, 1923, in a resolution of the Conference of the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan in Paris, the frontiers of the Riga Treaty between Poland and the USSR were recognised "with regard to the fact that Poland had admitted with respect to Eastern Galicia that the ethnographic situation demanded unconditionally an autonomous order".

563 661 But the Polish authorities had no intention to grant political autonomy to the Ukrainians. Even the rights of the Ukrainians for cultural development were narrowly restricted in Poland. Against the Ukrainians in Poland, a police régime was introduced. In 1920 there were in the Polish concentration camps many thousands

Ukrainians where they died in masses from insufficient food and 563
disease. The Polish Government abolished in Galicia most of the 661
Ukrainian schools which had existed in the times of Austrian rule. [871]
In the schools in Galicia, Volhynia and other Ukrainian territories,
the Polish authorities conducted a forced Polonisation. The Ukrainian University that had been created in Lviw in 1920 privately was suppressed by the Polish Government. Simultaneously, the admission of Ukrainians to Polish Universities was made extraordinarily diffucult. State officials of Ukrainian nationality were dismissed in masses by the Polish Government, and new applicants were not accepted. Even the national name 'Ukrainian' the Polish Government did not recognise and ordered the use officially only
of the archaic name 'Ruthenian'. At the elections to the Polish Diet [665]
and Senate in 1928, for the first time under Polish rule, the Ukrainians of Galicia took part. The Ukrainian population gave its voices at the elections for two parties: the party of the democratic centre (UNDO — Ukrainian National Democratic Union — under the leadership of Dmytro Levytsky) and the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party, led by Ivan Makukh.

After the termination of the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1919, on 727
the Western Ukrainian territories economic reconstruction by the 474
Ukrainian population themselves began, predominantly in the form
of co-operative societies. In 1924 in Lviw the Central Co-operative 563
Bank was founded, and a central institution for all co-operative societies organised *(Centro-Soyuz).* The Ukrainian co-operative movement in Poland was headed by the Revisional Association of Co-operatives, which had about 500,000 members and had more than 12,000 employees. The Association of Ukrainian Dairy Co-operation *(Maslosoyuz),* supplied dairy products, not only for the Polish market, but exported many of its products to the countries of Western Europe.

The Polish Government looked on the Ukrainian economic activity with displeasure and tried to hinder the development of Ukrainian co-operative societies and private economic initiative. In 1934, by order of the Polish Government, the operations of the Revisional Association of the Ukrainian Co-operatives were limited only to Galicia. Ukrainian co-operative societies in other Ukrainian territories in Poland, about 450, were forced to be subordinated to Polish co-operative centres.

The Warsaw Government carried on a systematic colonisation in 563
the overpopulated Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian peasants
were excluded from the right of land reform. Having no opport-

563 unity to move into the towns or to emigrate the Ukrainian peasants were pauperised.

These conditions were favourable to the growing of extremist trends in Ukrainian political life: communism on the one hand and nationalism on the other.

668 The policy of 'Ukrainisation' in Eastern Ukraine was exploited
661 by Communist propaganda: the 'Ukrainisation' in Soviet Ukraine,
adversited by Moscow, did not remain without influence on the
563 population of the Western Ukrainian territories. The Communists
of Western Ukraine served Soviet Russia as a 'fifth column'
among the Ukrainians in Poland.

The Polonisation of Ukrainian schools, the colonisation of Ukrainian territory with Poles, the refusal to admit Ukrainians to Government service, the persecutions of the Ukrainian press, of educational and economic organisations — all this gave the basis for the creation of illegal Ukrainian groups which began the fight
[725] against the Polish régime with terror. In 1920 the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) was created in Galicia and organised attacks on the representatives of the Polish Government. Later UVO fused with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded at a Congress in Vienna in 1929 under the leadership of Colonel Evhen Konovalets. The Pôlish Government took advantage of the terrorist acts and sabotage attributed to the members of OUN to destroy the Ukrainian cultural and economic life. In September 1930, Polish troops and police undertook a terrible 'pacification' among the Ukrainian population in towns and villages. Polish soldiers and policemen severely beat more than 15,000 Ukrainians, mostly cultural and economic workers, who had not anything in common with the terrorist activity and often were resolute opponents of terror. Many victims of this 'pacification' died after terrible sufferings. A great number of Ukrainian economic and educational institutions — co-operative societies, schools, reading halls and libraries were destroyed.

After the 'pacification', the oppressions against the Ukrainians in Poland grew worse and the Polish colonisation of Ukrainian territories was increased by state funds. In September 1934, the delegates of the Polish Government declared at the Session of the League of Nations that Poland did not have any obligations towards the resolutions of the peace treaties regarding the protection of the rights of the national minorities in Poland.

By this action the Polish Government violated even formally the obligations accepted by Poland in the Peace Treaties in regard to the national minorities.

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The Polish policy aimed at the disintegration of the national life of the 6 million Ukrainians through attempts to divide them into different 'tribes' which were given various names in official statistics: 'Polishchuk', 'Hutsul', 'Ruthenian', 'Boyko', 'Lemko', and even 'Orthodox' and 'Aborigines'. Against the Orthodox as well as against the Greek Catholic Ukrainians a policy of systematic Polonisation was applied by forcible conversion of the Ukrainians to Roman Catholicism which in the conditions of the Polish State was equivalent to Polonisation. In Ukrainian regions the Poles organised on the eve of World War II 'dragonnades' in order to convert the Greek Orthodox Ukrainians to the Roman Catholic Church: armed Polish gangs drove through the villages, destroyed the Orthodox Churches, beat the Ukrainians, looted their property, and forced them by this terrorism to turn Catholic. Thus the Polish Chauvinists protected by the Polish Government destroyed in 1938 more than 100 Ukrainian Churches, among them many medieval and of great artistic value and forced many Ukrainian communities to accept Roman Catholicism. In vain the Ukrainian deputies to the Polish Diet protested against this Polish violence, in vain the Metropolitan of the Greek Orthodox Church in Poland Dionysios and the Metropolitan of the Greek Catholic Church in Lviw Count Szeptycki rose their voices. The Polish oppression caused a strong opposition and resistance among the Ukrainians in Poland, which the Polish Government tried to suppress by new persecutions. 563 661 798

In the entire Polish policy between the two World Wars the fear of the Ukrainian national movement is undoubtfully apparent. The Polish Government did not wish the creation of an independent Ukraine, fearing that a Ukrainian state would later demand union with the Ukrainian provinces of Poland. Even the small Carpatho-Ukraine, which had proclaimed its autonomy in autumn 1938, seemed dangerous to Poland as giving a 'bad example' for the Ukrainian population in Poland. This was one of the reasons why the Polish Government helped to destroy Czechoslovakia and supported the Hungarian claims on Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939. 000

In September 1939, the Ukrainian territories which after the Treaty of Riga were under Polish rule, were occupied by the Soviet Army in accordance with the German-Russian Pact of August 23, 1939, signed in Moscow. This 'liberation of Western Ukraine' brought to the population of these territories a time of terror and oppression. Thousands of Ukrainians of all classes were deported to the East, many of them did not come back. 661 563

The local Ukrainian Communists also were suspected by the Soviet authorities, they were not admitted to influential positions and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'

563 and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'. For the
423 Ukrainian peasants a land reform was proclaimed at the cost of the
474 big landowners, but simultaneously the organisation of collective farms was started, and this caused serious bitterness among the masses of the people.[1] It should be pointed out that between the Western Ukrainian territories recently occupied by the Soviet Army and the old USSR a strictly guarded police border was preserved, in order to prevent any contact between the population of these territories.

2. The Ukrainians under Rumanian Rule (Bukovina and Bessarabia)

563 In 1918 Rumania occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first had been a Russian province, the second had belonged to Austria. In these provinces there were about 1 million Ukrainians at that time. From the beginning of the Rumanian occupation, for 10 years, the state of siege was maintained. This paralysed the political, economic and cultural organisation of the Ukrainians. From 1922, all Ukrainian schools were transformed into Rumanian. The Rumanian Government did not recognise the Ukrainians as a separate nation but declared that the Ukrainians in Bessarabia and Bukovina were 'Rumanians by origin who had forgotten the Rumanian language'. During the state of siege in Bukovina the Ukrainian books in the public libraries were confiscated; in the Churches the Rumanian language was introduced. The Ukrainian co-operative societies were destroyed by administrative oppressions. The only sign of Ukrainian national life was the Ukrainian press, but against this press the Rumanian authorities placed various obstacles.

[665] In 1927 in Bukovina the Ukrainian National Party was founded. This party won at the elections to the Rumanian Parliament 3 mandates — 2 Deputies and 1 Senator.

[204] The Rumanian authorities greatly feared the possibilities of the development of the Ukrainian movement, and did not admit in Bessarabia even the Ukrainian press, while the Russian press was allowed.

728
●661 In 1940 Rumania ceded Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR. The Ukrainian parts of these countries were united with Soviet Ukraine, the territories populated by Moldavians were added to the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, founded as far back as 1925 within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet occupation by its terrorism and economic policy (forced collectivisation) soon disappointed the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina

[1. In Western Ukraine under Soviet rule, Sept. 1939 -- Analyst]

Attempts [illegible]

●661 were cruelly suppressed by Russia: large masses of the Kuban population were deported to Siberia.[1]

6. *The Ukrainians in Siberia and the Far East*

167 The lack of land on their own territory forced the Ukrainian peasants to move behind the Volga, the Ural, and into the regions of Siberia. This movement of settlers developed especially after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway at the end of the 19th century. Thus, large territories behind the Volga, the regions of Samara, Astrakhan, in Central Siberia, the regions of Tomsk, Omsk, Akmolinsk, in Turkestan and in the Far East, the Amur and Sea Region — the so-called Green Quoin, were colonised.

668 186 Before World War I in the Green Quoin about 500,000 Ukrainians, mostly farmers, were numbered. At that time a Ukrainian national movement began: educational organisations, bookshops, theatre performances etc. (centre Vladivostok). After the revolution of 1917, in the Far East, Ukrainian cultural, national, political and other organisations were created, and Ukrainian periodicals appeared for the first time. In June 1917, the 1st Ukrainian Far East Congress was called, which decided to demand national autonomy for the Green Quoin, a territory the size of Italy. The 2nd Ukrainian Far East Congress created the 'Ukrainian Far East Secretariat' for the administration of Ukrainian political affairs of the Ukrainian population of the Far East. The Japanese occupation of 1920—22, the war of the 'Red' and 'White' Russians for the Territory of the Green Quoin, did not forward the development [656] of the Ukrainian national movement there. After having taken possession of the Far East, the Russian Communists were hostile to the Ukrainian movement, and hindered especially the [191] development of Ukrainian schools. Though the demands for the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools for the Ukrainians of the Far East and Siberia came from the Ukrainian population itself and from the Commissariat of Education of Soviet Ukraine, the Russian bureaucracy did not recognise the Ukrainian language, declaring that this was "a separate group of Russian population speaking a special jargon" (Z. Ostrovsky, *The Problems of Ukrainisation and Byelorussianisation in the RSFSR: Moscow,* 1931, p. 33).

7. *The Ukrainian Emigration to Europe and America between the World Wars*

167 In consequence of the occupation of Ukrainian territory by Soviet Russia and Poland in 1920, a great number of Ukrainian emigrants

[1] [During collectivization and famine in the Kuban region of the RSFSR 1932-33 -- Analyst]

CHAPTER V

WORLD WAR II AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

1. Ukraine During World War II.

During World War II, two totalitarian forces contended for 727
domination over Ukrainian territory: Russian Communism and 661
German Nazism. In the first phase of the war the Moscow and Berlin Governments divided Poland between themselves. The USSR occupied the Western Ukrainian territories of Galicia, Volhynia etc., and the Ukrainian territories of Rumania, Bukovina and Bessarabia. By the war with the USSR in 1941, Hitler planned to acquire Ukraine for German colonisation. The German Nazis tried to weaken the Ukrainian population. During the German occupation Galicia was joined with the Polish territories — *Generalgouvernement* — and isolated from the other parts of Ukraine. Hitler gave the territory between the Dniester and the South Bug with Odessa to Rumania. The rest of the Ukrainian territories was put under the rule of Erich Koch as *Reichskommissariat Ukraine.*

The great majority of the population of Ukraine, regardless of their nationality, as well as the population of Russia and the Baltic States hoped that, in consequence of war, the Soviet régime would fall and the time for a free life would come. Completely separated from the outside world, the Soviet citizens did not know anything about Hitler's aims in Eastern Europe, and did not believe the Soviet propaganda. Therefore hundreds of thousands of Jews remained in Ukraine at the beginning of the war, being against the Communist dictatorship and hoping that the German régime would not be worse than the Soviet. The German authorities systematically exstirpated the more active elements among the Ukrainians; especially they terrorised the Ukrainian intelligentsia. A crude description of the rule of the German occupation in Ukraine in 1941—44 we find in the memorandum of A. E. Frauenfeld, the General Commissar of the Crimea, written for Hitler's staff on 10. 2. 1944. Frauenfeld saw the absurdity of the German policy in Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine sooner, but dared to write about it only when Hitler's catastrophe became inevitable.

On the policy of Erich Koch in Ukraine Frauenfeld writes in his memorandum:

727 "The course of ruthless brutality in treating the inhabitants of ●661 the country by principles and methods used in past centuries against coloured slave peoples, and the fact sneering at every sound policy that the disregard of this nation found its expression not only in the treatment of the people but was expressed at every possible and impossible opportunity again and again and was in addition printed and published in pamphlets, is a proof of the complete lack of instinct in handling of foreign peoples, which, with regard to its consequences, cannot be called other than shocking and catastrophic".

Frauenfeld shows this 'policy with the blacksmith's hammer' which would not see the inevitable reaction of the Ukrainians on such barbarism:

"There must be a naivety bordering on narrow-mindedness to believe that in the 20th century a nation having a shocking tragic history but, however, having a historical past, even if it is of another breed than the German people, — undoubtedfully has certain qualities of race and character, will permit itself to be degraded and insulted permanently and will also delightedly place its working power and capacities at the service of the tyrant".

Frauenfeld quotes the words of the Reichskommissar Erich Koch, who during a journey from Rivne (Rovno) to Kiev said to his staff:

"If I should find a Ukrainian worthy to sit with me at one table I must shoot him".

Frauenfeld cites examples from the work of the German administration headed by Erich Koch: the closing of schools, theatres, libraries, inattentiveness to epidemics among the Ukrainians, deliberate furtherance of the dying out of the Ukrainian people. As Frauenfeld witnesses, his collegues were very satisfied with the spreading of epidemics in Ukraine: "The Ukrainian needs no physicians; if an epidemic breaks out, thousands and tens of thousands will perish".

466 For the needs of the German economy the German Nazi Government took working power from Ukraine. Frauenfeld writes about 727 this:

661 "There was, for instance, the enlisting for work in Germany. That was carried out in a way that bears close comparison with the Bolshevik deportations to Siberia. From camps surrounded by barbed wire, from grated waggons to the encircling and searching of villages by surprise, and nocturnal levying in which people were taken in GPU manner out of their beds, the whole technique of the Arab slave hunters among the negroes of Africa in past centuries was used".

727 The Germans did not touch the Soviet collective farms, because
● 661 they regarded them as the best method for exploiting the peasants. On the other hand, the German authorities did not wish to permit the partition of the land, for they prepared Ukraine for German colonisation.

[181] Frauenfeld points out the high physical and moral qualities of the Ukrainians, their highly developed consciousness of personal dignity and their aspiration for education. He witnesses that the closing of schools by the German authorities in Ukraine roused the greatest dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian people:

"The Ukrainians, especially the women, are very desirous of learning, and one could hear from them: 'Under the Bolsheviks we were starving, but we could learn something at least. Under your rule we cannot even learn. This proves that you are our enemies' . .".

The author of the memorandum comes to the conclusion that the Ukrainians should not be exstirpated in the interests of Hitler's 'racial policy'; on the contrary "the often genuine blond and blue-eyed as well as brunette population" should be assimilated for such an assimilation "would be without doubt more desirable and advantageous than many we had absorbed during our history, or are even trying to suck up . . ."*).

725 Against pillage, terror, oppression and humiliation the Ukrai-
668 nian people reacted with great vehemence, in spite of the extraordinary weakening by the previous Soviet terrorism, the famine and the war. In all parts of Ukraine risings broke out. This Ukrainian partisan movement helped to a great extent to defeat the German armies in Ukraine. But this was not a proof of affection of the Ukrainians for Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian partisan movement took place under the banner of an independent Ukraine. The initiative for the creation of the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) came from officers of the army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1941.

The Ukrainian Partisan Army turned its weapons after the defeat of Germany against the new oppressor — Soviet Russia.

2. *Ukraine after the War*

727 In the course of World War II the entire territory inhabited by Ukrainians from the Caucasus to the Carpathian Mountains came
000 under the rule of Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian nation, from the

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*) Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld, *Denkschrift über die Probleme der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete: 10. 2. 1944* (Document No. 5394, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes).

●661 The Ukrainian nation, from the famine of 1921/22 and later years, suffered under the Soviet terrorist régime great losses of its biological substance. To this were added the enormous losses in World War II, in the risings and from the terror of both totalitarian régimes.

731 In 1946 Ukraine had to suffer from a new famine in consequence of a bad harvest, and it must be stated that the policy of Moscow with respect to hungry Ukraine had not changed; the Ukrainian people received aid from the Communist Government only in a minimum degree. The principal aid came from America.

165 The statistics count the losses of the Ukrainian people during the Soviet Russian rule in Ukraine in millions. In 1917 approximately 30,000,000 people inhabited the territory of Ukraine within the frontiers of Soviet Ukraine before the outbreak of war in 1939. The Soviet statistics gave the figure of 31,000,000 inhabitants of Ukraine in 1933. The census of January 1939 counted a population of only 30,960,000 in Ukraine. These figures show clearly the consequences of the Soviet Russian policy of exstirpation in Ukraine. If a normal increase of population had taken place, the population of Ukraine should have reached at least 40,000,000. Thus Ukraine had had from 1917 to 1939 a loss of 10,000,000 inhabitants! (comp. Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union — History and Prospects:* Geneva, 1946).

An entirely different picture statistics show in Russia: from 78 million in 1926 the Russians grew to 99,3 million in 1939. These figures speak for themselves.

000 After World War II, the Russian Communist dictatorship is playing on the strings of the traditional Russian nationalism and imperialism more than before. 'The great Russian nation', 'the great Russian language' and similar epithets doubtless inspire the Russians and make them an obedient instrument of Moscow's imperialistic policy.

During World War II a new political trend appeared among the Russian emigrants who had fought at the beginning of the revolution in the 'White Armies' against the Communist dictatorship. This was the movement of so-called 'Soviet Patriots', who began to return in masses to Russia, especially from France, inspired by the prospects of the growth of the Russian Empire under Communist leadership.

In the Soviet Union the national movements of the subjugated peoples are officially regarded as the 'principal danger'. Therefore, the Soviet Government is making haste in 'liquidating' entire nations which Moscow has recognised as 'reactionary' — Crimean Tartars, the peoples of the North Caucasus, etc. Of course, the

Of course, the 656

Ukrainian problem has remained from old times for Soviet Russia 661 the basic problem of its internal and foreign policy. The unceasing Russification policy against the Ukrainians is carried on by particularly cunning methods: the Ukrainian language is not yet [191] abolished definitely in the offices of Soviet Ukraine. But that official who speaks Ukrainian also in his family and in private relations becomes in the eyes of the Soviet authorities suspicious, and has to suffer repressions.

The Communist theory of the national problem worked out by Lenin preaches the 'fusion of nations'. Basing on this, the Russian Communist Government is trying to 'fuse' the nations of the Soviet Union with the Russians. Against peoples who oppose forced Russification, ruthless repressions are used by Moscow. Even the mentioning of the national rights of the non-Russian peoples is condemned in the USSR as 'bourgeois nationalism'.

There is a great principal difference between the situation of the 000 Russians and the peoples united by force with this state: though the Russians are not satisfied with the Communist dictatorship, they do not, however, feel national oppression. Even in the new anthem of the USSR it is said that this state was rallied by Great Russia. We can state the efforts of Russian political groups opposing the Communist régime to maintain the rule of the Russian state over the territories conquered by Soviet Russia, even after the eventual fall of the Soviet régime.

As a curious fact we can quote the view of the well-known Communist L. Trotzky, who was assassinated in Mexico during World War II, on the Ukrainian problem. Trotzky demanded in 1939 the full separation of Ukraine from Russia. But Trotzky thought of an independent Ukraine in the form of a Soviet Republic. This naturally deprived his thesis of all seriousness, for Trotzky needed the slogan of an independent Ukraine only as a political argument in polemics against Stalin *(Bulletin of the Opposition,* No. 77/78, 1939).

As the facts prove, the Ukrainian nation has to endure the heaviest oppression in the USSR. Unfortunately, the words of the famous historian of France Charles Seignobos written in 1913 on Ukraine, can be used emphatically to describe the outstanding feature of the present state of the Ukrainian nation: "Here is the most oppressed nation" ("Voici la nation la plus opprimée", *Les Annales des Nationalités:* Paris, 1913).

In its equalising policy, the Soviet Russian Government retains, 659
also, traces of the Tsarist régime in the affairs of Church and reli- 79
gion. Thus, after having seized Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine dur- 661

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

651 ing World War II, the Soviet Government abolished the Ukrainian
798 Greek-Catholic Church by force, against the will of the popula-
● 661 tion, and destroyed the hierarchy of this Church. The Ukrainian
Greek Catholics who were in union with Rome were ordered to become subordinate to the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow, who is backed by the Soviet Government.

200 The struggle of the Ukrainians against Russian imperialism did not cease after World War II. It is being conducted in various forms. In this struggle other peoples who are oppressed by Russia, from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Turkestan, participate. Thus a common front of freedom-loving peoples against despotic Russia is being created.

656 In 1949, Moscow has permitted Ukraine to use an own flag and
156 an own different anthem. However, this cannot be regarded an ex-
661 tension of the rights of Ukraine in the Soviet Union. It seems to
be more an attempt to bring the so-called satellite countries to the Ukrainian level.

Moscow is watching attentively every expression of Ukrainian political thought and national sentiment, and wants to have everything under its control. The Decade of Ukrainian Culture held in Moscow in July 1951, ended with rebukes and threats against the participants of the Decade, and a 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists whom Moscow imputes 'bourgeois nationalism'. Only the Russian Communists have beeen beyond any doubt as regards their 'internationalism'; there was no case that the manifestations of nationalism among the Russian Communists had been condemned by the Communist Party. On the contrary, Moscow is cultivating an exaggerated national pride among the Russian people. The Ukrainian Communists are under a especially heavy control of
[554] Moscow. No Ukrainian has been General Secretary of the Commu-
nist Party of Ukraine. This position has always been occupied by people sent from Moscow: Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Khrushchev, finally Melnikov.

'Titoism' is no isolated phenomenon in the relations between imperialist Russia and Yugoslavia. Similar trends hostile to Russian imperialism have existed among Ukrainian Communists since the first days of Soviet Russian occupation in Ukraine. The Russian terrorism prevented these trends, however, from getting strong. Nevertheless, they exist clandestinely. Moscow's persecution of 'burgeois nationalism' among the Ukrainian Communists gives an eloquent proof of Ukrainian opposition against Russian imperalism.

11:Obermaier--117 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

After this first chapter of Muscovite national policy was completed, the second one began: the "New Economic Policy" (NEP). The Soviet Union was urgently in need of composure, of a breather and recuperation. The Bolsheviks in Moscow, therefore, loosened the reins and introduced the semi-free economy in which land, large enterprises and the banks remained the property of the state, the peasants obtained the usufruct of the land, and a free market could regulate 648 the distribution of goods. Simultaneously with the NEP, Moscow launched a second enterprise: the nationalization of non-Russian peoples. For it was necessary to administer in small doses and in as attractive a form as possible, Bolshevist ideology to the Ukrainians, the White Ruthenians, the Caucasian and all other peoples who were under Moscow's rule. With the XII Congress of the Communist Party in 1922 the policy of Ukrainization was adopted, to be sure only in the area of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic with its 443,000 square kilometers of surface and approximately 23 million Ukrainians, while the many millions of Ukrainians in the White Ruthenian Soviet Republic, the Russian Soviet Republic including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, in the Kuban area, on the Volga and in Siberia were at that time already being de-nationalized. During that XII Congress in 1923, the following words were spoken about the Ukraine: "This is one of the problems which threaten to involve Soviet Russia and the Party in the greatest complications. It is one of those problems which, we must admit frankly and honestly, will promulgate civil war if we do not approach it with delicacy and understanding."

The Ukrainian Communists adopted Moscow's
661 slogan without hesitation. To Ukrainize - that
648 meant to give Ukrainians leading positions in the government, in the Party, in the cooperatives, in economy, in the press and in the school system; /114/ it also meant using Ukrainian as the offi-

661 648 cial language and promoting Ukrainian culture in all its aspects, in science and art. The process was carried on so eagerly in all fields that in the course of it the task of converting people to Bolshevism seemed almost to be forgotten. In fact, a Ukrainian national Bolshevist movement was started, which soon ran into opposition with Moscow. It was headed by the People's Commisar for Popular Education, Shumskyj, whose group openly opposed the "exploitative colonial policy of Moscow". The situation was not too good within the Communist Party of the Ukraine. Shumskyj divulged this in his speech of May 12, 1926: "Within the Party, the Russian Communist prevails; he does not trust the Ukrainian Communist and is hostile toward him." (59)

59. Fedenko: Lectures on the Question of Nationalities in the U.S.S.R., page 12.

648 How weak the position of Moscow was after the subjugation of the Ukraine is shown by the Constitution of the Soviet Union of 1923, in which the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as well as the remaining national republics of the Union had to be formally recognized. The defense system, the transportation system, finances and foreign policy were declared to be affairs of the state. The Foreign Commissariat in Moscow established a branch in Khar'kov, which at that time was the Soviet Ukrainian capital.

661 648 The process of Ukrainization reached its external climax with the visit of the Ukrainian champion of liberty Colonel Konovalets who in 1918 and 1919 had carried on the bitterest battles against the Bolsheviks and now visited Kiyev at the invitation of the President of Soviet Ukraine, Petrovskyj. Like so many other emigrants he, too, had let himself be dazzled by Muscovite nationalist policy. What Petrovsky was able to show his West Ukrainian guest was indeed astonishing com-

661 648 pared with that which remained to the Ukrainians in Poland. The old cultural city on the Dniepr was experiencing a new efflorescence; 70% of all students in Soviet Ukraine were attending Ukrainian schools. There had been nothing like [214] it since the days of the Cossacks. /115/ Between 1918 and 1928 the Academy of Sciences published [217] 888 works and numerous libraries were founded. (60) Hundreds of newspapers, periodicals and pamphlets enlightened Ukrainians eager for knowledge in their mother tongue, and poetry and belles-lettres had reached a very high level. But soon black shadows were to fall on this brilliance.

Not yet satisfied with the results of the 661 policy of Ukrainization - in 1929 only 36% of 665 the officials were Ukrainians, the rest Jews and Russians (61) - the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine decided at the end of December, 1929, to intensify the process of nationalization. Especially the working classes were to take an active part in Ukrainian cultural life; Ukrainian theaters were to put on regular performances in the industrial areas; there were to be "Ukrainization cells" formed in the factories, the high union posts and the leading positions in the cooperatives were to be held by Ukrainians, and adherence to the course of nationalization of the administrative system was to be supervised. In this manner the cities were to be Ukrainized. The Commissar of People's Education, Skrypnyk, the successor of Shumskyj, successfully sought both to disseminate Ukrainian literature

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60. Tisserand: *The Ukraine, Life of a People*, page 283.

61. Fedenko: *Lectures on the Question of Nationalities in the U.S.S.R.*, page 17.

665 and raise its standard and to do the same for the theater and films. He even intended to impede
661 the sale of newspapers and books written in Russian. When the first Five Year Plan was drawn up the Ukrainian Economic Council had its own demands to make to the state planning commission. It requested the establishment of industries which should make the Ukraine economically independent of the rest of Russia, as for example, textile factories, leather factories, paper mills and chemical plants.

665 The Pan-Russian Communists had repeatedly warned of such a development. Even in 1927 when Shumskyj was transferred to the north for disciplinary reasons, the Communist Party drew up a memorandum to the Executive Committee of the Comintern /116/ which, among other things, stated: "Before the Revolution we had almost no Ukrainian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia in the cities, now they are increasing every year, they multiply through influx from the villages, they strengthen their positions in the economy and the apparatus of government and endeavor to bring a certain proportion of Soviet officials, workers and Party members under their influence." (62) In this memorandum the great danger of nationalistic deviation within the KPU (Communist Party of Ukraine)was emphatically pointed out. "The Disquieting Signal" was the title of a review of Vaganian's book On National Culture, in the official organ of the Russian government [illegible] publication: The Reader and the Author. To Vaganian's warning of national cultures the government publishing firm adds the remark that there is danger in the fact that in recent times a number of Ukrainian authors have published works which the

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62. Zaliznyak: The Struggle Between the Ukraine and the Soviet Union, page 669 ff.

648 162 budget plans. If things went on in this way the social system of communism would face serious crises as a result of the flourishing peasant economy of the Ukraine - in the regions of Great Russia communal ownership of fields has prevailed since ancient times - and the Muscovite conception of national unity might be seriously threatened by the increasing power of "assembled peoples".

In order to avoid these dangers and also in view of other considerations, Stalin discontinued the New Economic Policy and introduced the period of the Five Year Plans. In spite of the decision of the Sixteenth Party Congress, the way to Russianization was opened, and Ukrainization discontinued; Ukrainian nationalism received a hard blow when free peasant farming was immediately liquidated. There have been untold victims of these revolutionary processes which were attended by violent upheavals from the time Stalin announced his principle of "socialism within one country".

"Socialism within one country" demanded
648 185 industrialization as the presupposition for the independence of the socialistic /118/ state. This industrialization had to take place throughout the realm and according to a unified plan. Every form of particularism could only be detrimental - the Ukrainian form doubly so; for in the Ukraine are the coal and metal and the water power reserves of the Dniepr from which horsepower by the millions can be obtained. Such considerations led to the First Five Year Plan, in the course of which Ukrainian economy, heavy industry, finance and particularly agriculture were subordinated to orders from Moscow. The division of private economy was "liquidated".

• 661 The new system* introduced the purging of the Pan-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in the year 1930, where members of the "League for the Liberation of the Ukraine" had entrenched themselves; they were now "unmasked". In a monster trial in

*[i.e., Beginning of the Five year Plans — Analyst]

Khar'kov, Ukrainian scholars were sentenced to many years' imprisonment and exile - shooting was not yet customary at that time. In 1931 a second national Ukrainian organization, the "National Center", was uncovered, to which members of the Communist Party also belonged. Two years later about 4000 persons were arrested, of whom it was said they belonged to the "organization of Ukrainian revolutionists". Everywhere the GPU - state political division - discovered dangerous Ukrainians. The Secretary of the Central Committee of the KPU, Kossior, stated in this connection at the conference of the active section of the Party in Khar'kov the end of 1932: "The nationalistic elements became particularly active in 1931 and 1932 when every day they penetrated new areas of socialistic development." (63) In the course of the denationlization of the Ukraine, the People's Commissar Skrypnyk was also obliged to resign. Stalin called to account this collaborator of Lenin, who had been Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet government, because of "nationalistic deviation". Thereupon Skrypnyk committed suicide. In his place the enemy of Ukraine Zatonskyj and the Jew Khait, undertook the task of disciplining and educating the Ukrainian people. /119/

In its desire utterly to exterminate Ukrainian nationalism, the Moscow regime spared no one, neither the peasants who defended themselves against the loss of their property, nor the scholars whose eyes saw beyond Karl Marx' horizon, nor such supernumerary mouths to feed as poets, are in a land of production. Soviet poets in general never had an easy time of it. Whether they wrote love poems and poems about spring, or

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63. The Ukraine and the Nationality Policy of Moscow, page 54.

whether they remained silent, both could be interpreted as "sabotage against socialistic progress". In this situation an author "steers his boat like an adroit sailor through the stormy waves of Stalin's Party policy and takes care only to save himself." (64) What could be interpreted as a crime against Party policy in these purging actions against Ukrainian nationalists is shown by the fate of Grigory Epyks. In his book The First Spring "the true nationalist unmasks" himself in the following words: "He became lost in thought as he pictured to himself Vassa's full bosom, her slender, straight legs that tapered down to her ankles in a gentle curve. Serge feasted his eyes on this picture and began to conjure it up distinctly in his imagination. Vassa's legs did not seem thin, neither were they heavy. Their firm curve began gently at the chiseled knee,descended gradually, swelling proportionately toward the calves, by no means puny, and terminating in the thin, seemingly chiseled ankles. For such legs heavy servitude was probably many a time imposed on the Ukraine by the people of the Orient, and eyes and a soft, deep voice such as Vassa Polubotko had doubtless gave the Ukraine the right to be proud of their daughters." "In this nationalistic admiration of a racy Ukrainian woman," the critics of Epyk stated, "within a theory of national biology, which is actually the theory of race, crass nationalism is revealed." Epyk saved himself from spending his life in a labor camp by writing an appealing letter to the /120/omnipotent Postyshev, from which the latter communicated the following: "By planning terroristic attempts at assassina-

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64. *The Ukraine and the Nationalities Policy of Moscow*, page 82.

661 tion we have for many successive years carried on actions, in comparison with which the deeds of a highway robber may be called a model of honesty and humanity. I understood that the sentence of the proletarian court must be the following: to deal with me as with a mad dog, to do away with me as with a sick horse, to remove me from the social organism. The Communist Party has magnanimously accepted my penitence. The Party has given me life and the joy of work." (65)

65. The Ukrainian Literature in the Service of its Nation, pages 47 and 48.

661 665 It was Postyshev whom Stalin sent into the Ukraine at the end of 1932 with a small army of GPU men and whom he ordered to destroy the "national counterrevolution", while Tsatonskyj and Khait were to discover, unmask and correct "national aberrations". After approximately a year's activity Postyshev reported his "successes" to the plenary meeting of the Party actives of the city of Khar'kov in November, 1933. According to this report, 27,400 of a total of 125,000 members of the KPU were expelled in 1933; 1000 nationalists were removed from the People's Commissariat for Public Education and its subordinate organizations in the province, nearly 2000 from the cooperatives and economic organizations, and approximately 300 professors and assistants from scientific institutions. 2500 Ukrainian nationalists were rounded up by Postyshev's agents in central positions of Soviet Ukraine in Khar'kov alone. Finally, 237 Party secretaries of th peripheral administrations, 249 chairman of the executive committees and 158 chairmen of the controlling commissions, as well as 1300 members of the Association of Communist Socialist Youth (Komsomol) were victims of this purge. (66) The

66. Report of Pstyshev at the Party meeting in Khar'kov in November 1933.

661 665 000 general secretary of the KPU, Kossier, was apparently justified in saying: "The fact that we have shattered nationalism, /Facing page 120/ /Ukrainian girl drawing water./*/Facing page 121/ /What a wealth of imagination and highly developed skill is disclosed in these pretty handmade national costumes!/*/121/ that we have organized our work properly in the country, this has determined our successes in the year 1933." (67)

67. Izvestiia" Number 19 and Number 20, 1934, in Nation und Staat, page 107.

000 Several years later these fierce foes of the Ukrainian people were themselves to be "unmasked". They were, for example, the friend of Postyshev, Ioina Iakir, at that time supreme commander of the Red Army in the Ukraine who had raged furiously against the nationalists at the Seventeenth Congress, and the People's Commissar Tsatonskyj who was shot in 1937 because of counterrevolutionary activities. Tastonskyj's successor, Khomenko, was relieved of his office on April 9, 1939.

642 From the time that Moscow once more obtained for itself, with bullet and bayonet, a separatist Ukraine, the freedom of the country has been constantly curtailed. When the period of "integral centralization" with the Five Year Plans, began the branch office of the Foreign Commissariat in Khar'kov was eliminated, the Ukrainians were removed from leading positions in economy and the government, and the individual commissariats and whatever important commanding positions there were, were little by little turned over to Moscow.

The democratic Constitution of November 1936 tops the skyscraper of integral centralism. Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution are merely a gesture, according to which "every Soviet republic exercises supreme power quite as a matter of course"

*[For plates, cf. pp. 221-222, Category 116 - Analyst]

15: Pap S-4, 5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 the cause of Leninism. Only a few weeks before Skrypnyk's death, Khvylovyj, long the subject of refined persecution by the Soviet authorities, had been driven to commit suicide (May, 1933). According to information provided by his close friends, Khvylovyj left a note saying "I am dying because I love life."

668 Acting upon Stalin's order to persecute Ukrainian "nationalism," Postishev stated, in a report to the plenary session of the Ukrainian
661 Communist Party, November 19, 1933, that the discovery of Skrypnyk's deviation[1] led to the purging from the Ukrainian Socialist culture of any adherence to Petliura's, Machno's and other national elements. He also declared that within a few months 27,000 members, out of a total membership of 125,000 were expelled from the party, along with 1,300 members of the Comsomol. Relieved of their posts were 240 secretaries of regional committees of the Communist Party, 250 heads of "Ispolkoms," 150 heads of controlling committees, about 1,000 officials of the Commissariat of Education, about 2,000 co-operative workers and 300 professors of various educational institutions beginning with the Ukrainian Academy of Science.[41]

Despite the increase of physical and moral terrorism, Moscow did not succeed in eliminating resistance to its rule in the Ukraine. Early in 1933 the Soviet Secret Police reported the existence of a new well-organized and disciplined underground organization, this time the "Ukrainian Military Organization," whose large membership included commanders of the Red Army, scientific workers and young intelligentsia. The aim of this group was similar to that of the ones previously uncovered, excepting that the Ukrainian Military Organization was preparing a military revolt against the existing order.

The Soviet difficulties in the Ukraine were again illustrated at the seventeenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party. In his report on the dangerous developments in Ukraine, Stalin stated:

> The fall of Skrypnyk and his group in the Ukraine is not exceptional. Similar 'dislocations' are observable among certain comrades in other national republics.[42]

Describing the spread of local nationalism and labeling it as far more perilous for the Soviet rule than Russian chauvinism, Stalin continued:

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[41] Sciborsky, *Ukraine and Russia, op. cit.*, p. 51.

[42] *XVII. Sjezd Wsesojuznoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B). January 26-February 10. 1934*. Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow. 1934), p. 30.

[1] [cf. category 116, pp. 220-223 — Analyst]

> Only very recently, in the Ukraine, the deviation towards Ukrainian nationalism did not represent the major danger; but when we ceased to fight it and enabled it to grow to the extent that it joined forces with the interventionists, this deviation became the major danger.[43]

The discussion of the national question was brought to a final halt at the seventeenth Congress and the Soviet Government decided to use police terror against the opposition.[44] Following this policy, new purges were instigated and every sign of dissatisfaction with the Bolshevik order was simply suppressed by Stalin's GPU.

The various stages of Soviet tactics in regard to the national policy—the recognition of the independent National Republics, the formation of the Soviet Republics, the amalgamation of the Soviet Republics into a single Union on the basis of a "free" federation, and the liquidation of the formal "Independence" of the Republics—practically places the Russian Communists in the role of promoters of the idea of a "single and indivisible Russia" despite the Bolsheviks' attempts to demonstrate the Soviet regime as an inter-nationalist one The Soviet leaders started from the point where the Tsarist and Provisional governments ended and gradually arrived at the stage of strict centralization and oppression—with only the provision that the Kremlin was no longer in a position to deny, at least theoretically, the existence of the Ukrainian nation and language. The Soviet Russian press, however, was given, as far back as 1936, a green light to recover from the archives of the past such names as Ivan Kalyta, Ivan the Terrible, Tsar Peter the Great, Katherina II and others.

The struggle against the Ukrainian "nationalists" was carried out until "all" independent elements, including many members of the Ukrainian Communist Party, were executed or silenced. Only after the employment of total terror could the Soviet regime officially "boast"

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[43] Stalin's report, *ibid.*, p. 32.

[44] Describing the tactics of the Ukrainian opposition, Postishev concluded: "The Ukrainian nationalists have an interesting system of distributing their units. Take for example the People's Commissariat of Education. Its director was Yavorsky; Yavorsky went, then came Ozersky; Ozersky went, then came Konyk; all of them proved to be members of the Ukrainian Military Organization, and its leaders at that. Or take the case of the one with the power of attorney in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. There you had Maximovich; Maximovich went, then came Petrenko; Petrenko went, then came Tur—again all members of the UWO (Ukrainian Military Organization), even of its directing clique. It was the same in all the places which they controlled. They maintained the principle of always substituting their own people. Once they got control of a responsible department, they would not let it out of their hands." Postishev's report, *ibid.*, p. 70.

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of the triumph and success of "brotherly" cooperation among various nations under the leadership of the great Russian people and the "wisest" Stalin. Nevertheless, these proclamations of co-operation were soon negated by existing facts. Again *Pravda* reported new anti-Soviet activity of the "enemies of the People" in the youth organization (Comsomol) in the Ukraine:

> There is uncovered again the unseemly sight of the work of counter-revolutionaries and spies within the Comsomol of the Ukraine. Masking themselves in a base fashion, they carry on disruptive counter-revolutionary work. They consciously fouled the cadres of the Comsomol and the propaganda apparatus and they ruined political education. They served the fascists, conducted spying activities and prepared sabotage and terroristic acts. . . . These enemies of the people placed their own men in executive posts. When these men fell at one post they were immediately transferred into another region.[45]

The resistance of the Ukrainians to Moscow's domination could not be denied. However, such statements had double meaning and were produced by the Soviet press in order to justify the policy of strict centralization and Russification in the Ukraine. Even such a loyal Moscow servant as Liubchenko, President of the Soviet Ukraine, was by now considered as a dangerous and undesirable individual since he was a Ukrainian and could hinder, as Skrypnyk did in the past, the realization of the Soviet Russian policy. For this reason he was compelled to commit suicide on September 11, 1937. In the familiar Bolshevik manner, the Soviet press informed the people that Liubchenko was involved in anti-Soviet connections and, "evidently" afraid to face his responsibility before the Ukrainian people for betraying their interests, had ended his life. Such an interpretation of Liubchenko's death—who in 1934 had praised the GPU for its successful work in "totally" destroying the "nationalist" groups within the Ukrainian Communist Party—gave the Soviet regime the "legal" right to replace most Ukrainians holding higher positions in the Soviet administration by Russians whom the Kremlin could trust. Nevertheless, passive resistance to the existing order was continually felt and could not be wiped out entirely.

186 In 1938 world tension and fear of World War II increased. Therefore, even the rise of national consciousness in the small Carp-

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[45] *Pravda*, July 25, 1937.

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ions and into the promotion of democracy within the Soviet Union.[48]

Numerous difficult problems, which Stalin was anxious to solve in accordance with his plans, forced the "Generalissimo" at the end of the War to follow a cautious policy toward the non-Russian peoples, liberated from the German occupation. First, he needed time for the stabilization of his power inside the Soviet Union. For example, in the Ukraine he had considerable difficulties with the well-organized Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which emerged in 1941 as the reaction against the German terror, and now was engaged in a struggle against the Soviet occupation forces.[49] In addition, there were millions of Soviet citizens in Western Europe, former German slave laborers and prisoners of war, whose return to the Soviet "homeland" was a matter of major importance to the Soviet regime. These people were living witnesses of the failure of the Communist experiments in their countries and could have given tremendous support to the free world in Stalin's planned cold war. Consequently, the Soviet Government was anxious to reach an agreement on the question of repatriation of all Soviet citizens from the Western countries. An agreement on this matter was concluded at the Yalta Conference and was announced by the White House on February 12, 1945. The anxiety of the Soviet Government was abated since the agreement did not provide for an individual choice between political asylum and repatriation but made the return obligatory upon all persons who were Soviet citizens as of September 1, 1939.[50]

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As soon as the Soviet Government achieved control over the territories occupied by the Red Army, Stalin revealed his true plans with regard to the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. He accused some nationalities of being unworthy of the "privileges" given them

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[48] The real meaning of the Soviet promises, alliances and retreats was clearly explained by Stalin in his article on "Strategy and Tactics," 1924. He wrote: "The revolutionary will accept a reform in order to use it as a means wherewith to link legal work with illegal work, in order to use it as a screen behind which his illegal activities in the revolutionary preparation of the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie may be intensified. This is what the revolutionary utilization of reforms and agreements in an imperialist environment means." J. V. Stalin, *Sotchineniya,* Vol. VI (Moscow, 1947), p. 166.

[49] According to various information from behind the iron curtain, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is still operating in small detachments especially in the Carpathian mountains.

[50] *Department of State Bulletin,* "Repatriation of U. S. and Soviet Citizens" (Washington, 1945), Vol. 14, p. 443.

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● 661 by the Soviet regime and, as a result, made them collectively responsible for the delayed defeat of the German Army. This condemnation brought about the liquidation of several Soviet nationalities such as the Chechen-Ingush, the Kalmyks, the Crimean Tartars and the Germans of the Volga.[51] With regard to the larger nationalities, like the Ukrainians, the Byelo-Russians, the Caucasians, who also proved to be unreliable during the crisis of 1941-43, Stalin had chosen the policy of total Russification, beginning with wholesale purges and persecutions, especially among the intelligentsia.[52]

661 814 The decision, however, of the Soviet Government to return to the old policy of Russification was met by strong opposition. Ukrainian history, for example, was based (up to 1934 and again during the Second World War) on Hrushevskyj's works. It was, therefore, inconvenient even for the Russian Bolsheviks who were assured of Stalin's support to suddenly reject this interpretation of history since it had previous official approval by the Communists. Facing this situation, Soviet Russian historians were compelled to invent evidence that Hrushevskyj was not a scientist-historian, but a "bourgeois nationalist" who deliberately falsified actual facts in order to prove the differences between the Russian and Ukrainian nations.

One of the striking illustrations of Soviet-Russian difficulties in dealing with Ukrainian history and literature was offered by Litvin in *Bolshevik* (official Party periodical, in an article entitled, "About the History of the Ukrainian People"). In this article, Litvin admitted that the presentation of Ukrainian history and literature had up to this time been based on serious errors and deviations from the Soviet principle. These errors were promoted by the "enemies of the people" who had not yet been liquidated by the Party. He uncovered these deviations and errors in practically all the Soviet-Ukrainian histories used in schools and universities over a period of twenty-five years, and accused most of the Soviet-Ukrainian historians of having

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[51] P. E. Mosely, "Soviet Policy and Nationality Conflicts in East Central Europe," *The Soviet Union, a Symposium*, W. Gurian, ed. (Notre Dame, 1951), p. 68.

[52] Stalin's decision to return to the Tsarist policy of Russification should be considered as a severe blow to all non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, especially if one recalls his statement of what such promotion of Russian chauvinism would mean: "Every attempt to deviate toward great Russian chauvinism is an endeavor to ignore national differences of language, culture and mode of life; an endeavor to prepare the way for the liquidation of the national republics and regions; an endeavor to undermine the principle of national equality." Stalin's report at the XVI. Sjezd Wsesojuznoii Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), (June 26-July 13, 1930) cf. *Sotchineniya*, Vol. XII (Moscow, 1949), p. 362.

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served the anti-Soviet cause. The most inexcusable "crime" of these Soviet-Ukrainian writers was their failure to show that Great Russian literature played a significant role in developing Ukrainian culture. Litvin declared:

> The uncovery of serious shortcomings and mistakes in various publications of the Academy of Science of Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic by the Central Committees of All-Union Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Ukraine, as well as in many publications of the other Ukrainian publishing houses proved that the known group of historians and litterateurs in Ukraine are not sufficiently armed with the Marxist-Leninist materialistic methods and remain in the prison of bourgeois nationalistic methodology of Hrushevskyj. . . . Bourgeois historian Hrushevskyj developed a fallacious anti-historical conception of the origin and development of the Ukrainian people, as if the Ukrainian people had no relationship with the Russian people, as if the entire historical development of both nations had not proceeded in a genuine friendship, unity and mutual influence, but in a constant antagonism.[53]

In order to discourage Soviet historians from referring in the future to the works of Hrushevskyj, Litvin emphasized that Hrushevskyj had been in constant touch with the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, which directed anti-Soviet uprisings in the territories of the Soviet Ukraine long after the establishment of the Soviet order. Finally, after giving advice on how to write an "acceptable" history of the Ukraine, Litvin concluded that the "Ukrainian" people must wait for scientific works from Soviet historians, who will be able to present concrete proof of the "brotherly" union between the Russian and Ukrainian people and their common loyalty to the Bolsheviks.

Simultaneously with Litvin's accusations, the co-workers of Soviet-Ukrainian journals, newspapers and propaganda were advised to adjust themselves to the new Party line by denouncing and purging the "remnants" of the Ukrainian National elements from Soviet-Ukrainian literature. They were further advised to praise the Soviet order as an achievement of the Great Russian people, who, therefore, must be recognized as the leaders of all nations on the road to Communism. 661

The climax of the anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian course was

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[53] Litvin, "About the History of the Ukrainian People," *Bolshevik*, No. 7 (Moscow, 1947), pp. 44-45.

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reached in the summer of 1951. On June 15, a ten-day festival, in which most of the Soviet-Ukrainian writers and poets participated, of Ukrainian art and literature was opened in Moscow. For some reason Stalin did not send his traditional greeting to the festival. But he attended the first performance of the opera, "Bohdan Khmelnitzkyj," the libretto of which was written by a well-known Soviet-Ukrainian writer, A. Korneichuk and his wife, Wanda Wasilevska. The following morning, the Soviet official newspaper, *Pravda,* condemned the libretto and accused its authors of "departure from historical truth."

On July 2, *Pravda* published an article which excited much attention in the Soviet Union and abroad. A war-time patriotic and popular poem by the Ukrainian poet, Wolodymyr Sosyura, entitled "Love the Ukraine" (written and repeatedly published in 1944 with the approval of the Soviet officials and reprinted in the Leningrad literary magazine, *Zvezda,* in May, 1951) gave *Pravda* an opportunity to unleash a blast at the ideological defections of Ukrainian writers and artists:

> . . . It is true, in his poem the poet calls for love of the Ukraine. The question arises: *Which* Ukraine is in question, of *which* Ukraine is Sosyura singing? Is he singing of that Ukraine which groaned for centuries under the exploiters' yoke and whose sorrow and bitterness poured out in Taras Shevchenko's angry lines? Or does Sosyura's poem refer to the new, prosperous Soviet Ukraine, created by the will of our people, led by the party of Bolsheviks? It is sufficient to examine Sosyura's poem to remove any doubt that, contrary to the true facts, he is singing of some primordial Ukraine, the Ukraine "in general." . . . Out of time, out of historical epoch—this is the Ukraine in the poet's portrayal.[54]

Following this attack, a series of meetings, at which serious ideological errors were found to exist, were initiated in July and August throughout the Ukraine. Having "proved" that the poem was "bourgeois-nationalistic," *Pravda* accused the editors of Russian journals which published the poem, the Ukrainian Press, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Ukraine of having failed to recognize and to combat the dangerous deviationist tendencies of Ukrainian writers.

In his open letter to the editors of *Pravda,* dated July 10, Sosyura abjectly recanted his "unfortunate" errors. In a weird way, possible only under the pressure of Bolshevik terror, Sosyura wrote that he profoundly grasped the fact that the Soviet Ukraine cannot be conceived as separate from the mighty growth of the Soviet multi-national state, and that the Ukraine, after all, owed its present happiness to the fraternal assistance of the great Russian people. "Thanks to the leadership of our Party and of the deeply beloved leader of our peoples, Comrade Stalin, has the Ukraine become what it is," concluded Sosyura.[55]

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[54] "Against Ideological Distortions in Literature," Editorial, *Pravda,* July 2, 1951, p. 2.

On July 13, *Pravda* published a decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in which it was admitted that the deficiencies and errors were a result of laxity of the Central Committee in directing ideological-educational work. The Communist Party of the Ukraine pledged itself to take as quickly as possible drastic measures to eliminate serious existing deficiencies and errors in ideological works. It would educate by every means "the intelligentsia and the whole Ukrainian people . . . in the spirit of devotion to the party of Lenin and Stalin."[56]

Many more articles appeared and continued to appear in the Soviet press and journals on the distortion of ideology in Ukrainian literature and arts. The real reason for these accusations were clearly described in *Pravda Ukrainy,* July 15, in an article by the Soviet Ukrainian literary critic, Leonid Novichenko. He wrote:

> (Sosyura) . . . represents the Ukraine as standing alone, without connection with the great Russian people and other peoples of the Soviet Union. . . . The author refuses to see that in the battle to free the Ukraine, the sons of all the peoples of the Soviet Union and, in the first instance, the sons of Great Russia, took part; about them, he rudely and insultingly keeps quiet. . . . Sosyura, while praising a certain "exclusiveness" of the Ukrainian language, considered it possible not even to mention the Russian language, which is to every Ukrainian as much a native language as is Ukrainian itself.

The search for the shortcomings and mistakes in Ukrainian culture was intensified. On July 22, *Pravda Ukrainy* finally discovered that in the Ukraine,

> Too few lectures are being given on the economic and cultural construction of our country, about the eternal friendship of the Russian

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[55] Sosyura's letter to the editors of Pravda, *Pravda,* July 10, 1941, p. 4.
[56] *Pravda,* July 13, 1951.

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● 661 and the Ukrainian peoples and about the struggle against the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

That the Soviet leaders were compelled to refer to bourgeois nationalism and cosmopolitanism as dangerous phenomena after thirty-one years of occupation of the Ukraine, is concrete proof of the Communist failure to destroy the will of its people to live in liberty. Under the pressure of "public" opinion aroused by *Pravda,* the sixth plenary session of the Board of the Union of Soviet Writers of Ukraine was summoned at Kiev on July 30-31. Writers and poets from all over the Ukraine foregathered to discuss the "crisis" of Ukrainian literature. At this session, Sosyura was allowed to read to the assembly his new poem, "Ukraine," especially prepared for this occasion in order to demonstrate how much benefit he had derived from *Pravda's* "just" criticism.

Simultaneously with the anti-Ukrainian campaign, the Soviet officials discovered "nationalist" deviations in Armenia, Azerbaidzan, Turkestan, Byelo-Russia, Estonia, and in the Uzbek and Kazakhs Soviet Republics. The total mobilization of all party workers for the struggle against the dangerous internal "enemies" of the Soviet Russian people was once again underway. As in the past, the accusations of deviationism from the Party line would result in wholesale persecutions and purges of thousands of individuals found "guilty" of this "crime" by the Soviet regime. Such tactics, however, have resulted only in the weakening of the Bolshevik regime since they have driven millions of people into a silent passive opposition hardly to be destroyed.

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000 Thus history speaks clearly and unmistakably: the Ukraine, with its vast rich soil shelters people whose past demonstrates their yearning not to expand or to rule others, but to be their own masters on their own territories. Their tireless and fearless effort to establish an independent state and to gain their freedom certainly deserves consideration in any plans with regard to Eastern Europe. Freedom is worth fighting for; and it is freedom and equality not for the select few nations, but freedom for all, that will solidify all the peoples who, with God's help, shall one day celebrate a victory over freedom's conqueror—Bolshevism.

orientation. Khvylovy considered that Ukrainian literature should go 665
its own way and look towards Western Europe, no matter whether 186
bourgeois or proletarian. Shumsky advocated that the Ukrainian Communist Party should be independent of the Russian Communist Party.

This crisis within the Ukrainian Communist Party* prompted the 661
Moscow Bolshevik leadership in 1926 to make one of Stalin's principal 665
assistants, L. M. Kaganovich, Ukrainian party secretary for a short 186
period during which the first great purge against the nationalist deviation was carried out. Khvylovy was ejected from the party and Shumsky expelled from the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R. When Khvylovy repented he was given another chance and re-admitted as a party member, but in 1933 he committed suicide after a new campaign against Ukrainian nationalism had been launched.

Admittedly the methods of repression in the Ukraine were comparatively liberal until 1929-30. From that time onwards the oppressive policy of the Soviet State overshadowed in the minds of the Ukrainian nationalists in the U.S.S.R. the contribution which Polish, Rumanian and Czech communists were ready to make for the establishment of a Greater Soviet Ukraine. Many Ukrainian nationalists became convinced
that national unity was less vital to the Ukrainians than cultural and [177]
political freedom, in particular that free intercourse with the West which
Moscow was unwilling to grant.

The Soviet State inflicted many heavy blows on the representatives 668
of the western orientation among the Ukrainians, but never vanquished 661
it entirely. In this struggle Ukrainian nationalism commanded an almost inexhaustible reservoir of resistance forces. Bloodshed and terror seemed incapable of stamping out the longing for spiritual freedom. Almost every year brought the discovery of a new conspiracy, a new series of trials, a new trend in national Ukrainian deviations. In 1929 the G.P.U. discovered the 'Spilka Vyzvolenia Ukrainy', the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine', in 1931 the 'Ukrainian National Centre', in 1933 the 'Ukrainian Military Organization' (UVO).

The offensive by the central Government against the Ukraine's trends [814]
towards a more independent existence was conducted not only in the political sphere but also in the field of culture, where the régime had originally granted some scope to Ukrainian nationalism. One of the main bulwarks of Ukrainian nationalism was the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The history section of the Academy had turned out to be so anti-Bolshevik that it had to be disbanded altogether while its head, Professor Hrushevsky, was exiled to Russia proper. This banishment of the 'great old man' of Ukrainian nationalism from his place of work showed better than anything else that the policy of reconciliation which Moscow had originally pursued in its relation towards Ukrainian nationalism had been but a short-term manœuvre.

*[Cf. category 665, p. 130 --Analyst]

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THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS

661 668 423 Political and cultural oppression of Ukrainian nationalism[1] was coordinated with a tough fight against the Ukrainian peasant masses opposing the policy of collectivization. Famine, total disorganization of the Ukrainian agriculture and the formation of armed peasant bands were characteristic features of this period. The central Government got the situation in hand by physically annihilating peasant resistance, by making partial concessions on the tempo of collectivization and by thoroughly purging, between 1930 and 1932, the staff of the Ukrainian Peoples' Commissariat for Agriculture of alleged Borotbist wreckers.

THE SKRYPNIK AFFAIR

661 186 665 The Ukrainian crisis in the early thirties culminated in the 'affair Skrypnik', which was the most important single event in Ukrainian history of that period.

After his unsuccessful fight in 1922 as an associate of Rakovsky[2] for a 'Confederation of Soviet Republics' and for the quasi-independence of the Ukraine, Skrypnik in his day-to-day work as Peoples Commissar for the Interior, Justice, and Education tried to save for the Ukraine what could be saved in the way of an autonomous status. One of his main preoccupations was to prevent as far as possible the foundation of all-Union institutions such as the All-Union Agricultural Academy; but he failed.

Skrypnik had been a Marxist since 1897, and a member of the Bolshevik Party since its foundation. After the Revolution he was not just a local Ukrainian figure but became a Vice-Premier in the central Government of the U.S.S.R. and member of the Comintern Executive Committee. Nobody could with any shadow of justification denounce Skrypnik as nationalist. Skrypnik, it is true, considered that the central Government should bring proletarian internationalism and justified national aspirations into harmony with each other. 'Our work', he used to say, 'should be organized in such a way as to give the working masses of each nation the possibility of developing its national consciousness as much as possible'.

This conception amounted from an orthodox Bolshevik standpoint to the 'triumph of nationalism over the proletarian revolution' and was bound to get Skrypnik into trouble sooner or later. The men whom Stalin commissioned to liquidate the 'Skrypnik affair' were a Pole, Stanislav Kosior, and a Russian, Pavel Postyshev, first and second secretary respectively of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The final clash occurred on June 10th, 1933, in Kharkov, when Postyshev and Kosior, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, accused Skrypnik of being an enemy of the State and the actual head of the Ukrainian counter-revolution. At

[1] [Cf. cat. 186, p.p. 130-131 -- Analyst]
[2] [Cf. cat. 642, p128 -- Analyst 1932]

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that meeting the Ukrainian Communist Party decided that Great Rus- 661 ●
sian chauvinism had ceased to be the main danger in the Ukraine and
that Ukraine nationalism had become enemy number one. The decision 186
constituted an important landmark in the history of the Soviet Ukraine 665
and the prelude to a purge on a tremendous scale.

Skrypnik drew his conclusions from the 'new situation' by committing suicide less than four weeks after the decisive meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Executive Committee. Skrypnik's disappearance, whilst affecting the situation in the Ukraine in general, was particularly important in the field of Ukrainian cultural policy. After Skrypnik's death Postyshev and Kosior stopped the 'Ukrainization of the Ukraine', a favourite slogan of Ukrainian communists up to 1933, and
started a determined campaign against 'over-Ukrainization'. 'Fight [563]
against over-Ukrainization' was in reality nothing else than the recapture by the Great Russians of some of the positions which had been lost to the Ukrainians, particularly in the Donets Basin. There is no doubt that the Ukrainization had been overdone and had actually led to the imposition of the Ukrainian language on non-Ukrainians, particularly in the schools.

THE 'GREAT PURGE'

In 1934 and 1935 the party leadership discovered a big terrorist organiza- 661
tion of Borotbists in Kiev and Kharkov, as well as an alleged 'Nation- 665
alist-Trotskyite Bloc'.[6] In 1936 the situation seemed to be more stable 668
in the Ukraine, but 1937 was again a disastrous year for that country. Official Soviet statements claimed that in 1937 Ukrainian nationalism had made particularly extensive efforts to detach the Ukrainian S.S.R. from Russia by plotting with German and Polish fascists. Some of the plots and conspiracies uncovered had nothing to do with Ukrainian nationalism and were simply Ukrainian off-shoots of anti-Stalin currents within the All-Union Communist Party. It is true, however, that the Ukraine suffered much more during the big purge of 1937–38 than any other Soviet Republic. Moreover, the purge went on in the Ukraine after it had been ended on the whole in other parts of the Soviet Union.

The new chain of dramatic incidents started in the Ukraine in the summer of 1937, when the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Panas Petrovich Lyubchenko, committed suicide in anticipation of his arrest, trial and execution. Lyubchenko had been Prime Minister for three years during which he had made himself conspicuous by his passionate speeches denouncing Hitler's plans of aggression. Lyubchenko was a former Borotbist and thus suspect to the Kremlin. He was charged with having formed a secret Ukrainian fascist party and allying it to the 'right-wing Trotskyite centre'.[7] Lyubchenko's successor, Bondarenko, was arrested

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after two months of office for alleged treasonable contacts with Ukrain-
661 ian separatists. After Bondarenko, Vlas Y. Chubar, a Vice-Premier in
665 the Central Government, became Ukrainian Premier. He was purged
668 in the spring of 1938. Together with the three Prime Ministers,
Lyubchenko, Bondarenko and Chubar, a large number of Ukrainian ministers, high officials and party dignitaries were removed from their posts including the party secretaries, Kosior and Postyshev, once so powerful. The purge of the Ukrainian Communist Party was so thorough that of the thirteen members forming the Ukrainian Politbureau in April 1937 not one was left by June 1938. One of the last prominent Ukrainian communists to disappear was Grigory Ivanovich Petrovsky, the President of the Ukrainian S.S.R. There is no evidence of Petrovsky, Kosior or Chubar ever having been sentenced by a court. No public trial of a Ukrainian communist leader seems to have taken place after March 1938 when Grigory Fyodorovich Grinko, Finance Minister of the U.S.S.R. was sentenced to death as a 'Ukrainian nationalist' and 'Polish spy'.

To clear up the situation in the Ukraine, Stalin, early in 1938, appointed two new men to the key positions of that republic. The party secretary of Moscow, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchov became first party secretary of the Ukraine and M. A. Burmistenko second secretary. From the point of view of the Kremlin, Burmistenko's appointment was a mistake. He mysteriously vanished during the Nazi invasion of the Ukraine and may even have deserted to the enemy. Khrushchov, on the other hand, was the right man for the job. When taking it over he made a statement extremely characteristic of the entire communist Ukraine policy. He declared that the traitors to party and country would be annihilated to the last man just as Taras Bulba had killed the betrayer of his own people.

[539] The Cossack Ataman, Taras Bulba, the hero of Gogol's famous novel, slew his son, Andriy, who fell in love with a beautiful Polish girl, betrayed his homeland, his Orthodox faith and fought against his own people. Seen through modern eyes, Andriy is but a symbol of Polish, Western and Catholic orientation among the Ukrainians.

Yet Taras Bulba had still another son, Ostap, who represents the daring loyal Cossack fighter bravely enduring all tortures by the Poles who put him to death. The death of Ostap is the prelude to the triumph of Ostap's cause: 120,000 Cossacks appear on the horizon of the Ukraine, a victorious army sweeping away the enemies, the Poles. Taras died in this great struggle but before his death he pronounced a last curse upon the Poles and forecast the final triumph of the 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian Czar'. 'The time will come', said Taras, 'when there will be no power in the world which will not be conquered by him'.

THE UKRAINE

Stalin and his collaborators see the essence of the Ukrainian problem S.U.
in the same way as Gogol[1] did by considering it basically as a 635
struggle of Taras against Andriy, the Russian conception of the 186
Ukraine against the Western conception. Krushchov was right in evoking UK
the parallel of Taras Bulba because under the Soviet régime Taras, 661 ●
the faithful watchman in the South of the 'Russian faith' and the 668
'Russian Czar', once again killed Andriy when he became attracted by 665
the West and ready to desert both faith and 'Czar'.

Krushchov as party secretary went on to kill 'Andriys'. His first victims were leaders of the Ukrainian Communist Youth League who were removed from their posts in December 1938, having been apparently overlooked in previous purges. Khrushchov rarely killed in the physical sense; he rather weeded out all influences and tendencies not in conformity with the narrow views which a Soviet Taras Bulba may have on history, literature, education, etc.

COMINTERN AND 'WESTERN UKRAINE'

In all its internal fights against Ukrainian nationalism the Soviet régime S.U.
never forgot the 'other Ukraine' beyond the frontiers of the Soviet 648
Union. A geopolitical gesture in the summer of 1934 was especially 563
intended for the attention of this 'other Ukraine'. It was the removal of the Ukrainian capital from Kharkov to Kiev, which was equivalent to the transportation of the centre of gravity of the country from the Eastern Ukraine to the Western Ukrainian areas near the Polish border.

Kharkov had been made the capital of the Soviet Ukraine in December S.U.
1919, in an attempt to link the administrative centre of the country [361]
as far as possible with the labouring masses of the Donets Basin; but Kiev was the historic capital and Ukrainian nationalists, therefore, liked to play up Kiev against Kharkov. This too was checked by the transfer of the capital. An official Soviet commentator said that the removal of the Ukrainian Government to Kiev, which was celebrated with music and dancing, had an 'extraordinary significance' both for the Ukraine and internationally, and that it was a more important event than the transfer of Russia's capital from Petrograd to Moscow after the October Revolution.[8]

This latter remark was true in so far as the shifting of the capital S.U.
constituted a prelude to the annexation by the U.S.S.R. of the Ukrainian [728]
territories of Poland.[2] This annexation carried out in 1939, it should [635]
be well noted, was by no means a triumph of political strategy but was due to the use of force alone. The failure to win over the population of the Western Ukraine by peaceful means was probably the greatest defeat which the Soviet nationalities policy had suffered on Russia's frontiers.

1 [Cf. category 116, p134, R1 Sov Union, Analyst]
2 [Cf. category 116, pp 136 ff -- Analyst]

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themselves so long without assistance from a part of the Soviet Ukrain- 000
ian peasantry.

While the armed struggle of Ukrainian nationalists was confined to 186
a small fringe along the Ukrainian border, the Soviet Government had 814
to face more subtle forms of opposition throughout the Soviet Ukraine. 661
One of the outstanding features of the post-war development in the Ukraine was that the same cultural institutions which in the purges of the thirties had been compelled to change their nationalistic Ukrainian personnel from top to bottom, were again involved in difficulties with the Soviet authorities.

This was particularly true of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and especially of its Institute for Language and Literature and its Institute for History. The former produced in 1945 an *Essay on the History of Ukrainian Literature*, whose authors stressed the dependence of Ukrainian literature on the West and 'concealed that Russian and Ukrainian literatures exercised a mutual fertilizing influence on each other in the course of centuries'.[19]

Even more serious 'nationalist excesses' were committed in the field of history writing. It seems that practically all major historical works which the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences published in 1941–5 contained 'serious mistakes of a nationalistic character'. For several years the party and state authorities did not pay much attention to the works of Ukrainian academicians; but after 1946–7 the leading party organs restarted to analyse Ukrainian historical writings and pointed out that Ukrainian historians had never, in fact, succeeded in overcoming the influence of the nationalistic-bourgeois school of Professor Hrushevsky.[20]

In the light of official Soviet admissions the ideological consolidation of the Ukraine seemed not to have advanced by a single inch since the days when Hrushevsky was still the teacher of the historians and Khvylovy,* the authority for those dealing with problems of Ukrainian literature. Twenty years after Khvylovy's first expulsion from the Communist Party, and fifteen years after his suicide, orthodox Ukrainian Bolsheviks were still haunted by the fear of 'Khvylovy-ist ideas' and were active in opposing them.

The first step in the purge of Ukrainian literature in the post-war 186
period was the replacement of the editorial boards of the three leading 661
Ukrainian literary journals *Vitchizna* (Fatherland), *Dnipro* (Dnieper) 538
and *Radyansky Lviv* (Soviet Lvov). All three journals had been accused of systematically printing nationalist novels and articles. As the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers was obviously responsible for ideological offences committed in literary journals published on Ukrainian territory, the purge had to be extended to this organization as well. The leading personalities of the writers' union, including its president,

*[Cf. cat. 116, pp. 30-31, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1.Soviet Union
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186 Maxim Rilsky*, were dismissed in November 1946. Rilsky, one of the
661 most outstanding poets of the Soviet Ukraine, was charged with being a
538 'prisoner of bourgeois nationalism'. He had not only 'sinned' in his works but he had also delivered a particularly objectionable lecture, 'Kiev in the history of the Ukraine', in which he 'idealized the old patriarchal order and depicted in rosy idyllic colours the conditions under the rule of landowners and bourgeois'. Together with Rilsky a whole group of Ukrainian writers was accused of nationalism, 'Khvylovy-ism' and reactionary tendencies, including I. Senchenko, Y. Yanovsky and P. Panch.[21]

Maxim Rilsky was replaced as president of the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers by A. Y. Korneichuk, author of a large number of political plays, who had always accurately interpreted the party line and had earned nothing but praise from the supreme Soviet leadership. It was Korneichuk's task to lead Ukrainian literature on the road of strict Soviet Patriotism and 'Socialist Realism'. Indeed, Ukrainian writers, publishing houses and literary journals became more careful and it appeared during a certain period as if Korneichuk had really succeeded in his assignment. The 'Festival of Ukrainian Art and Literature' held in Moscow in June 1951 showed, however, that this was a deception. The festival gave the members of the Bolshevik Politbureau an opportunity of getting a closer look at Ukrainian cultural life. They found that Ukrainian authors and artists had still not overcome their ideological mistakes. Even Korneichuk himself who was expected to give a good example to his fellow-writers had committed a serious offence. He had written a libretto for the opera 'Bogdan Khmelnitsky', which, from the official point of view, was not sufficiently anti-Polish and not eloquent
[626] enough in its pro-Russian bias. Through its mouthpiece, *Pravda*, the Politbureau not only denounced Korneichuk and other writers for ideological distortions but also reprimanded the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party for having neglected the political education of the Ukrainian intellectual élite. The Ukrainian Central Committee, mindful of what had happened to the Ukrainian Communist leaders in the thirties, immediately pledged itself to remedy the situation.[23]

THE UKRAINE AS A FACTOR IN SOVIET 'WORLD POLITICS'

648 After having fulfilled its original mission of bringing all Ukrainian lands
645 into the fold of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Ukraine was given a new task.

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* Rilsky, like most great poets of the Soviet Ukraine, has a 'nationalistic past'. In 1934 he and another poet laureate of the Ukraine, Pavel Tychina, were rebuked for their 'hesitation' in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to them. Yet another contemporary Ukrainian poet, Mikola Bazhan, who is not only like Tychina a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet but also a Vice-Premier of the Ukrainian Government, used to be likewise blamed for the 'nationalistic soil in which his creations have been rooted'.[22]